

The Month in Review



LAST MONTH saw the culmination in the Satellite orbit of a series of developments that had been gathering force in the post-Stalin period. The latest tactics, propounded and ordained at the Twentieth Soviet Congress, entailed a number of dramatic "re-appraisals," including that of the personality and rule of the late Soviet dictator himself. By now all of the regimes have extended such concepts as "collective leadership" and the denial of the "cult of the individual" to a denigration of Stalin, although there are still major differences in the intensity, scope and tone of this campaign. Poland is strikingly the most outspoken; Romania and Albania are the most reserved.

The rapprochement with Tito, begun shortly after the Soviet dictator's death with resummptions of diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations, has now entered a new phase of "adjustments" in the ideological field. The Cominform, an international organization of Communist Parties long dedicated almost exclusively to the destruction of the Titoist heresy, has now been dissolved. Major anti-Titoist political show trials—that of Rajk in Hungary and Kostov in Bulgaria—have been reassessed; the charges were declared false, the accused were all "rehabilitated," and the victims still living released from prison.

In Bulgaria, the anti-Stalin and pro-Tito campaigns were combined in the removal and demotion of Premier Chervenkov from his top government post. The long-time Party boss, who was a "Muscovite" and erstwhile ardent foe of Tito, was replaced by Anton Yugov, a former guerrilla leader and "national" Communist. This change, hailed by the regime press as the most significant reorganization since 1944, was pointedly carried out by the Bulgarian parliament in the presence of a high-level Yugoslav parliamentary delegation.

The policy of "re-activating" internal political "fronts," begun in the post-Stalin era in some orbit countries—notably Hungary and Bulgaria—has lately been given new impetus and seems to be coupled with the Soviet Congress' call for common action between Communist and democratic left and center parties throughout the world. Many former opposition leaders in the Satellites have been released from prison, in some instances officially, complete with "rehabilitation" (as in the case of some Social Democrats in Hungary), in other instances unofficially.

Ever more frequently, particularly in Poland and Czechoslovakia, appeals are being made for the good will and cooperation of non-Communists. In Poland this has involved a reevaluation of the role played by the London-directed A.K. partisan army, many of whose members were ruthlessly exterminated by the Communists. The survivors, long discriminated against, are now being belatedly extolled for their anti-Nazi resistance. In both Poland and Czechoslovakia, it has also been admitted that anti-Semitism was used as a State and Party policy under Stalin. The Jewish newspaper *Folks-Sztyme* in Poland admitted the liquidation of Jewish artists in the postwar years, and the Czechoslovak regime denounced the policy of anti-Semitism manifested in the 1952 Slansky trial.

These revisions in ideology and policy were clearly aimed at achieving a number of specific and long-evident goals, including "friendship" with Tito, an end to the isolation of the Parties from the people in the captive countries, the return of political exiles, the revival of Popular Fronts and the destruction of Western defense alliances. The revisions are not a repudiation of either Stalinist economic policies (forced industrialization and collectivization) or of many of the political methods used by Stalin to attain his goals. In fact, in the very reversal of some of Stalin's deeds, the Communists have not hesitated to use Stalin's own tactics. In Hungary, for instance, in clearing the accused in the Rajk trial, the regime ascribed the "error" to the perfidy of the long-imprisoned former police chief Gabor Peter. In actual fact, Rakosi, the present regime leader, originally took full credit for the trial and its verdict. Cynical inconsistency was also evident in the failure to clear some of the defendants in the Slansky trial, all of whom had been linked directly or indirectly with the now-cleared defendants of the Rajk and Kostov trials.

Finally, in the midst of what the Soviets have pictured to the world as a sudden revulsion against Stalinist terrorism, some of the most brutal aspects of so-called "Socialist legality" have been preserved. Thousands of persons—religious and political leaders, and ordinary citizens—innocent of the crimes imputed to them, are still in prison. Furthermore, the Communists have lately emphatically reasserted that the Party's claim to power in the captive countries cannot be questioned.

There is also a striking contrast between the aforementioned departures from politically inconvenient Stalinist policies and the present implementation of one of the most hated aspects of Stalin's program—forced collectivization. After two years of comparative stagnation in the growth of collectives throughout the area, there has been a sharp increase in the number of collective farms, collective membership and land incorporated into the collectivized sector. If the present rate of growth is sustained for the remainder of the year, the destruction of private farming in the orbit will at least equal that wrought by Stalin in the last, and most repressive years of his rule.

While the Communists are continuing their policy of collectivization and heavy industrialization, they are trying, wherever possible, to give workers better incentives to fulfill planned goals. The Warsaw government recently took steps to ensure a minimum basic monthly wage of 500 *zloty*, to improve pensions and "regulate" the wage system. The Prague regime announced new price cuts for consumer goods and plans for a gradual revision of wages. These adjustments and increases, however, are minimal, and further substantial wage increases in the Soviet orbit will depend largely on productivity rises and cuts in production costs.

In Poland, the widespread campaign for "Socialist legality" and against the previous admitted brutalities of the Security services has resulted in the firing of four high officials. These are: Stanislaw Radkiewicz, Minister of State Farms, previously removed as Public Security Minister in December 1954; Henryk Swiatkowski, Minister of Justice; Stefan Kalinowski, Prosecutor-General; Stanislaw Zarako-Zarakowski, Chief Military Prosecutor. In addition, Minister of Culture Wlodzimierz Sokorski was released in line with the current attack on the stifling of art in dogmatic rigidities. As we go to press, a new Polish amnesty is about to be promulgated, largely for political offenders, which, according to Radio Warsaw, April 22, will affect some 70,000 prisoners and release about 30,000.

Amnesties and Releases

The article includes a survey of one of the most striking features of post-Stalin Communism, the release and rehabilitation of men purged as political "criminals," culminating in official reinterpretations of most of the major political trials of the past.

A CONSIDERABLE number of persons in Soviet Satellite Europe have been released from prison since the death of Stalin. Some of these benefited from amnesties to both political and non-political prisoners, while others owed their freedom to a belated "revision" of some of the major trials of the last decade. In some instances the releases were effected with fanfare and the usual trappings of Communist political stage-setting; in other cases the releases were unofficial and unconfirmed. In many instances the reprieved included both persecuted anti-Communist democratic leaders and the very Communist persecutors who had originally sent them to prison. In every case the releases were a function not of justice but of political expedience.

It appears that the object of most, if not all, of the releases is to further the "Popular Front" tactics enunciated at the recent Soviet Congress and to effect closer rapprochement with Tito's Yugoslavia. Many of the prominent persons involved are therefore either leaders of former democratic (mostly Agrarian or Socialist) anti-Communist parties, who were purged after the Communists had cemented their power in Central and Eastern Europe in the years 1944-47, or Communists who, in the following years, were accused of having engaged in "nationalist" or "Titoist" activities. In the former case, the majority of the releases have been effected quietly, particularly if the persons involved refused to recognize their alleged guilt. Only when their names



Wladyslaw Gomulka, former Secretary General of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party, was purged for "rightist deviation" in 1951. After many months of reports that he was out of prison, his release has been officially announced.

could be used on repatriation commissions or various so-called "Fronts" were the releases given publicity. In no instance did the Party acknowledge that these democratic leaders were legally and morally justified in their resistance to the establishment of a dictatorship by a minority Communist Party. In the case of "Titoists," on the other hand, a series of dramatic "rehabilitations" took place; former top Party leaders such as Rajk in Hungary and Kostov in Bulgaria were cleared of the charges levelled against them. So in part was Slansky. The leaders themselves are of course dead, summarily executed hours after their "trials" and "confessions." Co-defendants still alive are now reaping the benefits of these "revisions."

The "rehabilitations" are in no way to be interpreted as an adherence to the rule of law as it is known in the West: the present "explanations" are as cynical and as removed from the truth as were almost all of the original charges. In Hungary, for instance, the culprit in the Rajk case is said to be the local Beria, Gabor Peter; in fact, however, the Hun-

garian "Stalin," Rakosi, took full credit for the "unmasking" of the "traitors" at the time of their trial and personally supervised the proceedings. In Czechoslovakia, while the anti-Semitism of the Slansky trial is now repudiated—a maneuver designed to appeal to intellectuals and liberals throughout the world—"Zionism" (another issue at the trial) is still pictured as a worldwide conspiracy, obviously to further the Soviet campaign for influence over the Arab nations. The cardinal point to note is that, in each case, the rehabilitations conform not to objective criteria of truth and justice, but to present regime aims.

The Gomulka affair is a case in point. This former Polish Party leader is now free after many years in prison. He is free, presumably because announcement of his release was deemed helpful to the regime in its endeavor to effect a "thaw" or relaxation in national affairs. But Gomulka, far from having been rehabilitated, has been denounced once more, and on the most spurious grounds. The regime accuses him of having advocated a "reformist" moderation in collectivization and industrialization; and that is indeed true. But all Polish Party leaders made similar promises when, through trickery and coercion, and the backing of the Red Army, they marched to power at the end of World War II. Truth in the Gomulka affair would demand discussion of such basic matters as the real meaning of so-called Party "democracy" and the real relationship between the Satellites and the USSR. Such a reappraisal is of course out of the question.

It must further be noted that the releases of non-Communists come some ten years after the Party's assumption of power in Central and Eastern Europe. The majority of the democratic leaders now freed are old, broken men, without party, without hope of political power as long as the Communist stranglehold on their countries is maintained. The regimes can allow these men to finish their days in comparative freedom: politically, they are long dead. In some instances, even now the Communists could not afford to release recalcitrant prisoners, men who, like the Romanian Social Democrats recently sent to Soviet prisons, refused to cooperate with the Party or to barter freedom for silence.

Another reason for the present Communist "magnanimity" is that the greatest and most courageous non-Communist leaders were either executed long ago or died in prison. Everywhere in the Satellite orbit, with the relative exception of Czechoslovakia, the Communist Parties at the end of World War II derived their strength not through the size of their membership or the popularity of their program, but through the presence of the Red Army. After many years of dictatorships and repression, the peoples of Eastern Europe hoped after the war for the dawn of a new, democratic era; in all these countries the end of the war saw the emergence of liberal, peasant, or worker parties headed by men who had valiantly opposed tyranny under various dictatorships—royal, Nazi, or Fascist. As a matter of principle the Communists deliberately and systematically set out to destroy these leaders and their parties, in many cases using their former Nazi or Fascist tormentors to carry out the liquidation. What is now happening, therefore, is a show of "democratic legality" on the grave of infant East European democracy.

Bulgaria

THE BULGARIAN Communist regime has never officially announced an amnesty; it is the only Satellite government not to have done so.* However, it is certain that Bulgaria participated in the general post-Stalin reduction of prison and labor camp population, and Bulgaria has, in recent months, resuscitated previously purged prominent political persons on a larger scale than most of the countries in the orbit.

As early as September 1953, Premier Vulko Chervenkov announced that "the government has decided to close ten out of nineteen prisons because they are unnecessary," (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], September 9, 1953.) No information is available on numbers or on proportions of political and common criminals involved.

Softening of regime attitude towards political prisoners was one of the subjects raised by Chervenkov at the Sixth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party in the Spring of 1954. He stated that:

"Persons formerly in opposition, a number of whom were in prison and are now free . . . may join the ranks so that they too can apply their efforts to building the new Bulgaria. . . . The people's regime, however, will pardon no one the repetition of former crimes. . . . Everyone who in one way or another has not belonged to progressive movements or has been a member of the various associations and organizations under the influence of the bourgeois State. . . . should not be [automatically] qualified as an enemy." (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, February 26, 1954)

The Agrarians

Most important politically of those released from Communist prisons has been the group of Agrarian Party leaders. These, together with all influential non-Communist politicians, had been imprisoned after the liquidation of Nikola Petkov's opposition within the Fatherland Front in 1947. Then, beginning slowly in November 1954 and increasing in frequency through 1955, came announcements of the release of various Agrarian leaders with, in each case, an accompanying declaration of new-found loyalty to the regime. By January 1956 there had been forty-six such announcements and declarations.

One of the first of the Agrarians to return to the sun was Asen Pavlov. Minister of Agriculture from September 1944 to July 1945, he had belonged to the left wing—*Pladne*—of the Agrarian Union and had been imprisoned in 1948. On November 13, 1954, Radio Sofia announced the receipt of "a letter from Asen Pavlov, one of the leaders of the former opposition headed by Dr. G. M. Dimitrov and Petkov. Pavlov replies to a number of questions put to him after he was released and asks that his letter be published in the press." The letter began by attacking G. M. Dimitrov (who is now in exile in the US and heads the Bulgarian National Committee) as an agent sent back into Bulgaria by the British and Americans after the war "in order to disorganize the anti-fascist Fatherland Front and the regime headed by the Bulgarian Communist Party, to break the

* See p. 50 for the latest development in external amnesties.

worker-peasant unity of the CPB and of the Bulgarian People's Agrarian Union, and to create a strong opposition among all opposition circles—the reactionary bourgeois and royalist officers—so that they might combat the leading role of the CPB and the influence of the USSR . . . and so that a government applying an Anglo-American imperialist policy in Bulgaria might be imposed.” After Dimitrov was “unmasked” and left Bulgaria “with the help of the Americans,” the letter continued, the Agrarian Union “maintained close collaboration with American-British representatives in Bulgaria,” and engaged in “hostile activity” both “in a concealed manner while participating in the government and openly by going into opposition.”

After this thorough repudiation of his political past, Pavlov went on to praise Communist accomplishments in Bulgaria:

“Events have shown that the political activities of the opposition were mistaken and harmful; they have shown how correct was the policy followed by the Fatherland Front. The radical reorganization and numerous constructive initiatives have demonstrated the strength and potentialities of the people's regime in which the Bulgarian People's Agrarian Union, led by the Bulgarian Communist Party participates. . . . The present leaders of the Bulgarian People's Agrarian Union, basing themselves upon the progressive political line of Stambolisky* and in accordance with the progressive development of society, have in certain respects reorganized the . . . Agrarian Union. . . . The Bulgarian Communist Party considers the . . . Agrarian Union to be a brotherly organization with which it pursues identical aims and tasks. . . . As a result of this revision of our values I and my other comrades saw clearly the correct path to be followed in the development of our social and political life. . . . I and other comrades have become clearly aware of the great negative consequences resulting from our attitude in the opposition; we saw how much effort, how many resources would have been saved if we had not acted as we did. . . . Only a strong people's leadership such as that of the Fatherland Front, solidly based upon the people and defending their interests can act in a magnanimous spirit toward those, myself included, who have become conscious of their wrongdoing and have corrected their attitude by providing them with the possibility of falling once more into step with the people and of associating their efforts in the defense of their interests for the well-being of the nation.”

The letter concluded with an appeal to all former members of the Agrarian Union to “correct their attitude and to adopt a positive and active attitude towards the policy and activities of the Fatherland Front, led by the CPB, for strengthening peace, democracy and Socialism and for the progress and prosperity of the people and of Bulgaria.”

The tone and content of Pavlov's declaration have been

* Alexander Stambolisky (1879-1924) was founder and longtime leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union, and a prominent figure in Balkan politics. In 1919 he led the opposition against King Ferdinand, and after the latter's abdication in favor of his son Boris, Stambolisky became Premier. His Agrarian Government completely dominated Bulgaria from 1920 to 1923. It was overthrown by a military coup in June 1923, and Stambolisky was killed.

Dimiter Gichev



Gichev is the only important Bulgarian Agrarian Union leader who has not recanted and been released from prison. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in March 1948.

echoed time and again by the other former Agrarian leaders who have since emerged from prison. Following are the most important of these:

¶ Vergil Dimov, a leader of the right wing of the Agrarian Union, *Vrabcha 1*, Interior Minister in the seven-day Coalition Government of September 1944. Together with two other *Vrabcha 1* leaders, Dimiter Gichev and Konstantin Muraviev, he refused to join the Communist-dominated Fatherland Front, and in September 1944 was sentenced to life imprisonment. His release declaration was published on December 10, 1954. (“We must admit . . . that the present Bulgarian government defends in a most patriotic manner the interests of the State and the national independence of the Bulgarian people.”)

¶ Stoyan Kurlov, former Agrarian Union organizational Secretary, Deputy President of the Agrarian Parliamentary group, mayor of Vratza, member of *Vrabcha 1*. Release declaration, March 1, 1955.

¶ Kamen Kamenov, prominent *Vrabcha 1* member, former Secretary of the Agrarian Youth Union. Release declaration, April 23, 1955.

¶ Boris Bumbarov, *Pladne* member, Minister of Public Works in the first years of the Fatherland Front, sentenced in 1948. Release declaration, January 3, 1956. (“In con-

clusion, Bumbarov appeals to all his comrades, former opposition members, to return to the people, to take their places boldly in the ranks of the Fatherland Front and labor for unity between peasants and workers, for the welfare of all, for peace, democracy and Socialism, and for the flourishing of the motherland.")

¶ Nedelko Atanasov, center faction, former Minister of Telephones, Telegraph and Post, former National Assembly Deputy President. Participated in Fatherland Front before going into opposition. Release declaration, January 18, 1956.

The most important of all Agrarian Union leaders was Dimiter Gichev. From him there has been no word; he is presumably still alive, still in prison.

A variety of reasons may be adduced for the actions of the Agrarian leaders and the regime in this parade of recantations. As to the Agrarians, there is no need to stress the persuasive effects of eight years in Communist prisons. Nothing as unsubtle as physical force need necessarily be involved in all cases. The sense of desolation for these political men in being cut off from their country's political life must have been strong; any hopes they had once entertained of Soviet postwar withdrawal or dramatic Western advance must have grown tenuous. Further, it is not impossible that they now seriously believe that they might have some effect within the Fatherland Front.

For the regime, the releases offer many advantages. Bulgaria is very largely a nation of peasants whose attitude toward the Communist regime is, at best, apathetic. The country is badly in need of an increase in agricultural production; it is quite possible that the released Agrarians may help to obtain greater peasant cooperation.

In addition, the policy of the Agrarian Union has always been one of close friendship with Yugoslavia. The adherence of the heirs of this policy to the Communist regime may well have been meant to placate Tito; the Communist rulers of Bulgaria produced, in the Traicho Kostov* trial and elsewhere, some of the most rabid and vicious anti-Tito propaganda of the Yugoslav-Soviet break, and doubtless feel (or have been made by Moscow to feel) the need for placation.

The revision of the Kostov trial was announced on April 14 (pp. 50-51). It was stated that "all innocent persons detained in connection with these trials will be freed." Of the eleven defendants in the Kostov trial, only Kostov himself was executed; the other ten are presumably released. These include former Central Committee member and Finance Minister Ivan Stefanov, former head of the Bul-

* Traicho Kostov was born in 1897, became active in the Bulgarian Communist Party in his early twenties. In 1924 he was arrested for his underground Party activities, imprisoned until 1929. During this time he suffered partial paralysis and permanent injury to one leg when he leapt from a fourth story prison window. Amnestied in 1929, he went to the USSR for two years, returned to Bulgaria, as a member of the Bulgarian Party CC, was associated with Georgi Dimitrov in Comintern work. Engaging in anti-German resistance, he was arrested in 1942. Released in 1944 after the German defeat, he became Political Secretary of the Central Committee and Politburo, Deputy Premier, one of the regime leaders. In 1949 he fell victim to charges of Titoism, was tried with much fanfare for attempting to overthrow the government, being a Yugoslav and Anglo-American spy, disorganizing the national economy, etc. He was executed in December.

Vergil Dimov



One of the released Bulgarian Agrarian leaders. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1944.

garian National Bank Tsoniu Tsonchev, and former President of the State Committee for Economic and Financial Affairs Nikola Nachev. In addition, there were further trials in 1949, 1950 and 1951 of persons implicated with Kostov. Presumably these will also be released.

Finally, the releases were no doubt calculated to be of help in the strenuous campaign being waged for the defection of Bulgarian nationals abroad. The change of heart exhibited by the Agrarians, their unstinted praise of life in present-day Bulgaria, and their appeals to former adherents to return and join them, have been beamed at the emigration.

Czechoslovakia

FOUR CATEGORIES of persons have been subject to recent amnesties or releases in Czechoslovakia. These are: persons, mostly Sudeten Germans, sentenced as war criminals and collaborators immediately after the war; Communist Party members purged between 1949 and 1953; regime opponents imprisoned after the 1948 Communist coup; political refugees living abroad.

On November 13, 1955, *Rude Pravo* (Prague) announced that:

"On the basis of negotiations held with the government of the German Democratic Republic, the Czechoslovak government has decided to examine the question of German nationals who were sentenced by special People's

Courts for crimes committed, and are serving sentences in Czechoslovakia. As a result of these negotiations, 1,437 persons were released—these settled in the GDR, the German Federal Republic and Austria. These prisoners were released gradually. In its decision, the government acted in light of the facts that the prisoners have served a considerable part of their sentences, and that more than ten years have elapsed since the end of the second World War. German nationals who were sentenced for especially grave crimes against humanity and whose place of origin is in the GDR will be handed over as war criminals to the GDR State organs, since the Czechoslovak government does not consider it possible to release them prematurely."

This has been the only official announcement of the release of Germans. According to information gained from various unofficial sources, it may be presumed that this release began late in 1953. It was probably dictated by the Soviet desire to conciliate public opinion in East Germany, as Germany became increasingly the focus of East-West diplomatic moves in Europe. It is noteworthy that the announcement above mentions no release of prisoners convicted of "grave crimes" whose place of origin is in West Germany.

These "war criminals" were not released under the Jubilee amnesty of May 9, 1955, but by special dispensation of the President of the Republic. The Jubilee amnesty (see NBIC, June 1955, pp. 52-3) provided for the remission of penalties for crimes committed before the date of the amnesty in the following manner: remission of unpaid fines not exceeding 5,000 *koruny* (about \$700 at official rate), remission of prison sentences not exceeding two years (three for "young offenders"), life imprisonment converted to twenty-year sentences, no prosecution of crimes committed before amnesty date if the penalties cannot legally exceed

two years, or in the case of young people or mothers of children under fourteen, three years.

The amnesty also provided for remission of penalties "imposed in respect to the criminal act of fleeing the country committed before the day of this decision to persons who left the Republic without permission under the influence of hostile propaganda, provided that they return to the Republic within six months of the day of this decision." This clause, the most important of the amnesty, was in line with the redefection campaign directed toward exiles abroad (for a discussion of the area-wide redefection campaign, see NBIC, October 1955, pp. 3-13).

The amnesty specifically excepted those guilty of high treason, sabotage, espionage, acts punishable under the Retribution Decrees and the Peace Protection Law, murder, looting or damage to national or collectivized property, if the sentence exceeded five years, or anyone who had been sentenced for two deliberate criminal offences in the last five years. It is apparent that, except for the redefection provision, the amnesty was not directed toward those convicted of political crimes. It was thus similar to the only previous general Czechoslovak amnesty of May 1953. Political prisoners, when freed, were released by individual decision, without publicity.

The largest number of such political prisoners released in the warmer air of the post-Stalin thaw were those involved in the Slansky purges. No official announcement has been made on the numbers released. However, there have been indications, including many refugee reports, that some of the more important still-living victims of the purges are now out of prison; it is reasonable to assume that, if these men have been released, then so perhaps have many of the thousands of middle and lower echelon bureaucrats whose



Antonin Gregor, formerly Foreign Trade Minister, left, before his purge. He is shown returning at the head of a foreign trade delegation from Moscow. Last year he was rehabilitated, made Ambassador to China. *Svet v Obrazech* (Prague), March 4, 1950

association with Slansky, real or alleged, led to their arrest at the time of the trial, November 1952.

Of the fourteen persons tried and convicted in the Slansky trial itself, eleven were executed. The other three were sentenced to life imprisonment. These were Artur London and Vavro Hajdu, both former Deputy Foreign Ministers (serving under Clementis, who was executed with Slansky) and Evzen Loebl, Deputy Foreign Trade Minister until his arrest. On August 13, Premier Viliam Siroky, in the interview in which he stated that there would be no basic revision of the guilt of the men executed in the Slansky trial, said that London had been freed, Hajdu is to be released soon, and Loebl's case is being reviewed and his release probable.

Among those not tried with Slansky but involved in his purge and now unofficially reported released are the following:

¶ Marie Svermova, sentenced to life imprisonment as a Slansky accomplice in January 1954. Her husband, Jan Sverma had been a prominent prewar Communist and one of the heroes of the wartime resistance. In 1944, while fighting the Germans together with Slansky, Sverma was killed. One of the charges against Slansky was that he had engineered Sverma's death; a recent account of the battle in which Sverma fell does not mention Slansky at all. After the war, Madame Svermova became a Deputy Secretary General of the Czechoslovak Party, under Slansky.

¶ Eduard Goldstuecker, given a life sentence in May 1953 for aiding Slansky and for "sabotage activities" in the Foreign Ministry and the diplomatic service. He was Minister to Israel at the time of his purge.

¶ Dr. Josef Goldmann, a leading Party economist, one time Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Office. He was implicated in the Slansky trial and disappeared, although his own trial was never reported. Then, in the January 1955 issue of *Nova Mysl* (Prague), appeared an article entitled "Introduction of a New Technique and Improvement of its Utilization—A Decisive Factor in the Growth of Labor Productivity," signed by B. Pavlu and J. Goldmann. It is highly probable that this is the same Goldmann and he is apparently now at liberty and permitted this miniscule space in the public eye.

¶ Simon Orenstein, an Israeli citizen and a "Zionist accomplice" of Slansky, who was a prosecution witness in the Slansky trial and was himself sentenced to life imprisonment on August 7, 1953. He had for a time before his arrest worked at the Israeli legation in Prague, and later conducted a business there. On October 26, 1954, the Government of Israel announced that the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry had informed the Israeli legation in Prague of Orenstein's release. Orenstein returned to Israel shortly thereafter; reports have stated that he refuses to discuss his experiences in Czechoslovakia. The other Israeli citizen involved in the Slansky affair, Mordecai Oren, cousin of Orenstein, who was also a State witness in the trial and was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, is still in jail. Oren was an Israeli Parliament member from the MAPAM, a left-wing party with strong pro-Communist factions. He

was returning to Israel from an East German Trade Union meeting when he was arrested. His case is being reviewed and his release is likely.

¶ Gustav Bares (born Breitenfeld) was a member of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Party, member of the Party's Organizational Secretariat, editor of *Tvorba*, the now defunct Party political and economic monthly. His dismissal from the latter post was announced early in 1952, and he subsequently disappeared from public notice, except for occasional references to his pernicious ideological influence. On October 25, 1955, *Rude Pravo* printed a brief notice in fine print on the last page, announcing a lecture to be given the next day at the V. I. Lenin Museum by "Comrade G. Bares on the subject of Lenin and Stalin in the 1905 Russian revolution." This is the only indication so far of Bares' apparent partial reinstatement.

Other leading political figures once purged and recently reported released are:

¶ Antonin Gregor was made Foreign Trade Minister in February 1948 in the post-coup government, and became a Party Central Committee member a year later. In December 1952 he was removed without explanation from Ministerial office and disappeared from public notice. On March 4, 1955, *Rude Pravo* announced his appointment as the new Ambassador to the Chinese People's Republic.

¶ Oldrich John, a former Fierlinger Social Democrat, was made a member of the Central Committee Presidium in May 1949, and was National Assembly Speaker from 1948 to September 1953. At that time he resigned without explanation and was not heard of again, although there were reports that he was working in a minor bureaucratic post. A student who left the country in March 1955 claimed to know that John was now head of the State Arbitration Office, an organ with jurisdiction over disputes between State economic organs. If true, this would mean a partial comeback.

¶ Zdenek Hejzlar became head of the Czechoslovak Youth League in 1950. In August 1952 he was removed from this post and from his National Assembly seat; Radio Prague called him a member of "Slansky's and Smermova's gang." There were reports that even before the announcement he had been arrested; there was no official word of arrest or trial, but he vanished from public notice. A recent report states that he was released this year, and is working as a member of the district committee of the Trade Union Sports and Gymnastics Organization in Hradec Kralove.

¶ Laco Novomesky was a CC member of both the Czechoslovak and Slovak Parties, Slovak Commissioner of Education, a well-known poet. He was arrested in early 1951 and tried in April 1954 together with four other prominent Slovaks. He received a ten-year sentence for supporting "bourgeois nationalism" in the Slovak CP. A recent report states that he was released from prison in the Fall of 1955 at the urging of his friend Georgi Pushkin, Soviet Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic. Novomesky is reported to be writing anonymously for the Bratislava *Pravda*.



Oldrich John, before his purge, standing at the center. He is reported to have been released from prison. Klement Gottwald is seated at the desk, the others are (left to right): Premier Zapotocky, Deputy Speaker of the Assembly Polansky, Speaker John, Health Minister Plojhar and Post Minister Neuman.

Svet v Obrazech (Prague), March 16, 1953

¶ Gustav Husak, who was sentenced to life imprisonment in the same trial. He had been a member of the Slovak resistance during the war, and afterward was member and later chairman of the Slovak Board of Commissioners.

¶ Vilem Novy, arrested late in 1949 as a Western spy, never publicly tried. He had been Editor-in-Chief of *Rude Pravo*, the leading Party newspaper, and Chairman of the Foreign Commission of the National Assembly.

It is apparent from these examples that Czechoslovakia had quite different purposes than Bulgaria in releasing politically prominent men. Rather than being featured in a loud propaganda campaign, the Czechoslovak releases have been carried out all but secretly. They seem to be a quiet attempt to mend some of the worst errors of the purge years (those that can be mended; widows can be indemnified and reputations can be cleansed, but the dead are excluded from amnesty).

Hungary

TWO OFFICIAL amnesty orders were issued in April 1955, one for those imprisoned or accused in Hungary, one for exiles (see NBIC, May 1955, p. 50). The internal amnesty was largely political in character, providing for:

"... cancellation of punishment and abandonment of criminal proceedings against those who did not take a leading position in the reactionary regime before the liberation, and who, it may be supposed, will become useful working members of our society when amnestied. These persons will be amnestied for criminal acts against the State regardless of the degree of punishment, provided that they

did not act with hostile intent or were obviously influenced by delusive hostile propaganda. The amnesty will also be extended, under certain restricting conditions, to other criminal acts of a general nature, as well as to criminal acts of a military character, provided that the person involved was not sentenced to more than one year in prison, or if it may be presumed that a prospective sentence will not extend to a longer period." (*Szabad Nep* [Budapest], April 3, 1955.)

This is the fifth Hungarian amnesty since 1945 (the others were in 1947, 1948, 1950 and 1953). It is the first one, however, to extend to political rather than criminal prisoners.

There has been no official word on the number of persons released under the amnesty. Some reports indicate that the number might be as low as under a thousand, but there is no way of confirming this. As far as major political figures are concerned, most of those released, and there have not been many, did not come under the amnesty. The "interruption" of the imprisonment of Cardinal Mindszenty in July 1955, for example, was evidently a move designed to placate world opinion on the eve of the Geneva Conference. In October a similar "interruption" was given the sentence of Archbishop Groesz, sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment in June 1951. At the same time four Catholic priests were released from prison unconditionally. On February 25, 1956, Radio Budapest announced the release of nine Catholic priests. One of these was Jusztin Baranyi, who had been a co-defendant with Mindszenty, and the only one of the seven defendants who did not plead guilty.

A number of high regime functionaries arrested in 1951 in a purge of so-called "national Communists" were released toward the end of 1954. Among these were the following:

¶ Janos Kadar, Minister of the Interior from August 1948 to June 1950, and Deputy Secretary-General of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party. After his release from prison he became Party Secretary of the XIIIth District in Budapest.

¶ Gyula Kallai, Minister of Foreign Affairs replacing the purged Rajk. After his release he was made Deputy Minister of Education and a member of the board of directors of the Patriotic People's Front.

¶ Geza Losonczy, former State Secretary at the Ministry of Education. After release he was given an important post on *Magyar Nemzet*, the PPF newspaper.

Others reported released include Szilard Ujhelyi, former section chief in the Welfare Ministry, and Ferenc Donath, State Secretary in the Agricultural Ministry. Although there has been no official public discussion of these released victims of the 1951 Party purge, regime statements have made it clear that the "mistake" of their arrest was blamed on Gabor Peter, the purged police chief.

On March 29, 1956, Radio Budapest broadcast a speech by First Party Secretary Matyas Rakosi in which he admitted that the 1949 trial of Laszlo Rajk and seven others for

Archbishop Jozsef Groesz at Trial



Caption reads: "Jozsef Groesz shows how he concealed documents of the conspiracy in his furniture."

Nepszava (Budapest), June 23, 1951

sedition, espionage and "Titoism" was an error and "based on provocation" (pp. 52-54). This was the first public revision of one of the great anti-Titoist *causes celebres* that racked the Satellites after Tito's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948.

Rakosi stated that the surviving trial victims had been released from prison. Five of the defendants, including Rajk, were executed after the trial. Presumably, therefore, the other three—Pal Justus and Lazar Brankov who received life sentences, and Milan Ognjenovich who was sentenced to nine years imprisonment—have been freed. An unofficial report confirms the release of Justus; of the others there has been no word. In addition to the actual defendants at the trial, hundreds of persons were purged at the time. It is possible that the survivors have been or shortly will be released.

A small number of leading Hungarian Social Democrats were released before the current spate of rehabilitations, including Anna Kethly. Miss Kethly, now nearing seventy, was for years a major figure of European Socialism, and the outstanding personality in the women's labor movement. She had been a member of Parliament for twenty years, and from 1945 to 1948 was Vice-President of the National Assembly. She was expelled from the Social Democratic Party in 1948, for her staunch anti-Communism, and was arrested in the summer of 1950. She was released, according to the official announcement, on November 21, 1954. She now lives in Budapest, in semi-seclusion. Two other prominent Social Democrats, both arrested in 1950, were released in 1955: Armin Ladanyi, former President of the Bar Association, released in the summer, and Miklos Kertesz, former trade union leader, released at the end of the year. There has been no effort on the part of the regime to exploit these people for propaganda purposes.

Much more recently, in his March 29, 1956, speech in which the rehabilitation of Rajk was announced, Rakosi also stated that "The cases of former Social Democrats were investigated. Most of them have been set free, the rest will be released in the next few days." Unofficial reports indicate that the following important Social Democrats were released at about the time of the Rakosi speech: ¶ Imre Gyorki, author, lawyer, sociologist, Social Democratic Member of Parliament from Debrecen for over 25 years, and President of the National Social Insurance Institution. He was arrested in June 1950, having three years previously been expelled from the Social Democratic Party for his anti-Communism.

¶ Arpad Szakasits, originally a stonemason, later active in trade unions. By 1939 he was editor-in-chief of *Nepszava*, then the Social Democratic daily. In 1944 he headed the Social Democratic underground fighting the Germans, and was a founder of *Magyar Front*, the chief underground organization. In 1945-48 he was Secretary-General of the Social Democratic Party, Chairman of the Budapest City Council, Member of Parliament, Deputy Premier. A left-wing Social Democrat, he became President of the united Social Democratic-Communist Party (Hungarian Workers' Party) in the summer of 1948, a few months later became President of the country, following the purged Smallholder, Zoltan Tildy. He was arrested in the spring of 1950.

¶ Istvan Udvaros, Governor of Vas County at the age of 26, originally arrested for leftist sympathies. Became Gyor Social Democratic Secretary and Trade Union Secretary in 1926, after his release. Arrested by the Arrow Cross regime in 1944, but escaped and led in organizing the resistance. Member of Parliament and on the Social Democratic Central Committee in 1945. Expelled from his

Anna Kethly



Anna Kethly, prominent Hungarian Social Democrat, was released from prison in November 1954.

party in 1948 because of anti-Communism. Arrested in June 1950.

¶ Zoltan Horvath, one of the younger generation of Social Democratic leaders, and a Member of Parliament. Joined the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party after the merger. Arrested in 1950.

¶ Gyorgy Marosan, trade unionist, member of the Social Democratic Central Committee and Member of Parliament after the war. Became a Deputy Secretary-General of the Hungarian Workers' Party, and was arrested in 1950.

¶ Pal Schiffer, postwar Member of Parliament and Social Democratic leader. Became member of the merged Party. Arrested in 1950.

Poland

THERE HAS BEEN no official amnesty in Poland since 1952, when certain categories of offenders, criminal rather than political, were released, although it was reported in April that a new internal and external amnesty is shortly to be promulgated. However, even previous to the reorganization of the Security Services after the Swiatlo revelations in 1954,* a decrease in the prison population was being effected. On December 31, 1954, the Special Commission for Fighting Abuses and Damages to the Economy, which had possessed and used wide powers for summary sentencing of economic and political "saboteurs" was abolished, and its competence transferred to the regular judicial system. At the same time, a number of new administrative regulations made it possible for sentences imposed by the Special Commission to be reduced. The Prosecutor General's office was given power to release persons sentenced to forced labor camps after completion of one-third of their term, "postpone" consignment to labor camps, or permit the payment of fines in installments.

Speaking of this reduction of prison population former Party Secretary Bierut said:

"The results of open violations of the principles of legality by some of the Security organs were removed, and persons punished unjustly were released and rehabilitated. The persons responsible for these violations were held for the Party and the courts." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], January 26, 1955.)

Although there was in this period a two-way traffic, former police officials being trundled off to jail and their previous victims coming out, it can be assumed that in the balance the prison population was effectively reduced.

There had been persistent rumors and reports for many months that Wladyslaw Gomulka had been released from prison. Gomulka, Secretary-General of the Polish Party from November 1943 to September 1948, was arrested in July 1951 for "rightist deviation" but was never brought to trial. (Poland, alone of all the Satellites, had no great anti-Titoist show trial.) A number of reports stated that

* Jozef Swiatlo, Lieutenant Colonel of the Polish political police, fled to the West in December 1953. As Deputy Chief of Department Ten (the Party security section), Ministry of Public Security, he was privy to a great many of the regime's secrets of intra-Party blackmail and throat-cutting, familiar with the practices of police brutality and inhumanity. His revelations of these matters, sent into Poland by Radio Free Europe broadcasts and Free Europe Press leaflets, created a major sensation. (See NBIC, March 1955.)

Marian Spychalski



General Spychalski was purged in 1951. His release was recently announced.

he was seen attending his mother's funeral in April 1955. The rumors concerning him stated variously that he is at liberty but under careful police surveillance, that he has a responsible Party post in Warsaw, and that he had a minor bureaucratic position in the Western Territories.

The release of three purged generals, Marian Spychalski, Wacław Komar and Jerzy Kirchmayer, was revealed in a letter printed by *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), March 28, 1956. The letter stated that the releases were known only to "a small group of people," and complained that "The unawareness of public opinion and its consequent reserved attitude toward these men generates a new injustice. The high-ranking army officers who were rehabilitated in the eyes of the law have not been rehabilitated in the eyes of the public."

Spychalski had been Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and Deputy Minister of National Defence until 1949, when, in connection with the beginning of the Gomulka purge, he was removed from his positions and from the Party. He was arrested in 1951, slightly before Gomulka, but was never brought to trial.

Komar was probably arrested in 1953, although the precise date was not announced. He had fought in the Spanish Civil War, and in 1950 was appointed Quartermaster General of the Polish Army. No more specific reason for his arrest was announced than that he was a

"traitor" and "capitalist scum."

Kirchmayer was sentenced to life imprisonment in the August 1951 trial of nine high ranking army officers convicted of treason, espionage and conspiracy.

These releases were confirmed in a speech by the new First Party Secretary Edward Ochab, Radio Warsaw, April 6. He stated that "The thought of those arrested and accused without foundation causes us much pain and bitterness." In addition to confirming the releases of Gomulka, Spychalski and Komar, he revealed that General Jozef Kuropieska, a prosecution witness in the 1951 officers' trial and thereafter imprisoned, had been released. Ochab said that the officers' trial is being reinvestigated, that "the authorities have released from prison scores of persons whose innocence has been proven," and that "20 officers have been rehabilitated."

There have also been reports, very probably reliable, that others who fell in the purge years are now released. Among these are the following:

¶ Marshal Rola-Zymierski, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army until succeeded by Marshal Rokossowski in 1949, and subsequently a member of the State Council. He was arrested in 1953 by Jozef Swiatlo on Bierut's orders. The official charge: working for French Intelligence.



At right, Marshal Rola-Zymierski when he was head of the Polish army. With him is Marshal Rokossowski, still in Russian uniform, who succeeded Zymierski in 1949. Zymierski was arrested in 1953. He is now unofficially reported released.

Five Years of People's Poland (Warsaw), 1949

¶ Edward Osubka-Morawski, pro-Communist left-wing Socialist leader, and Premier from 1944 to 1947 in the coalition Provisional Government. After January 1947, when naked Communist control was asserted, he served as Minister of State Administration, and in December 1948 was further demoted to Director of State Resorts. He was arrested sometime in 1951 on charges of "rightist deviation." Both Rola-Zymierski and Osobka-Morawski are apparently at liberty in Warsaw.

The Polish releases of prominent persons have been in general similar to the Czechoslovak: unpublicized releases of some victims of the purge years.

Romania

THERE WERE two amnesties in Romania in 1955, one for those abroad, on June 26, one internal, on September 25. The external amnesty followed the familiar pattern of the redefection campaign. It was perhaps the most sweeping in the area, pardoning all crimes except murder committed by "Romanian citizens or ex-citizens who, at the date of issue of this decree find themselves abroad, providing they obtain authorization to return and they do so return to this country before August 23, 1956." The decree also extended to the wives and minor children of persons complying with the decree.

The internal amnesty was the first in Communist Romania to apply to political prisoners rather than common criminals. It provided for full pardon to those serving sentences of up to ten years for "war crimes" and "crimes against peace and humanity." Those serving sentences of more than ten years for these crimes were pardoned if they had participated in active combat against the Germans, or if they had committed no murders on their own initiative. Those not so pardonable had their sentences cut in half (life sentences were reduced to twelve and a half years). Specifically excepted from these amnesties were members of the Romanian September 6, 1940-August 23, 1944 government, a provision which markedly reduced the scope of pardons, since many major war criminals had participated in that government.

The decree also provided full pardon to those sentenced to up to five years for "crimes against the security of the State, rebellion, embezzlement, illegal entry into Romania, violence against the democratic order and defiance of authority." Of this somewhat mixed grab-bag, it may be said that very few prisoners in the first two categories received sentences as low as five years, and that the number of persons guilty of illegal entry into Romania is severely limited. Full pardon regardless of the length of sentences was given to foreign citizens guilty of the crimes just enumerated.

Finally, complete amnesty was given for certain misdemeanors connected with illegal manipulation of or failure to declare hard currency and gold.

A number of important political figures have been released from prison and used by the regime, but these did not come under the amnesty. Most of them were apparently released in the spring and summer of 1955, although there

Romanian Repatriation Commission



Tatarescu, released Liberal Party leader, is second from right. Ionel Pop, released Agrarian leader, is fourth from right.

Glasul Patriei [regime repatriation organ] (Berlin), December 10, 1955

is no official confirmation of the dates.

The most important of these men are the three leading representatives of the three major anti-Communist Romanian political parties: Gheorghe Tatarescu, Liberal Party leader; Ionel Pop, heir to the leadership of Iuliu Maniu's Peasant Party; and C. Titel-Petrescu, Socialist leader.

Tatarescu, born in 1887, has long been a major political figure. He became leader of the Liberal Party in 1931, Minister of Industry in 1934, Prime Minister 1935-37, was one of the founders of King Carol's personal party, the National Renaissance Front, in 1939 (whereupon he was disowned by the Liberal Party, but retained a sizable Liberal following), and Prime Minister again November 1939-July 1940.

Because of his lifelong history of association with the Iron Guard and other fascist elements in Romania, and because he had invited German military missions and training units to Bucharest early in the war, Tatarescu was high on the Communist list of war criminals. However, after a visit to Bucharest by Andrei Vyshinsky at the end of 1944, his name was removed from that list and, on March 6, 1945, he became Foreign Minister in the Communist-controlled postwar coalition government. He was the only major right-wing politician willing to work with the Communists, and the Communists gained an experienced hand and a split in the Liberal Party ranks. His position was taken over by Ana Pauker in 1947, he was placed under house-arrest the following year, and jailed in 1951. There was no formal arraignment and no announced charge.

Rumors of his release began in the Spring of 1955. On

October 20, the regime permitted him to be interviewed by a New York *Times* correspondent in the house he had been given in Bucharest; it was the first confirmation of his release. In the interview he revealed that both Iuliu Maniu, elderly Peasant Party leader and former Prime Minister, and Dinu Bratianu, Liberal Party leader, had died in 1950, both in prison.

Tatarescu stated in the interview (which took place in the presence of the editor of *Scinteia*, the Party newspaper) that "his conception of liberty and the liberty of the individual did not coincide with the basic conception of Communism and Socialism," but went on to praise the "epochal successes in economic, cultural and social problems" achieved by the regime. He added an appeal to exiles to return to Romania.

Ionel Pop was Iuliu Maniu's nephew, like him a Roman Catholic, and, although never very active in politics, considered by some to be the heir to Maniu's mantle. In 1945 he was Commissioner for Transylvania. He was probably arrested in 1947, with Maniu, and it seems probable that he was not released until the middle of 1955.

First confirmation of his release was a letter in the first issue, December 10, 1955, of *Glasul Patriei* (Berlin), organ of the Romanian repatriation drive. In a preface addressed to the editor, he said:

"Hoping to find your understanding and sympathy, I am sending you the following lines which contain the thoughts that disturbed me recently on seeing the great achievements in our country and the deep social changes they have generated. I think that if these lines could be published

Titel-Petrescu



Petrescu, Social Democratic leader long imprisoned and now released, speaking at the funeral of the prominent Romanian Socialist C. Dobrogeanu Gherea, in 1920. The photograph appears in "Socialism in Romania, 1883-September 6, 1940" by Titel-Petrescu.

they would be in a certain measure useful to those who still are doubtful and sceptical as to the capacity of the worker-peasant regime or profess any vain and unrealistic hopes for a return of that past which is forever gone. I am thinking of those now outside the country."

In the letter, Pop reiterated these themes of the beneficence and inevitability of the Communist regime:

"These are the things I want to express in the present lines, I, a man who has belonged to the old ideas and institutions. . . . Those who imagine that they can revive the past with its blackness and misery for the people are very much mistaken. For them there is no place here, and there never will be. But if patriotism and warm love for the country's earth are stronger than the hatred instilled by foreign elements in the souls of the self-exiled, then I think it my duty to express my modest suggestion to return with clean thoughts to their motherland, which will receive them with warmth and forgiveness to her generous bosom. Anybody who wishes to work honestly for the country has a place in the Romanian People's Republic."

Constantin Titel-Petrescu was founder and leader of the Romanian Social Democratic Party, and one of the major figures of East European Socialism. In 1944 he accepted a popular front with the Communists, but changed his mind the following year (the pro-Communist splinter of the Socialist Party, led by Voitec and Radaceanu, was absorbed by the Communists in 1948). Titel-Petrescu was arrested in 1947.

On December 18, 1955, a letter from Petrescu appeared in *Scinteia*. It contained a complete renunciation of his former anti-Communist and anti-regime position, and re-

ferred in glowing terms to the achievements of the regime (see NBIC, February 1956, p. 43). It spoke of the "enormous industrial construction of the democratic regime, the enthusiasm shown by the workers of yesterday, who are today living under decent conditions, in creating Romanian industry. . . ." It stated flatly that "Today I am in a position to admit what has become evident—that the policy of the Romanian Workers' (Communist) Party is right. . . ." It appealed to "friends abroad [who] are perhaps expecting other messages from me" to return home "in order to unite with the Romanian people in the struggle for and activity of building a new life in Romania." The letter was not a balanced appraisal, setting off Communist accomplishments against their flaws and failures; it was a paean.

There is no doubt of the pressures exerted on the imprisoned Social Democratic leaders, Petrescu foremost among them. There is very strong reason to believe that for most of his imprisonment, which lasted over eight years, Petrescu was immured in solitary confinement. Even this, apparently, proved insufficient. A reliable report from a former prisoner in a Bucharest jail states that in October 1955 the still intransigent imprisoned Social Democratic leaders, including Petrescu, were informed that they would either declare themselves ready to cooperate with the Romanian regime and sign any statements required of them, or they would be handed over to Soviet authorities and lose any hope of freedom. Petrescu alone acceded; the others, it was reported, were flown by the Soviet authorities to Moscow and when last heard of were imprisoned in the Butyrka Prison, on Gorki Street. It is striking that even in these days of post-Stalin and post-Geneva thaw, and even for the purposes of impressing the good opinion of the world, methods of terror and brutality are still, when deemed useful, resorted to.

The major use made of these three men has been in the intensive repatriation campaign. Tatarescu and Pop are both members of the recently established Repatriation Commission (see NBIC, February 1956, pp. 42-3); Petrescu is not, but his name and statement are frequently invoked in the repatriation propaganda.

Several other less important figures were released at the same time as Tatarescu. Among these were Ion Nistor, Liberal, prewar member of Parliament and Minister of Public Works; Vasile Sassu, Liberal, prewar Minister of Agriculture and Industry; Valer Pop, Liberal, prewar Minister of Justice; Mihai Popovici, Peasant Party, prewar Parliament member and Minister of Finance; Emil Hatieganu, Peasant Party, prewar Minister of Health. These men have not been used for propaganda purposes, and it may be assumed that they were considered harmless and released in a mild gesture of "national unity." They are all elderly; Valer Pop, the youngest of them, is 65. There was no official announcement of their release, as there had been none of their arrests.

The Official 1956 Vatican Yearbook has reported that one of the ten Roman Catholic Bishops arrested around 1951 has been released and is back at his post. He is Bishop Aron Marton of Alba Iulia. Of the others, six are dead, three are still in prison.

Labor Camps

PARALLEL TO THIS areawide decrease in the prison population, there has been an even more marked areawide decrease in that sector of the prison population incarcerated in forced labor camps. There are, indeed, strong indications that the whole labor camp system, so long a feature of Communist life, is undergoing complete revision. This revision has had two effects on the Satellites: their own internal forced labor systems have been greatly reduced and the remainder greatly modified, and numbers of their citizens have been released from Soviet camps and returned home.

As far as can be gauged from unofficial reports (it must be stressed that there is no official information whatsoever on forced labor camps), the pattern of changes in the area has been as follows: Throughout the area, the number of camps and inmates has fallen. In Poland there was relatively little recourse to forced labor, even at the height of the Stalinist period; that little has grown less. In Bulgaria, where it has been estimated that by 1954 the number of persons who had passed through forced labor camps amounted to one-third of the total industrial work force, labor camps have been almost completely abolished. Toward the end of 1953 there was, it appears, an unannounced amnesty which greatly reduced camp population.

In Romania, almost half the camps were closed. This reduction was in part the result of abandonment of projects like the Black Sea-Danube Canal, which were being built almost entirely with convict labor. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia the prison camp system has been sharply curtailed. In all countries, in 1953, jurisdiction over sentences to the camps was taken from the Security organs and made subject to regular judicial processes.

The number of persons in camps in the Satellites never approached the proportion of the total population that it did in the Soviet Union. It has been estimated that by the end of 1954 approximately one million people had passed through (or were still in) labor camps in the captive nations. The estimate for the Soviet prison camp population (not the total of those who had passed through) was about 14 million at the 1953 peak.

In the USSR, exploitation of the vast, empty, forbidding areas of the Northeast could be started most cheaply by a profligate expenditure of the lives of forced laborers, rather than by making conditions that would attract free labor. The Satellites had no such Siberia, and therefore much less economic incentive for forced labor on the immense Soviet scale. It was rather restricted to economic sectors where the manpower need was desperate enough to warrant the use of forced labor despite its low productivity and efficiency. Mining and such grandiose schemes as the Black Sea-Danube Canal were the major areas.

The grandiose schemes were abandoned after Stalin died, and in mining, although forced labor in the modified new form is still used, the regimes are making an effort to increase production by offering higher incentives to free labor.


The release of many forced laborers from Soviet camps began in September 1953, after the post-Stalinist political amnesty. Great numbers of those released were of captive nationality, and were sent home. Such ill-famed camps as Vorkuta disgorged thousands of such people, who returned home as "free citizens." (At least one recent report states, however, that a group of such returned prisoners in Poland complained about the jobs to which they were sent, and were promptly clapped into Polish prisons.) There is no accurate information on the number of these people.

Forced labor camps remain. They were always particularly used in mining, and offenders are still being sentenced to forced labor in the coal mines, or in the notorious Jachymov uranium mines of Czechoslovakia. Conditions in the camps, however, have improved. Since the death of Stalin, norms have been reduced, in some cases such rewards as decrease of sentence or permission to leave the camp for brief periods were given for norm overfulfillment, and even wages were paid. In the USSR, this change was partially the result of such pressure as the 1953 Vorkuta strike; a nation as dependent as the USSR on convict labor for its natural resources had cause to fear serious unrest in the camps. In the Satellites, the major cause of the change was the low productivity of forced labor under the harsh Stalinist conditions and the shortage of productive manpower. It was hoped to raise that productivity by offering greater incentives; at the same time, the free working force was subjected to greater control—higher norms, tighter laws against absenteeism, etc. In this manner the differences between convict and free labor were reduced.

Patterns

It is apparent that there have been two elements involved in the wave of political amnesties and releases. First, in the release of numbers of political criminals and the general thinning out of the prison population, there has been an attempt to heal some of the worst wounds caused by the years of Stalinist terror. Secondly, certain of the regimes have released prominent political prisoners for propaganda purposes. It is interesting that the two countries in which this has been done to the greatest extent, Romania and Bulgaria, are the countries in which the Communist regimes are in greatest need of shoring up. In both these cases the release of "converted" non-Communist political leaders is designed to obtain a degree of popular support and co-operation which the Communists have so far failed to get.

Eyewitness



Reports...

This section presents current information on conditions behind the Iron Curtain from refugees interviewed by Radio Free Europe reporters.

IN THE SOVIET BLOC countries the trade union steward is the liaison between workers and the State-run trade unions. Theoretically the steward represents the workers' interests, but information provided by refugees has indicated that in practice he is the tool of Party and management, carrying out the orders of the factory Party Secretary.

Small plants with less than 200 employees have one steward, while in larger plants there is one for each department. The steward's duties are to organize the workers into the union, collect dues and manage union funds. He recommends the granting of leaves and benefits, and is expected to collect signatures for regime propaganda petitions and subscriptions to the Peace Loans. In return for these services he receives rewards for "exemplary work," and, if exceptionally efficient along the proper lines, may be sent to a Party school and launched on a Party career. If his performance is unsatisfactory to the Party, he is relieved and usually transferred to another plant as an ordinary worker.

Despite the fact that the trade union steward is important to the workers because of his power to bestow or withhold benefits, he is actually on the lowest level of the Party hierarchy within the plant. In theory he has the right and obligation to start action for the improvement of working conditions, but an escapee who had worked in several factories in Hungary said that he knew of no case in which a steward fought for the workers' rights. For example, every type of work is given a classification according to the quality of the product and the time required for performance. Every category has its norm, and in many cases the worker does not have enough time to fulfill it 100 percent. This should be protested by the steward, but on the contrary, the steward usually tries to raise the norms in an effort to win the management's approval.

However, if a worker feels he has been treated unfairly—for instance, dismissed without cause—he may appeal to the trade union. The trade union takes the case to

the mediation committee of the plant. In Hungary the committee has three members, appointed by the trade union, the plant management, and the State respectively. The committee may call on the manager to take back the man within three days or recompense him. If the manager fails to comply the case goes to the district mediation committee which reviews it and passes sentence, as the highest trade union legal forum. If the manager still does not comply, the case goes to a regular court whose decision is binding for all parties. If the manager is found guilty of causing damage to the worker, part of the worker's compensation may be deducted from the manager's pay.

At present it is not compulsory for workers in Hungary to belong to a trade union, but great pressure is brought to bear on them to join. Membership dues are 1 percent of a month's pay. One of the privileges of membership is participation in the election of the steward—a somewhat illusory privilege since the only candidate is proposed by the Party Secretary. Trade union members are given special rates for travel and fuel, and preference in the allocation of apartments and of places at the State health and recreation centers.



HOW A 19-YEAR-OLD German girl was granted an audience by Boleslaw Bierut, recently deceased First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party, provides an illuminating example of the prevailing attempt to narrow the gap between rulers and ruled in Poland. The girl had been separated from her parents during the war and had been trying for years to obtain permission from the Polish authorities to rejoin them in Germany. In desperation, she decided to make a personal appeal to Bierut. She also wrote a letter to Soviet Premier Bulganin shortly after the Geneva Conference suggesting that according to his announcement

that displaced Germans in the Soviet bloc would be returned to Germany she should qualify for permission to rejoin her parents. The letter was not answered but the effect it had is described in this account of her meeting with Bierut:

"I went to Warsaw at the beginning of October 1955 to press my application [for repatriation] at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the [East] German Consulate. As I had received no reply to either of my letters—to Bulganin and Bierut—I made up my mind to reach Bierut before I left Warsaw again. On October 7, I went to Bierut's palace the 'Belvedere' and asked the soldier at the gate where I could get a permit to speak to Comrade Bierut. The soldier shrugged his shoulders and pointed across to the building opposite the 'Belvedere' where permits to see Rokossowski are issued and said I might have some luck getting one for the First Secretary himself. I went to the Information Office in this building and the man on duty—he was in civilian clothes—advised me to go to the headquarters building of the Communist Party in No. 6 Nowy Swiat.

"I went straight there and found the Permit Office on the ground floor. The official there told me that I would not be able to get a permit as it was not Comrade Bierut's business to arrange exit visas to Germany. There were other offices which dealt with that sort of thing, he said, and anyway Comrade Bierut was not in. He then closed the shutters in my face and I stood on one side for about a quarter of an hour and watched other people making their inquiries. There were two men in the office and I could see them talking to each other and looking in my direction from time to time. Later one of them came out and asked me why I was hanging around since my case was hopeless and I would not get a permit. However, he did say that I could make a written application and hand it in addressed to Comrade Bierut personally. I pleaded that any written applications would only get lost in the files and that my case could only be dealt with by Comrade Bierut because no one else would listen to me. By now it was already 1:30—I had started my rounds at nine o'clock at the Belvedere—and the two men were relieved for lunch. The new official asked me after a time what I was waiting for and this time I broke into tears and told him that it was not fair to keep me from my parents and that I wanted to talk to the First Secretary about it. This man seemed kinder than the others and told me to wait. . . . I was finally given a piece of paper and told to go into the building and show my pass to a civilian official at the end of a long corridor.

"This official who, although he studied my permit very carefully, seemed to know I was expected, took me further into the building and stopped before a large door. He told me to knock and go in, which I did, although by now I was very nervous. I found myself in a large room with very nice furniture. There were beige-colored curtains on the windows and a beautiful thick carpet on the floor. Bierut was sitting behind a large writing desk when I appeared. He looked to see who had come in and then stood up and gave me his hand. He said that he had been

told on the phone that I wanted to see him. He then waited and I saw that I had to start explaining so I took out all the papers I had in my briefcase and laid them on his desk. He sat down again and looked through them one after another. I moved back a couple of steps as I did not want to appear to be looking at the other papers on his desk but I watched him going through my various letters and applications. I saw him stop at the copy of the letter I had written to Bulganin and read it through completely. In this letter to the Soviet official I had given my whole life story, explaining how it had happened that I had been separated from my family. I also described how I had tried to get a visa from various Polish Ministries and offices, always without success, and that it was because of this I was writing to him in the hope he might be able to help me. Bierut finished reading this letter and went through the rest of the papers. Then he closed the file and looked up at me and asked why I had written to Bulganin. I thought he looked a little annoyed when I told him that it was because of the Geneva Conference and that I had read in the papers that all Germans who were not war criminals would be allowed to return to Germany.

"He made no comment to this, but picked up a pencil and made some notes in a book, referring then to some of the papers in the file. Then he got up and said, 'We will put everything in order for you and your case will be completed within two weeks.' Maybe it was a silly thing to do but the words came out before I could stop them: I asked him whether he would really do his best because I had been running around for so long that I had almost lost all hope in having any luck. He frowned as though I were doubting his word and merely said, 'Yes, you may be sure, and you can tell your parents.' That was the end of my audience with Bierut.

"During the whole time he was very reserved and did not try to be hearty. He seemed rather tired. He was wearing a very nice dark blue suit and was obviously a man who took some trouble with his appearance. On thinking it over afterwards, I am sure that my letter to Bulganin which he found in my papers had made him a little angry and that he had decided to show me that he was the right man to deal with cases like mine and that he resented an application being made to the Russians.

"In spite of his assurances that I should hear within fourteen days, it was nearer three weeks before I got my written exit permit through the mail. Before I left I spoke once again with an official of the Passport Office and told her about my visit to Bierut. She told me that Bierut's intervention would not have been necessary because my case had already been decided beforehand and I had been booked for a resettlement transport some time before. On November 4th I left with a transport and arrived two days later in Friedland [Germany]."



ACCORDING TO A HOUSEWIFE who recently left Poland, the much-heralded price reduction of last spring (1955) amounted only to minor cuts in the price of milk

and some luxury items sold in the delicatessens. Staple foods, such as bread and flour, did not become cheaper but they became more consistently available on the market. Meat and fat supplies were still short; to buy these one almost always had to stand in line, except just before pay-days.

Fruit and vegetables continue to be very expensive, the woman said, especially at the beginning of the season. Later the prices drop a little, but the goods are shipped so carelessly and stored so poorly that they go on sale damaged and half-spoiled, and few people care to buy them. The State fruit and vegetable centers then attempt to recover their losses through high prices. The people, therefore, prefer to buy from the few private vegetable vendors, who compete favorably with the State in regard to prices and the quality of their goods.

A NUMBER OF REFUGEES from Hungary have described how the hard-pressed members of the former middle class dispose of their valuable antiques, silver and other possessions for money. The agency for this is the organization of State commission shops which maintains 16-18 shops in Budapest and a branch in virtually every town of over 20,000 population. To these shops people may bring their rugs, furniture, antiques, furs and linens to be sold on commission. The goods may be sold to the shop for cash on the spot or for a small advance on the proceeds of sale. Naturally the goods are always assessed at a very low value, particularly in the cases where the shop pays cash. The situation is a little better where the customers wait for sale: at the time of delivery they receive a token amount but after the article is sold they receive the full amount obtained, less 18 percent for handling.

Before the articles are put on sale in the commission shops, they are examined by the export firm *Artex*, which sells every article of worth abroad. The antique furniture, paintings and Oriental rugs have proven a good source of hard currency. Much of the antique silver has reportedly been sold to Austria and Switzerland. If *Artex* is unable to sell the goods the commission shop puts them up for sale. Hungarians are rarely found shopping in the commission shops, since they are not able to afford luxuries. The main domestic customers are employees of foreign consulates and State prize-winning artists. According to well informed sources, 80 percent of the items have been sold abroad. However, the supply is rapidly diminishing since people have gradually sold all they have. How the

"secret resources" of the Hungarians are being exhausted is demonstrated by the fact that there used to be 100 to 150 new items a day on sale in a commission shop whereas today there are only 25 to 30 a day.

THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM for the care of the disabled has put these unfortunate people so much under obligation to the regime that today they form one of the most politically reliable groups in society, according to a recent refugee from Czechoslovakia. In 1949-50 the regime created a central organization called "Druteva" for the benefit of all those who as a result of physical defect, either congenital or due to accident or war injury, are not capable of regular employment.

The official activity of Druteva consists of: 1. club activity, chiefly meetings at which questions of interest are discussed, such as schooling and re-education of members for appropriate work according to the degree of disability, etc. The entire club activity has a strong Communist Party coloring; frequently it is directly linked with the teaching of Communist ideology and literally becomes a political agitation course. 2. practical activity, which is the placement of members in industry and agriculture, in cooperation with organs of individual State offices and Ministries. 3. purely charitable activity, support of the totally incapacitated.

"It is an indisputable fact," said the refugee, "that the invalids in Druteva are genuinely grateful to the regime for having in this manner integrated them into practical life. The regime is fully aware of the possibilities which their moral indebtedness presents and knows well how to take advantage of it."

The result is that many people have gradually come to regard every invalid as a possible STB (Secret police) informer or agent-provocateur. Chiefly suspected are those Druteva members who travel around the country on business for production enterprises and thus have an ideal opportunity for coming into inconspicuous contact with anybody in whom the STB is interested, and those members who sell hand-made articles from door to door. These latter win confidence easily, partly because of their condition; conversations develop, the discussion turns to daily worries and eventually can be guided to political opinions. It is these elements of inconspicuousness and easy confidence which the regime police is widely believed to be utilizing for its own purpose.

Labor Productivity in the Captive Nations

"We must not forget for a moment the advice of the great Lenin with regard to the decisive importance of the increase of labor productivity. In the final analysis labor productivity is the most important factor . . . in the victory of the new social regime. Capitalism has created a labor productivity which was unknown in the days of feudalism. Capitalism can be and will be finally beaten by the fact that Socialism is creating a new labor productivity, a much higher productivity."

First Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej at the recent Congress of the Romanian Workers Party.

IN 1938 Eastern Europe was predominantly agricultural. Peasants were approximately 55 percent of the population in Hungary; 63 percent in Poland; 78 percent in Romania and 80 percent in Bulgaria. Where agriculture was based on large estates, as in Hungary, there was a class of landless agricultural workers who were certain of finding employment only in seasons of peak activity. Where small holdings prevailed, as in Bulgaria and to some extent Romania, the land was too crowded to provide full-time work for the people living on it. Thus a large proportion of the peasant labor power was superfluous, although it went uncounted by statistics of unemployment.

The Communist regimes have drawn upon this pool of labor power to man the factories and swell the new industrial centers such as Nowa Huta in Poland, Sztalinvaros in Hungary and Dimitrovgrad in Bulgaria. Between 1946 and 1953 the urban population of Poland rose from 31 percent of the total to 41 percent. In Romania it rose from about 23 percent in 1948 to nearly 35 percent

in 1953. The stream of recruits from the country was supplemented from other quarters. Special efforts were made to mobilize the youth, particularly during holidays and vacations. The former employees of private craftsmen were drawn into the industrial army when it became illegal for private entrepreneurs to use hired labor. The employment of women increased until in Hungary and Poland women comprised about a third of the non-agricultural working force. (See the articles on Satellite demography in NBIC, February and May, 1955.) Thus by 1953 the total Satellite labor force outside of agriculture had risen to more than 16 million, as compared with 12 million in 1948.¹

In these years the production of coal rose from about 134 million tons to about 183 million (including brown coal and lignite), of crude steel from 5.6 million tons to

¹United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1954*, Geneva 1955, Table 24. The figures include Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania.



Mr. Josef Stefan, polisher, is an "innovator" whose ideas have helped cut production costs.



By improving his methods of work Mr. Jaroslav Štěpán topped the norms by 170%.



The methods of shockwork, unlike capitalist speed-up, invariably mean better craftsmanship.

Photos and captions from *Czechoslovak Life* (Prague), January 1951



In the five-year period the output of ferrous metal rose 113 %. The big foundries of Sztáliváros and Diósgyőr were also erected during 1950-54. The picture shows big foundry of Sztalin Iron Works

Photo and caption from *Hungary* (Budapest), May 1955.

10 million, and of electric energy from about 19 billion kwh to over 35 billion. Romania and Bulgaria ceased to be "agrarian" countries and became "agrarian-industrial," while Poland and Hungary rose even higher in the Communist lexicon, becoming full-fledged "industrial" states, and Czechoslovakia passed from the "unbalanced industrial" category to "balanced industrial."² In their propaganda the Communists are fond of contrasting present levels of industrial output with former levels, and of comparing rates of change with those of non-Communist countries. In the article cited below a Soviet writer gives the following index numbers of gross industrial output for the captive area as a whole (including Albania), in percentages of 1937:

1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954
122	151	185	235	281	321	345

These figures cannot be considered accurate, since Communist production indices tend to exaggerate actual growth. The real accomplishment is undoubtedly less. It is worth

²This is the classification made by a Soviet writer, I. Dudinsky, "The Heavy Industry of the People's Democracies, Foundation of their Economic Might," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1955, No. 7.

observing, however, that if each index number is converted to a percentage of the preceding year, the rate of increase declines rapidly after 1951:

1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954
24	23	27	20	14	7

Thus it appears that the rapid early growth was only a temporary phenomenon, associated with certain special conditions which existed at that time. These conditions, of course, were the rural labor supplies already described, and industrial resources which had not been fully exploited. The large gains of the early years were mainly the result of moving new workers into mines, mills and factories—not of getting the existing industrial labor force to produce more than it had previously.

Output per Man-Year

SHORTLY BEFORE the Second World War Stalin pointed out, in his report to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party, that the true measure of a country's industrial strength is not its total industrial output but its *per capita* output. This is the concept generally known as "productivity." It can be expressed in various ways, and with varying degrees of refinement. It may be measured in tons per man-hour, output per man-year, national product per man-hour or in some other manner depending on the purpose at hand, but the central idea is that of comparing effort with results.

Productivity has been a preoccupation of the Communists ever since Lenin said that capitalism would ultimately be conquered by a new and higher "Socialist" productivity. As the Five Year Plans wore on in the USSR the preoccupation increased, until in 1939 Stalin listed among the most important tasks of his regime that of raising the productivity of labor. The emphasis came partly from fear of war with more highly developed countries and partly from the fact that, if Stalinism could not ultimately create an advanced economy, it would lose its chief justification.

The same concern with productivity is now appearing ever more forcefully in the captive countries. This stress figures prominently in discussions of the new Five Year Plans and in articles dealing with economic problems. The people are told that the superior living standards in countries such as England and the United States derive from the higher productivity of their economies—an argument which tends to conceal the real reason for the abnormally low standards under Communism. However, the basis of this talk of productivity is not just the desire to make people work harder. It arises from the fact that a ready supply of labor for new industrial plants is no longer available at the same rate as formerly, and that future increases in production will have to come largely from a higher output by the existing working force.

The standard way of measuring labor productivity in Communist countries is to divide gross industrial production (in terms of value) by the number of workers employed. Thus if production for a given year is valued at X, and average employment for the year is Y, then productivity

ity is the quotient of X/Y. Figures of this kind are seldom released because of the laws against publishing State information, and so productivity is commonly expressed in terms of an index based on some previous year. Annual plan reports since 1950 give the following data on productivity in five of the captive countries (in terms of percentage increases over the preceding year):

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955
Bulgaria	16.0	13.7	11.0	6.8	2.0	3.5
Czechoslovakia	7.0	9.7	15.5	7.0	2.0	8.0
Hungary	20.1	14.3	10.6	4.4	-1.5	6.1
Poland	9.0	14.0	13.0	10.6	7.0	6.0
Romania	—	10.0	12.5	—	2.7	11.0

It is necessary to add here the usual cautionary note concerning the accuracy of Communist statistics. These figures must not be confused with productivity estimates used in other countries, which are generally estimates of output per man-hour. The Communist figures are based on indices of gross production which probably exaggerate actual accomplishments; to the extent that this is so, the productivity indices will tend to exaggerate increases and minimize decreases. Another difficulty is inherent in the employment statistics which comprise the lower half of the productivity ratio: these are estimates of average annual employment, and they do not reflect changes in the number of hours worked per person, or in the amount of time missed because of sickness, absenteeism, etc. Thus if the number of hours worked in a year were to increase—for example, from “donations” of time by the workers—the effect would be to raise production without a corresponding increase in the employment index, and therefore “productivity” would show an increase. On the other hand, time lost from work would have just the opposite effect on production and on “productivity.” A more accurate name for Communist

productivity statistics would be “estimated gross value of output per man-year.”²

With all their limitations, these are the figures used by the captive countries to assess the performance of their economies and to set plan targets. For this reason, and also because they are probably adequate as indicators of comparative trends, it seems worthwhile to examine their implications at greater length.

Poland

The Polish regime has been the most successful so far as its economic programs are concerned. Following a Three Year Plan (1947-1949) emphasizing reconstruction, it undertook a Six Year Plan (1950-1955) aiming at rapid industrialization. The gross value of industrial production was to rise by 158 percent during the years of the Plan. The larger part of this increased production was to be achieved by the creation of new industrial plant and the shifting of manpower from villages to towns. Labor productivity was to rise by 66 percent, or less than half as fast as production. This level of productivity was claimed to have been reached by the end of 1954.

It is possible, on the basis of published reports, to reconstruct the official indices of production, employment and labor productivity in Polish industry. These are given in Table 1, with 1937 as the base year. They show that Poland emerged from the war with a much larger industrial labor force than in 1937—the westward shift in boundaries had created employment for Poles in former German industries—but a labor force understandably less productive than in

²There are other technical criticisms which cannot be included here. See the discussion of industrial labor productivity in Abram Bergson's *Soviet Economic Growth*, Row, Peterson and Co., Evanston, Illinois, 1953.

Table 1
Industrial Production, Employment, and Labor Productivity
in Poland, 1937-1954. Official Indices.*

Year	Gross Output of Industry		No. of Persons Employed in Industry		Industrial Labor Productivity	
	1. Index: 1937 = 100	2. Annual Increase (%)	3. Index: 1937 = 100	4. Annual Increase (%)	5. Index: 1937 = 100	6. Annual Increase (%)
1946	77	—	140	—	55	—
1947	107	39	168	20	64	16
1948	148	38	182	8	81	27
1949	172	16	198	9	87	7
1950	225	31	237	20	95	9
1951	279	24	261	10	108	14
1952	335	20	275	6	122	13
1953	395	18	293	6	135	11
1954	438	11	305	4	144	7
1955	486	11	317	4	153	6

* Prepared by the Free Europe Press Planning and Analysis section of the Free Europe Committee. Industry includes “Socialized” manufacturing and mining, but excludes construction and

transportation. The number of persons employed includes both strictly “production” workers and other employees (managerial, technical, etc.).

1937. Even in 1949 labor productivity was below the prewar level; and although between 1949 and the end of 1954 productivity rose by 66 percent the level was still only 44 percent above that of 1937.

Table 1 also indicates that the tremendous growth claimed for industrial production by 1954 (438 per cent of 1937) was achieved largely by adding to the number of workers (305 percent of 1937). The index of productivity grew relatively slowly at first and did not pass the prewar level until 1951. After that, however, increases in productivity began to assume more importance. If 1949 is taken as the base year for the indices it can be seen that during the latter part of the Six Year Plan employment grew less than productivity:

	Employment	Productivity
1949.....	100	100
1950.....	120	109
1951.....	132	124
1952.....	139	140
1953.....	148	155
1954.....	154	166
1955.....	160	176

On the whole, nevertheless, Poland's postwar development has been marked by a tremendous growth of industrial manpower and by a much slower increase in production per man-year. Though productivity is probably higher than in most of the captive countries, it has not yet reached the level of Czechoslovakia or the USSR.⁴

Czechoslovakia

A somewhat different pattern appears in Czechoslovakia, which had a relatively mature economy at the time the Communists seized power in 1948. As shown in Table 2, the regime claimed at the end of 1954 that industrial production had reached 225 percent of the 1937 level, or more than double what it was in 1948 at the beginning of the First Five Year Plan. At the same time, the official index of industrial employment had risen to 131 percent of prewar, while that of output per worker had risen to 172. As early as 1948 increases in productivity began to assume more importance than increases in employment. Allowing for some degree of exaggeration in the production and productivity indices, it is clear that the major portion of whatever has been achieved since 1948 must have come in the form of greater output per man-year.

Hungary

In the case of Hungary the picture is not so clear, since the published figures are not comparable for different years. While the regime has published a revised index of manufacturing production for the years of the Five Year Plan, it has released only scattered information on labor productivity and employment. Gross output in manufacturing rose between 1949 and 1954—the end of the Five Year Plan—by 155 percent. Labor productivity in manufacturing rose by 46.6 percent. Assuming that Hungarian economists measure productivity in the same manner as do their Polish and Czech colleagues, it follows by a process of

⁴Głos Pracy (Warsaw), March 22, 1955.



Under experienced foremen, women are employed in ever-increasing numbers in assembly shops, fulfilling their norms by up to 300 per cent.

Photo and caption from *Czechoslovak Life* (Prague), July 1953

arithmetic that employment during this period rose by 73.9 percent. Additions to the working force evidently made the major contribution to the increase of production.

It should be observed that the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe estimated the net increase in production to have been only 92 percent. (*Economic Bulletin for Europe*, Geneva, August 1955.) On this basis, assuming that employment increased by 73.9 percent, productivity must have risen by only 10 percent. A resolution of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party (*Szabad Nép* [Budapest], November 13, 1955) admitted that during the period of the Five Year Plan "increase in industrial output has been due largely to an increase in the number of productive workers and only to a minor degree to higher rates of productivity."

Romania

Romanian statistics are scantier than in any of the other countries under discussion. Speakers at the Party Congress in December stated that "Socialist industry's annual production increased compared with 1950 approximately 2.2 times," and that "for industry as a whole labor productivity increased only 47.7 percent, instead of the 70 percent called for by the plan."⁵ This implies that half of the growth in total production must have come from increased employment, as follows (percentages of 1950):

	Production	Employment	Productivity
1950.....	100	100	100
1955.....	220	149	148

Bulgaria

In Bulgaria the regime has not yet exhausted its manpower reserves, judging from the targets set by the Second

⁵Speeches of Premier Chivu Stoica and First Party Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej, *Scinteia* (Bucharest), Dec. 28 and Dec. 24, 1955.

Five Year Plan (1953-1957). Industrial production in 1957 is to be 60 percent greater than in 1953, while productivity is to increase by 35 percent. The difference will presumably be made up by additions to the working force. Official figures on annual increases in production and productivity since 1949 show that productivity has not been rising as rapidly as production.

Taking Stock

BY THE TIME of Stalin's death it was apparent that some of the economic plans, notably the Hungarian, had been too ambitious. Party propaganda began to talk of "imbalances" between different economic sectors. Agriculture was found to be lagging, partly because industrial recruitment had denuded the farms of their most efficient labor: in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary efforts had to be made to channel some workers back to the country. At the same time, industry was outrunning its supplies of fuel, power and raw materials. These considerations, as well as acute political difficulties, led to revision of plans in some of the captive countries. There was even some questioning of the traditional Communist emphasis on heavy industry. But by the end of 1955 the period of hesitation seemed to be over and regime spokesmen were announcing new Five Year Plans calling for more industrialization.

The new plans differ from those of the past in being less grandiose and by showing greater concern with problems of manpower and production costs. Confronted with their limitations in expendable resources—not only of manpower but of fuel, power and raw materials as well—the regimes

have evolved a complex set of measures for overcoming them. Although the cardinal principle of Communist economic policy, emphasis on the development of heavy industry, will not be abandoned, it is to be pursued in a different way than hitherto. Production must increase more rapidly than the supply of manpower, fuel and materials. Further progress is therefore seen to depend upon raising the overall efficiency of the East European economy.

The principal ways in which this is to be accomplished were outlined by Matyas Rakosi in his report to the Third Congress of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party on May 24, 1954. During the Second Five Year Plan, he said, "we must increasingly utilize such basic sources of Socialist accumulation as raising labor productivity, reducing the cost of production, as well as overheads in production, construction, transportation, trading and administration, eliminating wastefulness and unnecessary expenditure and in particular the strictest possible enforcement of thrift, not only in the national economy but in all spheres of life of the people's democracy." (*For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!* [Bucharest], May 28, 1954.) This can be boiled down to two fundamental precepts: (1) raise labor productivity and (2) reduce costs.

Similar statements have been made by spokesmen for the other regimes. In Poland, First Deputy Premier Hilary Minc said: "It is obvious that during the Five Year Plan we shall continue to invest and build, for without this there is no expanded Socialist production, but the main accent in the plan is not on building new enterprises but on full modernization of the old ones, on bringing enterprises under construction up to the planned production capacity. . . .

Table 2
Industrial Production, Employment, and Labor Productivity In
Czechoslovakia, 1937-1954. Official Indices.*

Year	Gross Output of Industry		No. of Persons Employed in Industry		Industrial Labor Productivity	
	1. Index: 1937=100	2. Annual Increase (%)	3. Index: 1937=100	4. Annual Increase (%)	5. Index: 1937=100	6. Annual Increase (%)
1945	50	—	—	—	—	—
1946	80	60	—	—	—	—
1947	91	14	98	—	93	—
1948	108	19	103	5	104	12
1949	126	17	107	4	117	12
1950	145	15	116	8	125	7
1951	167	15	122	5	137	10
1952	197	18	124	2	159	16
1953	216	10	128	3	169	7
1954	225	4	131	2	172	2

* Prepared by the Free Europe Press Planning and Analysis section of the Free Europe Committee. Industry includes State manufacturing and mining enterprises but excludes construction and transportation; presumably it also excludes artisan cooperatives. The number of persons employed includes both strictly "production" workers and other employees (managerial, technical, etc.). These figures were gathered from a variety of sources

and the construction of consistent indices involved considerable computation. The results are therefore subject to statistical error. They are, however, mutually consistent within this limitation and the few available opportunities to check them against other information indicated that they are accurate within a sufficiently small range of error for the purposes of this study.

The plan will lay main stress on the utilization of reserves, and technical progress, which means a rise in production with the lowest possible investments, highest quality, and lowest possible production costs." (Radio Warsaw, December 14, 1955.) In Romania, Premier Chivu Stoica told the Second Party Congress, "Of the total increase in industrial production during the Second Five Year Plan, 75 to 80 percent must be obtained by increasing labor productivity." (*Scinteia*, December 28, 1955.) First Party Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej said on the same occasion that production costs in industry must be cut by at least 15 to 20 percent. The achievement of these two tasks, he said, "will yield savings amounting to around 25 billion lei in industry and almost 7 billion lei in building." (*Scinteia*, December 24, 1955.) An editorial in the Bulgarian newspaper *Otechestven Front* (Sofia) on September 24, 1955, also emphasized the need for higher productivity and lower costs and said that progress so far was slower than had been planned. Similar intentions are evident in Czechoslovakia, where the recently-published plan for 1956 relies on an increase in labor productivity of 7.1 percent to achieve the goal of a 9 percent increase in industrial production.

These general exhortations have been implemented by the planners in a number of specific ways. For the most part they involve a renewed emphasis on old Communist solutions such as norm-raising and mechanization, but they also include one idea which is relatively new in Communist discussions.

Division of Labor

In November, 1955, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party stated in a resolution on the 1956 economic plan: "For the large-scale rise in labor productivity and the cutting down of production costs . . . greater use must be made of the possibilities involved in international cooperation among the countries of the Socialist camp with the further development of international division of labor based on . . . the economic potential of each country." (*Szabad Nep*, November 13, 1955.) The advantages of division of labor from the standpoint of productivity were emphasized by First Deputy Premier Erno Gero in a speech to the National Assembly several days later. Gero said that international division of labor could lead, on the average, to a 15 to 20 percent increase in labor productivity—"often as much as 40 to 50 percent." By specializing in certain items, industry would be able to "manufacture in mass production and on a very high technical level machines, vehicles, instruments, and industrial installations which normally only the very big countries would be able to produce." (*Szabad Nep*, November 18.)

This idea has been given play by all of the other regimes, and has received emphasis in Soviet publications devoted to the area. Its precise meaning and significance is somewhat obscured by the platitudes used to express it, and also by the fact that "division of labor" is not altogether new to the Satellite economies. Poland has a natural advantage in the coal industry and Romania in oil. Czechoslovakia, at the time of the Communist coup, had a well-developed engineering industry. These and other national

differences are already an integral part of areawide trading. What seems to be new is the emphasis on specialization within industries that are common to all of the countries, particularly in the engineering industries. Thus, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania all produce tractors, but evidently they are to specialize on different types of tractors, exporting some and importing others. Other examples occur in the production of ball bearings and rolled metal. According to a Soviet writer, Romania will export not only oil and related products, but also "tractors, sea and river boats, fabricated metal, chemical acids, cement, glass and other products of the chemical industry and the building materials industry."⁶

Much of the previous planning in the captive area had a flavor of autarchy, or economic nationalism. Each country seemed bent on a full-scale development of all branches of industry without much regard to the subtler advantages of international exchange. To some extent this was a rational attempt to exploit idle or undeveloped resources—especially of manpower—and to build up a balanced industrial base in each country. For example, the fact that the Silesian basin in Poland and Czechoslovakia has great industrial potential does not preclude the development of more limited resources in Romania and Bulgaria. But in some cases industrial development was apparently pushed beyond rationality to a point where costly projects were undertaken which could not be justified on even a long-term estimate of comparative advantages.

Aside from any misdirection in past planning, there is the inescapable fact that further industrial development will depend on raising the productivity of labor and lowering production costs. The chief means to this is mass production; and in such an area as Eastern Europe mass production obviously implies international division of labor. A recent article in a Soviet periodical expressed this idea in the following "theoretical" fashion:

"The perception of all the demands of the law of planned proportional development of the economy and its joint use by all the countries of the socialist camp indisputably leads to a broader action of the basic law of socialism and to its better application in each country and all the socialist countries. The all-sided coordination of the economic plans and the elimination of harmful parallelism serves to realize the demand also of other economic laws of socialism, among them the law of uninterrupted growth and the productivity of socialist labor, taken as a whole for the socialist camp. Now, a number of basic manufactures located in the socialist camp are rationally divided among them, for example, certain grades of rolled metal, production of ball bearings and so forth. This permits the individual People's Democracies to refrain from constructing a number of huge, expensive factories and to use the funds saved in this way for other branches of the economy, for concentrating its forces on mass production of a number of commodities intended not only for home consumption but for export to other countries in exchange for products of their industries.

"Such a development of the international socialist divi-

⁶I. Oleinik, "The Development of Heavy Industry in the Romanian People's Republic," *Voprosy Ekonomiki* (Moscow), 1956, No. 1.

sion of labor leads to a sharp increase in the productivity of labor in each of the countries in the socialist camp. . . .

"Insofar as goods belonging to various owners are traded on the universal democratic market, the law of cost operates, and because the owners are socialist States . . . there is a real basis for employing the law of cost in the interest of the people of all countries of the socialist camp. For this it is necessary that, on the basis of industrialization and electrification, on the basis of installing high grade machinery in production, the levels of production cost in all countries of the socialist camp should tend toward equality, and thus the social costs of commodities will be equalized in each of the countries as a unit, along with lowered social costs in the whole socialist camp and the simultaneous deepening and broadening of the socialist international division of labor."⁷

To carry out these principles in the tightly-planned captive economies will require more than devout lip service to them at Party congresses. In theory, at least, the program implies a thorough integration of planning throughout the area. Each country's plan must be linked in considerable detail with those of the other countries. Innumerable decisions must be made, on the basis of comparative costs, as to where specific items are to be produced, and corresponding allocations of materials must be arranged. Complete integration of the area is apparently not yet at hand, but the extent to which it has progressed is not clear. The fact that all of the countries except Bulgaria are beginning Five Year Plans concurrently with the USSR implies that these plans have been centrally organized to a greater degree than in preceding years, but the details have not been revealed.

The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed in Warsaw on May 14, 1955, may provide an organizational basis; it has been hailed by a Soviet economist as "an important landmark on the road to the further development and expansion of economic ties between the signatory nations."⁸ An article by Romania's Gheorghiu-Dej in *Pravda* (Moscow) on February 10, 1956, stated that the Warsaw Council "is allocating tasks for the production of certain items to various countries." Another method of integrating plans is suggested by a conference in January 1956 between representatives of the chemical industry from Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Zone of Germany, held at Berlin. The main subject, according to an unofficial report, was a common shortage of sulfuric acid and other basic materials. Recently the Hungarian Minister of Light Industry, Mrs. Jozsef Nagy, alluded to a meeting of a Light Industrial Collaboration Committee in Budapest, at which representatives from Hungary and the Soviet Zone of Germany agreed to mutual assistance "in developing the production of straw cellulose and synthetic leather." (Radio Budapest, February 10, 1956.)

Technical Improvement

A more concrete way of attacking the economic problem is the campaign to raise the technical efficiency of industry.

⁷Vladimir Kaigl, "Development of Economic Ties between the Countries of the Socialist Camp," *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 1955, No. 7.

⁸I. Dudinsky, *op. cit.*



"Is that the kind of shoes we produce for export?"

"I'm sorry—I thought they were for the domestic market."

Szpilki (Warsaw), September 25, 1955

This involves a multitude of things, from industrial research, mechanization and mass production down to the more efficient use of tools and better work methods. The chief difference from the past seems to lie in the realization that technical improvement must now justify itself by savings in labor and materials—that is, it must raise productivity and lower costs.

There is also the realization that much of the technical advance already made has not been uniformly applied throughout the industrial system, or accepted on an adequate scale by workers and managers. During 1955 the Satellite press was full of comment on "shortcomings" in the use of technological improvements. In Romania First Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej told the Second Party Congress that the coal industry "received in the course of the Five Year Plan investments amounting to almost three billion lei and was equipped with an important amount of machines and mechanisms. Nevertheless labor productivity decreased in this branch to 92 percent of what it was in 1950. The cause of this intolerable state of affairs lies in lack of attention by the Ministry of the Coal Industry and the mining directorate to the full use of equipment and machines at the disposal of the mines. . . ." He noted the same problem in the iron and steel industry, and the food and textile industries. (*Scinteia*, December 24, 1955.)

In Hungary, the Party's Central Committee found similar failures to take advantage of existing techniques. Its resolution of November 1955, in discussing the slow progress of labor productivity, said that the slowness "was chiefly because our State organs have failed to pay due attention to the principal source of raising labor productivity, that is, technical development. . . ." It went on to list a host of ways in which management could improve the exploitation of existing technique. (*Szabad Nep*, November 13, 1955.) The extent to which Hungarian enterprises have failed to take full advantage of technical possibilities was emphasized by an article in *Kozgazdasagi Szemle* (Budapest), July-August 1955, stating that "if we did nothing but teach existing and proven methods to all workers, productivity would show a 20-30 percent, or even greater, rise."

In Poland, where progress in technology has been the most marked of all, there is still a wide area in which production is hampered by obsolete methods and machinery. The prominent economist Bronislaw Minc, writing in *Gospodarka Planowa* (Warsaw) in August 1955, stated:

"People's Poland inherited a considerable stock of machinery from the capitalist period. Thanks to the interwar economic stagnation and the domination of the Polish economy by foreign capital, there was a great quantity of outmoded machines and equipment in Polish industry. During the German occupation the condition of machinery and equipment deteriorated and consequently the backwardness increased. In the period of postwar recovery (1945-1949) People's Poland was forced to put into operation the existing productive apparatus. This necessity led to renovation and use of the old machines and equipment without any change in their technical level. The six-year plan period was a period of great new investments, a period of creating numerous new branches of industry, a period of great development of the machine industry. But during the six-year plan no essential changes occurred in scrapping the old technique and replacing it with a new one. Therefore, beside the new technique there exists in our industry an old technique. This leads to glaring disproportions in labor productivity and use of raw materials among enterprises in the same branch of industry. The discrepancy in labor productivity often reaches 300 to 400 percent. . . . It is no exaggeration to say that replacement of the old technique by the new one and the mastering of it by the cadres would relieve hundreds of thousands of workers, who could be employed in new and rebuilt enterprises. There is also no exaggeration in saying that such a change . . . would save millions of tons of coal, hundreds of thousands of tons of metals, great quantities of timber, textile raw materials and other important materials, the deficit of which now hampers the development of the national economy."

In Czechoslovakia ordinary technological backwardness is less of a problem than among the other Satellites, but the necessity of further improvement is continually stressed. A spate of criticism has been directed at administrators and managers for slowness in applying more advanced techniques that are already available. They are accused of "bureaucratism" and "complacency," of "idle sticking to old, routine technique and technology." The range of guilt extends "from the Ministries down to the management of

plants." The failure is generally attributed to sheer lack of responsibility and the desire for an easy life. "Many technicians do not want mechanization. For them it is better if the miner works with a pneumatic hammer and shovel. Under these conditions, the technician does not have to concern himself with mechanization and machinery, because the miner will take care of the shovel himself." Again: "The Ministries and plants frequently ignore suggestions for improvement, or put them aside by accepting the suggestion for so-called 'prospective utilization,' i.e., they put them into the files."⁹

On October 24, 1955, the National Assembly discussed new legislation which would charge managers with the duty to "promote, according to a plan and using their own initiative, perfection of production, to ascertain the technically most perfect production processes, to make themselves systematically acquainted with the experiences of other enterprises, to watch the development of production methods in the entire world and to make better use than hitherto of the improvement proposals of workers."¹⁰

Work Norms

The drive for greater efficiency and productivity naturally does not overlook the workers. Most workers under Communism are governed by a system of "norms" that bears some similarity to the piece-rate system used in certain industries in other countries. One type of norm establishes the number of pieces a worker must complete if he is to earn his base pay—e.g., a toolmaker of a certain class may be required to finish 20 pieces of rolled steel bars in an 8 hour work day. If he finishes more than 20 his wages will be higher, and if he finishes less his wages will be lower. Some of the regimes have recently been very critical of the prevailing structure of norms on the ground that they are set too low and the workers overfulfill them, with the result that wages tend to rise faster than productivity.

The Communist philosophy of work norms was neatly expressed by a Czechoslovak newspaper last year in the following words:

"Soft and backward norms have an unfavorable effect on the workers, because they maintain in their consciousness a relic of the capitalistic outlook, which consists in the idea that 'it is better to conceal one's reserves or so-called good work.' From this attitude follow all kinds of antiquated viewpoints. . . . The workers lose interest in improving their qualifications . . . and all this causes a lagging in the productivity of work. . . . In many leading plants there is an expression of regressive viewpoints, stemming from ordinary as well as leading comrades, which manifest themselves in flirtations with lower norms, prevalent in less developed plants, and often one hears the statement that in their plant it is no longer necessary to tighten norms, because elsewhere they are much softer. . . . In some plants, so-called 'friends of the people' come forward with the statement that nobody could 'survive' on the work of such firm work norms, and they call for

⁹*Prace* (Prague), Oct. 17; *Rude Pravo* (Prague), Oct. 21; *Radio Prague*, Sept. 21; *Prace*, Oct. 4; *Praca* (Bratislava), Oct. 24, 1955.

¹⁰*Prace*, Oct. 26, 1955.


resistance against the tightening of norms. . . ." (*Nase Pravda* [Gottwaldov], March 25, 1955. Italics in the original.)

A recent article in *Prace* (Prague) complained that in the machine industry "more than 60 percent of the norms are stipulated arbitrarily. It is no wonder, therefore, that the machine industry fulfilled the plan of productivity in November 99.7 percent while the plan of wages was exceeded to 103.7 percent." (January 24, 1956.)

In Romania, Gheorghiu-Dej told the Second Party Congress: "Norming is often limited to the arrangement of norms in such a manner that a certain average increase should be made regardless of the percentage of increase in labor productivity. The completely abnormal overfulfillments of norms which are being achieved in this manner are without a corresponding increase in real labor productivity." He gave as one example the food goods industry, in which "in the third quarter of 1955 labor productivity decreased 7.2 percent below the level of the second quarter of 1955 whereas the average index of the fulfillment of norms increased from 133 percent to 139 percent." He added: "Such cases, unfortunately, are not few." (*Scinteia*, December 24, 1955.)

The problem of norms is by no means new; ever since they took power the Communists have had a continuing struggle to replace the old "capitalist" organization of work with the Soviet system, and their success has varied from one country to another, depending partly on the quality of the labor force and the competence of the Party cadres. In Poland the change-over to the Soviet model seems to have been relatively successful. Judging from the current press, in which the problem of norms is scarcely mentioned, the Polish regime is much more concerned with improving the technical level of production. But in Czechoslovakia, where free unions once flourished, the struggle for the norm has apparently met with considerable resistance.

Whatever their degree of success in the past, the new emphasis on labor productivity means that the regimes will have to increase pressure on the workers if they are to fulfill the current Five Year Plans. At the same time, managers are warned against "illegal" methods of exploiting em-



The machine: "Comrade, I have the feeling one of us is working to no purpose."

Urzica (Bucharest), October 30, 1955

ployees such as forcing them to work overtime in order to meet the targets. The official policy is to be one of adjusting or "correcting" norms in keeping with the technical possibilities of the equipment in use, without, it is stated, infringing on the eight-hour day. In Hungary and Romania the Party leaders have called for a more "scientific" setting of norms and the substitution of "technical" norms for the outmoded and inaccurate "statistical" type. The statistical norm is one based on an overall estimate of what a given class of workers ought to be able to produce—derived either from average performance in the past or from an educated guess. The technical norm, on the other hand (also known as the analytical norm), is arrived at by a precise study of a particular operation or a particular machine, or by qualified technical estimates and projections. The latter procedure is obviously a more accurate way of establishing a norm than the overall statistical method, especially in the case of new machines or new plants where there is no past experience to go by.

The Central Committee of the Hungarian Party, in its resolution of last November, stated: "Through the establishment of strict norm and technological discipline, and by increasing the number of technical norms, it must be insured that the norms gradually become more and more the



Title: "In competitions, some stakhanovites don't help their backward comrades." Stakhanovite: "When I am in a competition I only look forward!" [The worker behind him carries a screw marked "reject."]

Urzica (Bucharest), July 31, 1955

incentive factors of technical advancement and lead to the reduction of production costs." Likewise in Romania, where Gheorghiu-Dej said: "Technical norms must be established in a scientific manner which corresponds to the present level of technical equipment of our enterprises and the experience in production accumulated by the mass of the workers—norms which change to the extent of the technical progress of the enterprises. Such norms will stimulate the initiative and the efforts of the workers to increase production on the basis of increased labor productivity, the only way to raise living standards." In Bulgaria the Ministry of Heavy Industry has announced "corrections" of norms amounting to an average increase of 4 percent in coal mining, 2 percent in the production of iron ore, 15 percent in ferrous metallurgy and 4 percent in non-ferrous metallurgy. (*Rudnichar* [Sofia], December 31, 1955.)

Sweat and Strain

THE POLICIES described above are, of course, only some of the ways in which the regimes are attacking their current economic problems. In the matter of productivity alone there are many other things to be done. Some ground

may be gained by efforts to reduce the swollen administrative apparatus and thus raise the proportion of "productive" workers in industry—as Hungary attempted to do in 1954. Measures are being taken to encourage quality in production as distinguished from mere quantity. A reduction in absenteeism among workers, against which the regimes constantly inveigh, would have an immediate effect upon the ratio of output per man-year; so also would a reduction in the high rate of turnover in employment.

But the problem of productivity rests in a setting of other problems. The scarcity of manpower is only one element of a general scarcity of basic resources, which includes a tight supply of raw materials, of fuel, of power and of transportation facilities. And these in turn are accompanied by a chronic shortage of consumer goods and a stagnation of output in agriculture. The only area in which there is not a scarcity, in fact, seems to be the production totals of heavy industry. It is to achieve those ever-rising figures that workers must sweat and the economy strain. The people are told that the sweat and the strain are for their own ultimate satisfaction, and are asked to believe that some day, in some unspecified way, this system of worry will transform itself into a state of abundance.

Brickwork

This story is told in Bulgaria. A conference on trade relations among the captive countries and the Soviet Union was convened in Moscow. The Russian representative, opening the conference, said: "It is well known that Bulgaria produces bricks. These should be exported to Poland, which will give Bulgaria needed clothing items in exchange." The Bulgarian representatives applauded, pleased, and the speaker continued: "Bulgaria, however, should not keep these clothing items, but should export them to Czechoslovakia in exchange for machinery and agricultural implements." The Bulgarians, somewhat disappointed, thought that with Czech machinery they might manufacture the needed clothing, but the Russian continued: "As it happens, though, Hungary is in greater need of machinery, and Bulgaria should export the Czech machinery to Hungary in exchange for their excellent salami." Their spirits raised again, the Bulgarians were eager to settle for the salami. The Russian, however, went on: "Now this salami should be exported to the Soviet Union, which in exchange will send Bulgaria an excellent quality of clay for brickmaking." The Bulgarian representatives slumped to the floor, unconscious.

Night Life

in the

Soviet Bloc

IS WARSAW a gloomy city? The inhabitants of Warsaw would probably take offense at such a question. . . . The people of Warsaw are fonder of entertainment than the people of any other city," stated *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) on February 11, 1955. "However," the paper continued, "if this question were put to a correspondent who came from abroad for a short stay and visited the Warsaw restaurants and cafes, he would doubtless admit to an impression of gloominess. No wonder. There are in Warsaw more than 50 restaurants, but only in 11 of them is there dancing; there are 62 cafes, but only four of them have dance music. This state of affairs is prevalent, not only in Warsaw."

The call for stronger wine and madder music is a far cry from the austerity preached and imposed by the Communists during the first years of their domination in Eastern Europe. Before the war, Budapest, Warsaw and Prague were renowned for the gaiety and variety of their night life. But this side of life, suspended during the war, was never permitted to revive. The reorganization of society (the liquidation of the old bourgeoisie) and the economy (rapid industrialization) left neither the time, the means nor the spirit for casual pleasure-seeking. To the Communists, all forms of commercial entertainment were manifestations of bourgeois corruption; the new "Socialist" man was to be characterized by industriousness, purposefulness, and sturdy sobriety. Cafes and night clubs were the relics of a degenerate society, playgrounds of an idle class which dissipated its wealth and assuaged its boredom in dancing, gambling and drinking. Such unproductive pastimes had no place in a day which held scarcely enough hours to meet the demands of jobs, indoctrination courses, work brigades and Party meetings.

One of the aspects of the post-Stalinist "relaxation" in the Soviet bloc has been the change precisely in the realm



"Throughout the country there were thousands of balls at which people greeted the New Year. Warsaw enjoyed it magnificently. At 1 a.m. our photo-reporter found concrete examples of this. . . ."

Front Cover of *Swiat* (Warsaw), January 9, 1955

of relaxation. While the Communists still are far from being *bon vivants*, they now recognize the value of entertainment bought for money as well as the more exalted pleasure of hard work. The regimes have become aware that the drudgery and monotony of daily life under Communism provoke restiveness among the captive people, and that a safety valve must be opened.

Thus, recent visitors to the cities of the Soviet bloc have noted a considerable improvement in night life. Night clubs have been refurbished and new ones opened. Dress is more formal; no longer do people appear in restaurants and night clubs wearing open-collared shirts or overalls, a common sight in previous years. Imported wine, liquor and edibles are again available—though at astronomical prices. Hotels, restaurants and night clubs are now nationalized, and their rates and prices are high. Those with cabarets or orchestras charge an admission or minimum consumption fee.

The cabarets—variety shows predominantly satirical in content—are a distinctive feature of Continental entertainment. (*Poland* [Warsaw], No. 7, 1955, for instance, compared the *Szpak* cabaret in Warsaw to the *Chat-Noir* and *Lapin Agile* in Paris.) Cabarets are exceedingly pop-

ular behind the Iron Curtain, but *Trybuna Ludu* pointed out in its article on entertainment facilities: "There are, of course, the cabarets. They are, however, rather a kind of small theater characterized by sophisticated satire. Warsaw can afford a few of them, but a smaller city, owing to the lack of authors and performers, no more than one. This does not solve the [entertainment] problem, all the more since not everyone can afford to go to a cabaret. They are expensive and rather exclusive. . . ."

The service in the State-owned cafes and restaurants is reportedly poor by Western standards. Chefs and waiters no longer take pride in their profession or study traditional Continental techniques. Their salaries are low, and tipping is banned as degrading. Nevertheless, visitors observe that the practice continues as before. Another holdover from old ways is the doorman; it seems that not even the "new era" can dispense with this symbol of elegance and order. However, he has discarded his gold-braided uniform and wears ordinary clothes and a chauffeur's cap. His duties, too, have increased. He now collects the admission fees as well as welcoming the guests and, if necessary, speeding their departure.

The Communists have lately adopted a less stringent attitude toward dance music. Most orchestras will play rumbas and sambas upon request. But extreme Western dance steps are still taboo; in public, most people dance a fox trot to the rhythm of jazz and Latin American music.

The New Cafe Society

Who patronizes the night clubs, cabarets and cafes? According to Western observers, the "hard core" is composed of foreigners, Army officers, and the new managerial plutocracy of the Communist States—factory managers, skilled technicians, Party and government functionaries and the regime-favored intelligentsia. The highest State officials and Party leaders rarely go to public entertainment places—their revelling, like that of the old aristocracy, is lavish but mostly unknown to the people. Workers and students frequent the simpler cafes, dance halls and beer gardens. Westerners find that all such places appear crowded and busy. This is partly because many people in the Soviet bloc cities have more cash to spend than there are consumer goods to buy, and partly because of bad housing conditions—living quarters are so small and congested that people are forced to seek their recreation away from home.

A manifestation—in the field of social entertainment—of regime control and penetration into all areas of living are the large balls sponsored by various Party and mass organizations such as the Youth League, Women's League, and trade unions, writers', lawyers', architects' and other Communist-run professional unions. These balls are being given extensive coverage in the press as evidence of the regimes' concern for the happiness and enjoyment of the masses.

Trybuna Ludu's article drew the sanguine conclusion that "although it would be premature to speak of a final defeat of the atmosphere of gloom which until now has prevailed among the wide masses, there is evidence that it is rapidly receding. More and more, entertainment

and enjoyment are being raised to their proper place; they are no longer ignored; the cultural agencies are starting to pay due attention to them. This is evident from the imposing number of 497 balls which were held on New Year's Eve, and the growing number of cabarets performing in Warsaw cafes. . . . The days of dull discussions as to whether the samba should be allowed are done. . . ."

Poland

Until 1949 Polish Communist policy-setters frowned on all cafes and dancing halls, considering them rendezvous of thieves, spies, and black market dealers. The regime restored them to respectability by nationalizing them in 1949, whereupon they were held out as suitable places for workers to go. However, according to first-hand observation, "one can see everyone but workers" in the Warsaw dance halls. The prices at these places are double or triple ordinary restaurant prices. A few years ago a minimum charge of 20-25 *zloty* (\$5 at the official rate of exchange) was introduced, entitling the customer to one glass of vodka and a sandwich. In practice it is difficult to spend less than 50 to 100 *zloty*. At the *Stolica* dance hall, considered the cheapest, two cups of coffee and two glasses of cognac cost 60 *zloty* (\$15 or about a tenth of a worker's monthly salary).

There are reportedly nine night clubs in Warsaw. They are patronized chiefly by factory directors, administrators of cooperatives, State prize-winning artists and workers. One night spot, in the *Orbis* Hotel, is more or less the preserve of "foreigners," meaning Westerners. It is noticeably more luxurious than the others, probably to create the impression that Polish living standards are high and the night clubs on a par with those of Western Europe.

Warsaw's *Marszalkowska* Street is an avenue of numerous cafes and coffee shops. Most of these have a local character, like London's "pubs"; cafes in the Old City are particularly picturesque. In general, cafes are the cheapest public places, and many people take their meals in them. A demitasse of coffee or a cup of tea averages 1.2 *zloty* (30 cents); a doughnut or cake, 2 *zloty*.

In Cracow, the main night club is the *Casanova* in *Florińska* Street; a small place which caters chiefly to out-of-towners. Cracow residents patronize the hotels instead: the *Grand Hotel* in *Slawkowska* Street or *French Hotel* in *Pijarska*. The leading restaurant is the *Wierzynek*, where dinner for two costs several hundred *zloty*. The average Cracow resident consequently rarely goes there; he usually goes to the cafes where prices are low.

The center of night life in Wroclaw is the *Hotel Monopol* restaurant, which is in the luxury class and is popular with Party officials and official guests from abroad such as engineers from West Germany and Sweden, and visiting Communists from other Soviet bloc countries. In a large room there are about 40 tables; beyond is a smaller room called the *Blue Room*. The waiters are in full dress and are well trained; many of them speak several languages. The food and drinks are of excellent quality. In addition to Polish drinks there are wines and liquors imported from France, Russia, Italy and Czechoslovakia. In the same class

as the Monopol is the Klubowa restaurant, distinguished by a neon sign, a rare elegance in Wrocław. In contrast to these two places is the Hotel Polonia, which is the meeting place for working class men and women. It is described as a somewhat tawdry "tourist" hotel where workers coming to Wrocław find lodgings, and is the scene of frequent brawls.

In Poznań there are five night spots: the Theater Cafe, with dancing; Workers' Inn; Targow, Cafe de Dance, and Cafe George, which offers the best dancing in Poznań. In all entertainment places there is a minimum consumption charge of 20 *złoty*. Before the fee was introduced people would go only to dance, without occupying a table or buying even a cup of coffee.

The main first-class restaurant in Szczecin is the Bajka, with three dining rooms and a dance floor. There is an entertainment tax of 15 percent and a minimum of 30 *złoty*. Its best customers are Polish and Soviet officers. The place is also frequented by Polish and foreign seamen and allegedly by black market dealers who trade the articles brought by the seamen from the West. The staff of the restaurant is generally believed to be in cooperation with the police; if someone spends large amounts of money, he is apt to get into trouble.

In the Polish provinces and the new industrial towns, night clubs are unknown: recreation is confined to the dances held in the Houses of Culture, factory recreation halls, etc. A recent escapee described the dances in Oświęcim (Auschwitz), a chemical industrial town, whose workers are drawn mainly from the rural districts. The young people are a mixture: those who have already gone

through the trade schools are relatively urbanized in their tastes and customs. Others have come directly from the villages and the girls still wear plaited hair, head kerchiefs and peasant clothes. "At dances they cluster together in groups of five or six, holding hands with each other to give themselves confidence. They consider any conversation with a dancing partner highly improper, and after each dance, they return to their groups. They are often in the company of a group of young village boys who 'as in the old days' guard 'their' girls. Their suspicious attitude often leads to fights and violence at public dances, when the considerable friction between the newcomers from the villages and workers erupts."

Curb on Drinking

During the autumn of 1955, the regime launched a major campaign to reduce the rate of alcohol consumption in Poland. In November, the National Councils in Warsaw and the provinces of Lublin, Olsztyn, Cracow, Wrocław and Rzeszów passed resolutions limiting the number of establishments permitted to sell alcohol and restricting the hours during which alcohol can be purchased. The sale of alcohol on paydays was banned, and vodka may no longer be bought in canteens, snack bars, bus and railway stations. Proposals to introduce more entertainment for the population with the object of diverting the people from vodka drinking were made at public meetings. In conjunction with the campaign, the regime is trying to introduce measures for the improvement of restaurant and cafeteria services: in the future, cafes and restaurants will be re-

"SZPAK" FLOOR SHOW

"Good evening, ladies and gentlemen... we are about to begin a course on the history of cabaretology." These words spoken from a tiny platform by an elegant gentleman with an immobile face that disguises the jest, suffice to establish contact between the audience of the "Szpak" cabaret and Kazimierz Rudzki, Warsaw's favourite master of *swamizans*.

"Szpak" is a floor show performed by artists who can easily trace their lineage to the "Salon", "Bruciat", "Toulouse-Lautrec", "Chat-Noir" or "Lapin Agile" in France and the "Green Balloon" in Poland. Wit, charm, poetry and art combine in an attractive attire for this charming Muse, the patroness of literary floor shows. The gods on Parnassus, finding no name for it, simply called it the light muse.

Gay, sparkling and witty. A guitar strums a sentimental tune from the first half of this century; miniature skits are performed artistically or a favourite poem, reminiscent of the youthful period of some of the spectators, is recited. Tadeusz Boy-Zelencki, Julian Tuwim or Konstanty Ildefons Gałczyński, distinguished poets and writers, were not ashamed of their weakness for cabaret, creating little gems of poetry which time endowed with a patina.

An elderly gentleman in the hall listens with *staretted* eyes to a 30 year old song that gives vent to disillusionment with the whole world in which everything, particularly love, is just like the smoke of a cigarette — "gone with the wind"; that life is a stupid joke — a house of cards... Thus he relieves his youth.

But soon the small stage is occupied by contemporary satire, the sharp edge of which is directed against the shortcomings of our present everyday life, a satire which arouses roars of laughter...

It's nice to sip a cup of coffee or a glass of sparkling wine while listening at the same time to humorous sketches. The audience joins the actors singing the refrain of a French song.

The course in "cabaretology" has ended. The "students" have attended these nocturnal "seminars" of the "Szpak" with keenest interest and were not sparing in applause. The "Szpak" yielding to the persistent demand of the public that is unable to squeeze into the small café, is making preparations for performances in the open air, where thousands of people will be able to enjoy them.

M. S.

Photos: M. Holzman

1. Hanna Bielicka, 2. Kazimierz Rudzki and Tadeusz Olasz, 3. Edward Dzierwonaki, Józef Kondrat, Władysław Krolakiewicz, 4. and the director of "Szpak", Zemon Wiktorczyk

Poland (Warsaw), No. 7 (11), 1955



quired to supply customers with newspapers and magazines; in November, the regime abolished the obligatory minimum consumption in all restaurants and night clubs, except those with cabarets.

Comparison with USA

The prevailing dissatisfaction with off-hours activity was pinpointed in an article by regime journalist Jerzy Putrament in *Przegląd Kulturalny* (Warsaw), November 10, 1955. Putrament contrasted the night life of New York and Warsaw, to New York's favor. The writer was, quite literally, dazzled: "If New York is the best-lighted city in the world, Broadway is the center of that lightness. Its center—the surroundings of Times Square—is a real fairyland of lights, an incessant pyrotechnic display. . . ." Of New York amusement places Putrament wrote:

"I am agog at these establishments and inclined to admire them. Although they sprang from the low designs of speculators eager to draw a few dollars from bored and desolate fools, they nevertheless respond to some real human need, and they somehow satisfy that need in a singular and forthright way.

"And what about us [in Poland]? In spite of all the cackling about the necessity of improving the masses' cultural level, what, I ask, are the entertainment possibilities for an ordinary worker when he goes to town in the evening? Movies, theaters? Leaving aside the quality of their programs, how can one enter those buildings if he suddenly feels such a desire, unless it has been planned and agreed beforehand with the ticket office?

"Besides, it takes two or three hours to see a picture or a play. One is not always able to take that much time. What then is left, apart from vodka? Cafes. It is known that among the workers this is a very popular way of spending time.

"I am further inclined to admire Broadway bars and eating places. The restaurants guarantee clean, quick and inexpensive meals which—surprisingly—are also good. A pair of 'frankfurters' served with beans satisfy one's hunger at a few cents' expense. There are so many of these small cafeterias that one is always able to find a free place without waiting in line.

"The New York bars—and in general the American bars—are particularly worthy of attention. As a matter of fact, they could be called 'drinking places,' because although they serve, among other things, beer, unlike our taverns they offer a wide choice of other drinks which do not contain a drop of alcohol. To begin with—fruit juices: orange, pineapple, grapefruit, prune juice. They are excellent. In the better places the juice is squeezed from the fruit in the customer's presence. In one of the taverns they even advertise 'cocoanut champagne': cocoanut juice with soda water added, which, however, does not taste too good.

"To those who, reading this, will sigh and complain that cocoanuts and pineapples do not grow in Grojec [near Warsaw], I would like to mention tomatoes: tomatoes are grown in Grojec. Unfortunately, in our beloved country, they are served only with vodka. At best, they are used as the base for our horrible tomato soup with rice.

"On the other hand, in America there exists a separate industry producing tomato juice. It is an excellent drink. With a bit of salt added, it could very well replace our indispensable 'one vodka' taken before every meal. It not

only stimulates the appetite, it also contains valuable vitamins.

"Apart from this, in an American bar one may get half a dozen other drinks. There is, for instance, ginger ale, and some kind of sweetish carbonated drink, with a slight flavor of nutmeg. It is served in a glass, with ice added, and in that form it is excellent.

"Our American 'experts' resolved to make of Coca-Cola a symbol and the greatest danger from America. The truth is we have even had poems denouncing that plague.

"This is a foolish hatred. The drink itself, depending on one's taste, may be considered good or bad. However, it has one great advantage: it does not contain alcohol.

"The enemies of 'Americanism' who, for instance in France, in fighting against Coca-Cola, recommended drinking French wines, committed a serious error. They are opposing two entirely different things. To fight Coca-Cola by opposing to it 'national' alcohol is foolish and ineffective. The most 'imperialistic' Coca-Cola is preferable to the purest (ideologically) domestic vodka.

"At the same time, those of our citizens who [do not want to drink alcohol] have a very poor choice of other drinks. What can they get at the Municipal Retail Trade drink stands? Sometimes there is a horrible, lukewarm, insipid lemonade, sometimes (very rarely, however) a warm soda pop. The only drink which is available everywhere and always is beer, that precious drink which makes bellies grow big and heads swirl."

Hungary

The pall of Communism never managed to extinguish altogether the bright lights of Budapest. Even prior to the New Course, cafes and restaurants were relatively active, though little publicized. A large outdoor restaurant, the Budagyorgy, was constructed in 1952 at a cost of 9 million *forint* to the State. The restaurant of the large hotel on Margit Island, in the middle of the Danube, is perennially popular. According to a refugee in December 1953 there were 22 night clubs, 15 first-class restaurants, and about 50 ordinary restaurants in Budapest, plus innumerable coffee houses and tearooms with music or entertainment. A unique establishment is the restaurant in the Corvin Department Store, open day and night, which recently added a continuous floor show. In the afternoon a girl orchestra plays, in the evening a musical ensemble entertains the customers with sketches, songs and dance numbers for three hours, after which there is general dancing.

The luxurious Moscow Restaurant on Gorki Avenue is, in the main, patronized by Russians and avoided by Hungarians. Foreigners, particularly members of visiting sports teams, are usually entertained at the Palace. One of the most glamorous night clubs is the Jerevan, whose customers are almost entirely foreign tourists. According to a Western visitor, it is decorated in "real splendor": the walls are hung with Persian rugs, and the main room has a glass floor. The bar is modernistic, in the style condemned by Communist aesthetics. The orchestra is permitted to play the generally-banned Western numbers to which the guests dance the similarly banned Western steps. The price of a bottle of champagne is 250-300 *forint*, approximately one third of an average worker's monthly wages.

These are some of the leading night clubs, but in addition there are many open-air pavilions in the city's outskirts, and numerous coffee shops and tearooms. Some of these, for instance, the Volga Tearoom, boast of a small orchestra and a dance floor. Some of the espresso coffee houses also have a separate bar with entertainment.

The Lake Balaton resorts have a large number of night clubs, and there are cafes with music in every sizable Hungarian town.

Publicity—Home and Abroad

The Communist press treats the subject of Communist night life according to whom it is addressing. There is a subtle difference in emphasis and tone between articles directed to Hungarian readers and those in magazines exported abroad. Writing for domestic readers, *Esti Budapest* (Budapest), December 7, 1955, described an evening at the "Animation" (*Hangulat*) night club:

"A large neon sign identifies the 'Animation Club.' Inside, the beautifully furnished rooms shimmer in the soft, silky light. Rezso Kalmar and his band play softly and a few couples move slowly around the dance floor.

"It is the first visit for miner Pal Szabo. Now he has another bottle of wine opened and clinks glasses with his relatives, whom he is visiting in Budapest. In the corner a young couple is celebrating the husband's birthday; Sandor Mikszits works for the supply branch of the Hungarian Railways and he drinks a toast to his little woman. It is not often that they come to the 'Animation,' only on special occasions. They like the place very much, because, as they put it, there are no loud-mouthed drunkards or impertinent zoot-suiters, for the doorman does not admit just anyone. . . . The wife laughs softly and her mate looks at her lovingly. They dance, drink a glass of wine, another dance. . . . True, the place is not crowded and consumption is moderate—a bottle of wine, a glass of vermouth, a cordial or some coffee—but the faces are smiling, the atmosphere is definitely animated in the 'Animation Club.'"

Press descriptions for domestic readers generally make the following points about night life, either directly or by implication:

Night clubs are patronized mainly by workers, particularly "model workers." Party functionaries, factory managers or other leading officials are never mentioned in connection with night life.

Night club atmosphere is wholesome and informal, never raucous or "wicked."

Going to night clubs is within everyone's means. The contrast between the luxury of the place and its working class customers is always pointed out.

Amazing as it may seem, the couples in the night clubs are always man and wife and never couples of any other relationship. For instance, the article on the "Animation Club" carried a photograph showing miner Pal Szabo "having a good time with his relatives," who in the picture are represented by a young blonde.

On the other hand, articles addressed to Western readers strive to give the impression that the entertainment places do not differ from those for which prewar Hungary was so well known. The January 1954 issue of *Hungary*,



Picture and text from *Hungary* (Budapest), January 1954

published by the regime in English, French and German, carried an article about the former Britannia, now the Hotel "Peace," on Lenin Avenue:

"The reception clerk has let almost all the rooms, but he always keeps a few in reserve for guests arriving by the last transcontinental express. The spacious restaurant is filling up. Visitors from abroad, artists giving guest performances in Hungary, businessmen and people in from the country, as well as people living in Budapest, all are making their choice from the large menu. Music can be heard from the domed ballroom. In the wine cellar, where specialty dishes and vintage wines are served at dark-brown wooden tables, under walls decorated with frescoes, the gypsy band is playing a brisk *chardas*. At ten the lights go on in the bar, the pianist opens the piano, and the evening's program starts. Among the customers can be found the most varied types of people, from an agronomist to a professor of medicine, a Stakhanovite tractor driver or a provincial actress in town for a radio performance, as well as citizens of Budapest who like to spend an hour or two after work at a pleasant place, and who love beautiful songs, dancing and good entertainment."

The same magazine's October 1954 issue described the Hungaria Cafe, the former Cafe New York now reconstructed:

"This restaurant, dominating a street corner, glitters with gilt. The first-floor balconies look like boxes at the theater. Under them, like a large swimming pool, there is the lower restaurant with its highly decorated alcoves and arches, reminiscent of the aristocratic pomp of bygone centuries. . . .

"Soon after it was opened, the Hungaria became the haunt of artists of all kinds. The war battered this old cafe like so much else. But in the Hungarian capital of today, which lovingly nurtures the memories of the past

worth preserving, the old cafe, the Hungaria, shines once again in all its splendor. Besides the shining tables, one can find once again the journalists, writers and poets. From early morning until late at night people can be seen reading foreign newspapers and discussing ideas for new novels and plays. . . . Just as in the old days, the Hungaria is also a favorite haunt of the general public. All sections of the more than one and a half million inhabitants of Budapest enjoy themselves while the orchestra plays."

Descriptions meant for the West do not stress the "plain" character of the cafes and night clubs. On the contrary, the implication is that the glamor, luxury and tone of these places equal or even exceed that of Western night clubs.

Criticism

Proud as they are of their night clubs, the Hungarian regime spokesmen have sharply criticized two aspects of it: the dance music and the cabaret sketches. *Ludas Matyi* (Budapest), January 1955, exposed a recent night club sketch to some scathing satire:

"The chanson singer scores a wild success with a song which starts with the Latin words *Veni, Vidi, Vici*, which means 'I came, I saw, I conquered. . . .' It is obvious that the success of the song is primarily due to this first line because the public, which does not know any Latin, suspects something very naughty in Caesar's famous words. . . . We must admit that it is a sensational idea, to incorporate the words of great men into little dance tunes. Thus, while dancing the rumba one may also acquire an education. . . . The idea may be further developed. For instance, continuing with the above-mentioned Caesar, it was he who said, when crossing the Rubicon, that the die is cast. This Latin saying would make a very nice little ditty:

'*Alea jacta est*
Let's down a bucket of spirit
It is later than you think
A boat-ride on the Rubicon
Is warmly recommended.'

"Caesar also said '*Et tu mi fili Brute*' [You too my son Brutus] and this too has become known all over the world. It would provide an excellent subject for a hit:

'*Et tu mi fili Brute*
Who cares if she is plain
Or if she is beautiful,
Just ask for her hand.'

The article concluded reprovingly: "It is really fantastic the way the people of Budapest fall for any foolish thing coming from the West."

The cafe in the Corvin Department Store was sharply criticized in *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), February 5, 1955:

"No matter how crowded the place may be, it always gives an impression of dismal emptiness when one pays the three *forint* entrance fee. Without the help of rousing 'spirits' [alcohol] this is hard to bear. But of course most of the guests show marked signs of such help . . . consequently from the business point of view the atmosphere is very satisfactory . . . only cultural requirements remain unfulfilled. On the whole the show . . . is simply a background to the various activities taking place in the semi-dark.

"The rather off-color introduction by master of ceremonies Laszlo Dalmadi is followed by a sketch by Margit Lukacs. She is in the Hungarian [national] costume and is 'the Country Girl in the Big City.' It would not have been out of place as far back as 1930. In fact, many such sketches were presented in those days. . . . Then Imre Palotas sings with concentrated sentimentality, laying the charm on thickly. He is followed by Piroska Littvay, who slinks in dressed in a white blouse and blue skirt as a 'poor little innocent.' In itself this is not an objectionable number, but in the midst of the openly vulgar and brutally 'funny' numbers, it only serves as a bridge from bad taste to the obscene. Intermission is followed by the sketch 'The Microscopic Merry Widow.' In this, only the level is microscopic because the presentation and everything else are grandiosely vulgar, shrieking of bad taste. And with this the program ends to give way to general dancing. . . . How much longer are we going to tolerate it—that bad taste, which we have tried to liquidate with so much effort, should again return? The City Council should make a close survey of conditions in our restaurants and night clubs and by introducing a strict supervision bring order into this big-city jungle."

Beke es Szabadsag (Budapest), June 9, 1954, reviled the "mud music (the muddled tone-mixture of be-bop which sounds as if formidable toads were heaving and gurgling in the mud of swamps)" played at the Paradiso Cafe, and accused the orchestra at the fancy Moscow Restaurant of indulging in what it called "pots-and-pans music (which sounds like someone furiously beating kitchen utensils to the tune of a whistling teakettle)." Of the cabaret at the Moscow Restaurant the paper said:

"Now let's take a look at the show. We found the situation slightly improved on our tour . . . in early June. After long shilly-shallying they have finally dismissed Ida Boros, chanson singer, who had the nerve to sing the beautiful ballads of Janos Arany to the tunes of swing music. The hesitation was due to the fact that the night club managers, whose first concern was income, believed in the famous statement of the Roman Emperor Vespasianus:



Budapest Hotel. Picture from Hungary (Budapest), January 1954

'Money has no odor' and kept the vulgar singer on because many of the patrons liked her. . . .

"The situation is fluid at the Cherie restaurant in Vaci Street. Among the nice, respectable numbers there is a song telling about the amorous escapades of a young Venetian matron of the Middle Ages. Her case is brought to court and one of the witnesses says:

"Her dress was disarranged,

Judge! A sight not to be seen—but dazzling."

"Then the beautiful signora, exonerated by her judges because none of her deceived lovers will testify to their own guilt, sings:

"Praised be the Madonna,

For every fool saw me—with someone else."

"Cherie is also the place where we hear samples of another characteristic product of present-day entertainment: corny Socialism. The title of this little sketch is 'Visitation by Ghosts.' It takes place in a bar, where a revolution breaks out among the various bottles. Cognac, rum, and champagne wage a determined class struggle when the greatest of all drinks, proletarian water, appears on the stage and warns the whole gang, in fact, the whole world, that if they do not make peace at once the powerful water will flood the world, just as during the time of Noah. . . . The song was allegedly composed with the best intentions, in an honest effort to serve the peace struggle by suggesting that all controversial questions be solved by a Great Flood. The public was somewhat shocked at this strange oblique agitation."

The article ended by calling on the public to demand entertainment "on a higher cultural level."

Masked Balls

A traditional form of Hungarian revelry, which the Communists have appropriated and adapted, is the winter carnival, the season of parties and balls. *Hungary*, addressing foreign readers, described the carnival season in the following terms in its March 1955 issue:

"It is carnival time in Budapest. People walking along the boulevard, or getting into taxis and trolley buses, have fancy dress under their winter coats. Three Musketeers, a Charlie Chaplin, a Toreador and a Carmen hurry along to the lighted door of the ballroom. Carnival time has never been so popular or successful as this year. It is not only in the big ballrooms of the capital that balls are held, but every factory or office of any size has its own club and its own carnival. The places where fancy dresses are rented out did record business. Some evenings they had more than six thousand costumes rented out—and of course many people made up their own costumes at home with bits of materials, shawls, paper, walking sticks or sunshades. . . ."

How the State apparatus has taken over the organization of the carnival balls was outlined in *Magyar Nemzet*, February 20, 1955:

"On the eve of the last Sunday in the carnival season the lights go on in every big hall suitable for balls and parties; the trumpets and orchestras announce the commencement of the ball. Factories, trade union and regional Houses of Culture, schools and mass organizations vie with each other in the organization of these balls. This year a special national ball committee has been formed

with the purpose of aiding the various small committees in their task of organizing and also to arrange dance competitions. The committee is also trying to revive old traditions and customs which make the balls of the various trade groups and villages colorful and distinctive. Last Saturday the university students' ball was held in the Parliament building in Budapest. The same evening there was another carnival on Lenin Square for the high school students. The Council workers enjoyed themselves at a ball which took place in the Hall of Culture of the Budapest Council and at which prominent artists performed. Similarly, the journalists' ball was held on Saturday in the Army Officers' building."

The Communists try to endow the House of Culture with the function of an entertainment center where people can go to dine and dance, in order to lure them into the other more "productive" activities of these State community centers. On February 11, 1955, *Magyar Nemzet*, writing about one of the largest Houses of Culture, that of the construction workers, speculated along these lines:

"The fact that the building's exterior is ugly cannot be helped. The interior, on the other hand, has many possibilities. There is, for instance, the winding staircase, of almost theatrical beauty, which connects the lobby with the first floor in a sweeping arch. If a liveried doorman were there to receive the club members at the entrance . . . If heavy velvet curtains divided the huge room, also providing a frame to the staircase, which would be covered by heavy red carpet . . . The sound of subdued conversation would be heard from upstairs as the sign of contented guests. All this would be enveloped in the soft hiss of the espresso coffee machine and the clatter of knives and forks from the restaurant. . . . In the corners there would be aquariums, lamps giving soft light, comfortable easy chairs—and every day the house would be full because there would be some special attraction, music, dancing, folk singing. . . ."

A factory worker who escaped to Vienna from Hungary described the House of Culture of the Budapest Electric Bulb plant as follows:

"There was a factory ball once a month, always on Saturday. The House of Culture was situated in barracks. On entering you were in a long corridor with a cafeteria on the left and a booth where they sold drinks. Opposite was a big hall with a stage where shows were given, and where the nine-member orchestra sat to play for dancing. Officially the orchestra was supposed to play Hungarian and Western dances alternately, but this was only a formality because the public clamored for Western tunes all the time, and the request was usually granted. Most of the time these were sambas and boogie-woogie."

Somewhat different are the parties arranged for the entertainment of the Party aristocracy. A private report of July 1952 described night life at the most exclusive summer resort on the shores of Lake Balaton: "The resort is furnished with dazzling pomp. The patrons' comfort is enhanced by beautiful objects, removed from the castles of the previous nobility. On occasions when influential members of the Party or government have met here, impressive parties were organized at which famous artists

performed. The program was followed by dancing, naturally to jazz, strongly forbidden in public."



The coffeehouse is still a favourite haunt of the general public

Hungary (Budapest), October 1954

Czechoslovakia

According to a recent visitor to Prague, only about five night clubs are functioning in the city. One of the best restaurants, he found, was in the Hotel Europa (formerly Hotel Soubrek). Its prices were low; a complete dinner cost a little over one dollar.

Most striking was the change in the old U Smelhaus cafe in Melantrich Street. This was a Prague institution with a long tradition and a fashionable following. Today it is a "people's restaurant and tavern." It has a five-piece band, and charges an admission fee of five *koruny* (70 cents at the official rate of exchange). A bottle of champagne costs 49 *koruny* (\$6.80); a glass of liquor costs 40 to 60 cents. Many customers order only a cup of coffee, as a pretext for occupying a table.

The Western traveller described the "People's Variety," (formerly the Drahnovsky Cabaret). The show was introduced by the manager who greeted the audience and reminded them that in return for the privilege of attending the show they must endeavor to fulfill their work obligations

and contribute their share to the building of the People's Democracy. There were two commentators, Geierova and Hurych, who made mild satirical jokes about "shortcomings" in the system. Geierova quipped that Prague "is no longer called the City of a Hundred Spires but the City of a Hundred Samples" (a sarcastic allusion to the fact that the goods on display in Prague stores and factories are frequently unobtainable, especially in rural districts).

The quality of cabaret entertainment in Prague is frequently criticized in the press. A reporter for *Vecerni Praha*, November 22, 1955, expressed astonishment at the superiority of cabarets in Budapest, where he went to some of the night clubs. "You will smile skeptically," he wrote to his Czechoslovak readers; "for not only was the wine excellent but we saw programs of real artistic merit. For us this was amazing—to walk into a night club and see a program in which the greatest artists perform. . . . [These artists] want to come here in order to compare their art with ours and to learn from us—but I am of the opinion that we are the ones who could learn. . . ."

According to a Western tourist who recently visited Karlovy Vary (Carlsbad), amusements in the famous spa "are not what one would expect of a place with such a great reputation." However, the regime is attempting to revive night life for visitors, and several night clubs recently reopened after many years. The Hotel Pupp, previously reserved for the use of Soviet officers, has opened again to civilians. It has a restaurant-grill, the Florentina, a night club with dancing and a small cabaret theater. The most popular rendezvous in Karlovy Vary is said to be the Cafe Otava. Another popular place is the Strelnice, which was re-decorated and reopened during the 1955 season and now has a floor show.

Workers from the nearby Jachymov uranium mines frequent several dance halls and taverns in midtown Karlovy Vary—the Cacadu, U Petru and the Moravska Vinarna. The spa visitors do not go to these places. All of them are reportedly black market centers for smuggled Western goods such as American cigarettes, chewing gum, coffee, watches and razor blades.

Brno, Czechoslovakia's second largest city, never had an active night life, and the regime almost completely destroyed whatever there was. In 1948 the Communists closed three night clubs (one of which was turned into the cultural club of the Zbrojovka armament plant) and six cafes, one of which now serves as the club of the Jan Sverma works. However, during the past year some improvement has been noted: entertainment places have been re-decorated and are better run. The night club in the Hotel Slovan has, according to a recent visitor, been redecorated and now has good lighting, comfortable seats and tasteful murals.

In Bratislava, a new night spot called the Lotus Club, featuring Chinese decorations and cuisine, was recently opened in the Hotel Carlton, according to *Lud* (Bratislava), August 10, 1955.

As in Hungary, the new "Socialized" balls are made much of in the press. *Lidova Demokracie* (Prague), January 31, 1954, for instance, announced that 183 balls and

carnivals would be held that year in Prague alone. A detailed code of procedure and etiquette for these functions was laid down. Said the paper:

"The idea of a ball evokes the image of something beautiful. Our man of today who is struggling to build up his country has the right to joyful recreation and entertainment. The Central Ball Committee of the Chief Administration of Enlightenment in the Ministry of Culture has the task of raising the level of balls and restoring their festive character. A ball is a social event which is supposed to avoid the everyday and the vulgar—it is no dance for the gentlemen dressed in mad eccentric ways. It is not the place either for acrobatic exhibitions of dance steps and boogie woogie. It is up to the sponsors to arrange the order of the compositions of 'the king of waltzes,' or other classics, modern dances and the favorites of the older guests—the *beseda* and *mazurka*. A ball which is supposed to be representative of a certain organization requires that the men wear black and the women long gowns; and, not least, that many will learn how to behave in a social situation, which is just as important today [as in the past]. The organization of summer carnivals is now under way; also courses in dancing, social behavior, and the preparation of a social handbook."

Ceskoslovensky Svet (Prague), February 27, 1954, reported that "this year we have behind us 24,000 balls, not counting those in Slovakia." The article described a Youth League ball in the Prague *Lucerna*. The ball opened with "the Polonaise and a festive waltz."

"Fathers and mothers, grandfathers and grandmothers, were surprised when they saw the dances of their youth—old Czech dances—*polka*, *bublava*, *sotys*, *kvapik*—which are coming into fashion again. The *beseda* is also becoming popular again. Among the young people there were no tired, bored sons of manufacturers or daughters of wholesale merchants, but healthy young people who can laugh from the heart and enjoy a lovely evening. The girls dressed in long evening gowns and the boys in dark suits which were very suitable for the evening.

"This year a great surprise is in store for those who will be in Prague. Large outdoor garden parties will be held in the Valdstein Garden and in the Park of Culture and Recreation in Stromovka and Smichov."

Romania

A Westerner who visited Bucharest at the end of 1954 found that there was no place in the city where one could go to dance. He was told, however, that this situation would be changed in 1955. He learned also that many new espresso coffee houses were springing up, many of them providing music. The visitor said that "the coffee was quite good in the cafe I went to, and not expensive. They didn't have espresso machines; they just boiled it up in the back room. These coffee houses are always crowded, in contrast to the restaurants which did not seem to be doing much business."

The visitor went to a cabaret one evening, and found it filled to its 700-person capacity. The entrance fee was 14 *lei* (\$2.33). He thought the program "quite good." He noted that the song "Johnnie is the Boy for Me" was introduced as a popular Romanian folk song.

In June 1955 two new night clubs, the Continental and the Colorado, opened in the city. A popular orchestra leader, Joe Reininger, formerly known as Romania's "jazz king," was released from prison and is now featured at the Continental.

A reporter for the West German *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* contributed his impressions of recent Bucharest night life in the September 3, 1955 issue of the paper:

"It is 9:30 p.m., the regular time for dinner. The big thermometer in Palace Place still shows 82 degrees. Old American-built private taxis and new State-owned Russian Pobedas make their way with loud toots through the dense crowds of pedestrians. From the garden restaurant Cîna, near the Athenaeum, come the strains of dance music. The doorman beckons invitingly: foreigners are so rare. There are only a few tables left. Prices are high: a glass of cognac is 10.5 *lei* (\$1.75). The women's dresses are passable and so are the men's summer clothes. In general, things look better than in 1953, but not as good as in 1938. The eight-piece orchestra plays well. A female singer interprets French chansons.

"In many parts of the town, one can find these attractive outdoor spots where one can have a good time. People dance till two, three or four o'clock in the morning. Who goes to these places? I found out later: painters, writers, musicians, actors and singers, who make plenty of money and can afford it."

The price of a meal in a good restaurant—the Pescarus, Cîna, Athenee or Bucuresti—is about \$17. A small bottle of imported Czech beer costs \$1.50, a ¾ liter bottle of *tuica* (brandy) \$3, a bottle of good domestic wine \$3. Beer may be served in restaurants for only one or two hours daily, owing to its scarcity.

A report from the provincial city of Cluj revealed that large restaurants still exist in the provinces. All of them have been taken over by the State and given numbers replacing their old names.


Bulgaria

Sofia never had the range of entertainment of some of the other Balkan capitals. Immediately following the war, when the American, British and French military missions were stationed in Sofia, the hotels and restaurants were active; at the same time, small "apertif" cafes, where liquor, wine and small snacks were sold, sprang up all over the city, in basements and tiny corners in bombed-out buildings. The Communist regime, upon gaining power, was able to suppress all these places and to force the owners either into the State restaurant collectives or into some altogether different line. Now there is only a token number of night spots in Sofia. Dancing is restricted to a few midtown hotels and summer pavilions erected outdoors on the city's outskirts.

The showplace for foreigners and rendezvous of the new Communist plutocracy is the Hotel Bulgaria in the center of town. Visitors report that here, as nowhere else, everything sparkles and shines. The impression one receives on entering the hotel is that "nothing has changed." Large halls and rooms are brightly lit by



"Variety Theater" in Bucharest



Rumania Today (Bucharest), August 1955

bronze and silver lamps. Heavy rugs and draperies provide a rich and relaxing contrast to the drabness outside the walls of the hotel. The staff is well trained and many of its members speak several languages, chiefly Russian, English, German and French.

There are two public rooms used by foreigners. One is used exclusively by Russians, who always avoid social contact with others; and one—paradoxically called the "Red Hall"—is popular with the other foreigners. Bulgarians patronize the cafe-restaurant and a separate room for dancing which draws a capacity crowd on weekends.

For ordinary young workers in Sofia there are few amusements, according to refugees. The cheapest entertainment is the movies, but the people "are tired of the Soviet propaganda films." The theater is beyond their means. Their chief diversion is to go to the dances organized in the various public dance halls and Houses of Culture, or, if they can afford it, to go to the State restaurants with dance orchestras.

One of the most popular dance halls is the so-called Seminaria, in the building formerly occupied by the Orthodox Seminary, which is now used as a reading room in the daytime and a dance hall on Saturdays and Sundays. There are also dance halls in the Macedonia Theater and the National Bank. These halls are only open on Saturdays and Sundays from 7-11 p.m. The entrance fee is 2 *leva* (30 cents). No liquor or refreshments are provided.

Numerous Bulgarian and Russian soldiers go to these dances. The girls are often requested over the loudspeaker to dance with the soldiers. The clothes of the young people at these parties faithfully reflect their material conditions. One can see girls dancing in rubber boots

and boys dressed in work clothes. The orchestras are made up of young amateurs who get 10 percent of the intake at the door. Only the Bulgarian folk dances, or tangos, foxtrots and waltzes are played. Rumbas and jitterbugging are banned.

Dance music is reportedly strictly controlled in Bulgaria. As elsewhere, at private and semi-private parties songs are played and sung which the censorship overlooks or deliberately ignores. But, jazz and swing are still officially prohibited in public entertainment places.

Restaurants Attacked

Visitors allege that the only restaurant in Sofia with good European cooking is the Ruski Dom, in the former headquarters of the Union Club. Complaints about the *horemag* (State collective) restaurants are regularly sounded in the Bulgarian press. Not only is food in short supply, lacking in variety and badly prepared, but managers cannot even be counted on to keep the restaurants open on any predictable schedule. Above all, the service is very poor. The waiters, chefs and bartenders, who in the past were frequently also the proprietors of their places have now become employees of the State, and anxiously await the end of the month to get their paycheck like any other State employees. Customers complain that it takes "hours" to get served, that the dishes and cutlery have to be wiped clean on the tablecloth (if there is one), that the food is served half-cold, and the beverage—wine or beer—often fails to appear until one has already finished the meal. In spite of inducements of extra pay on a salary percentage basis, the workers and managers continue to cook indifferently, to waste and pilfer food and to give

bad service. (Over two years ago, the Ministry of Internal Trade offered extra pay of 1½ percent of the monthly salary to restaurant managers and master cooks for each percent of overfulfillment of their monthly quota, and 1 percent for all other *horemag* workers.)

According to a Bulgarian escapee it is possible to order something other than what the very limited menu offers in the State restaurants, if you are willing to pay "under the counter" for it. In such a case, a mixed grill, for instance, will be covered with eggs to look like an egg dish; a pork chop or a steak will be disguised with lettuce leaves. These treats are only available to those with money, however.

The Ministry of Internal Trade was criticized by *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), November 3, 1954, for failing to organize training courses for chefs and other skilled workers who are badly needed in the public eating places. The provincial paper *Borba* (Turnovo) in its May 19, 1955, issue, launched a broad attack on the provincial restaurants. "The food in public eating places is very bad," said the paper. "The restaurants in the villages of Batak, Slomer, Pavlikeny, Sredno (Elena) and others are in a deplorable condition. They are dirty and unsanitary . . . the wine and liquor are regularly diluted. . . . The loss and waste of material grow instead of decreasing. For example, the village cooperative restaurants in Pavlikeny County realized a profit of 3,600 *leva* and a loss of 31,000 *leva* in the first quarter of this year." *Rabotnichesko Delo's* article complained that in spite of all measures ("It has already been five months since the publication of the decree of the Ministerial Council and the CC of the Bulgarian Communist Party for the improvement of internal trade and supply") the restaurant conditions in the districts of Burgas, Kolarovgrad and the mining regions are no better. The article called for "an improvement in restaurant fare and introduction of more attractive and refined service to the public." (Burgas, one of the richest agricultural districts of Bulgaria, is one of the places most frequently cited in complaints of inadequate restaurant service.)

Conclusion

Night life in Eastern Europe appears superficially to be enjoying a new flowering. But despite the impression of renewed activity, a shadow still hangs over the cafes and dance halls: the ever-present awareness of the watchful eye of the regime police. Westerners are invariably struck with the extreme reserve of the pleasure-seekers: their care to avoid conspicuousness, their reluctance to engage in conversation with a stranger. If in the past it was the custom for friends to meet regularly at one favorite cafe, today people who can afford to go out move from place to place in order not to attract the attention of the police.

Night life in terms of volume, variety and quality has by no means returned to the prewar level; and the Communists are not encouraging its revival to assume the dimensions of a spree. The Novy Vary, Moscow's first new night club since the war, opened with great fanfare in October 1955 but closed abruptly three months later, despite its instant success and continuing popularity. In the Satellite bloc, the expansion of entertainment facilities has two discernible objects: to accommodate the tourist trade which these nations are now trying to attract, and to demonstrate to the local people that the regimes have become less rigid, more indulgent toward human needs and desires. However, long years of austerity, and lack of material incentives and the incentive of pride, have destroyed the old standards of comfort and service. The number of good night clubs and first-class restaurants in the Soviet bloc cities is proportionally much lower than in the cities of Western Europe and the United States, and they are far too expensive for the working man who finds the necessities of life barely within the range of purchasing power of his paycheck. But most noticeable to visitors from the free world is the absence of an atmosphere of genuine gaiety: merry-making is guarded and spiritless, and the new, grand and glittering amusement places have a chilly air—hollow artifacts in the gentle art of casting off care.

Payment in Kind

The municipality of Szekszard, Hungary, is reported to be issuing theater tickets in exchange for waste paper. A ticket for the front row was said to cost 17 kilograms of waste paper.

Athletes on the Run

"For us it is not immaterial how our athletes live. Because very often the youths select their heroes from among athletes . . . The present camp of youths and of sportsmen in Hungary is not void of nationalism and chauvinism. On the basis of our successes in sports many believe that we are a special race imbued with exceptional talents. These erroneous views manifest themselves in despising the opponents, in superficial preparations for certain sports contests, in the underrating of the results achieved by others. Incorrect remarks testifying to ill-will can also be heard about sports in the friendly Soviet Union. We do not differentiate between athletes as to their class origin, but we cannot tolerate that the members of the discredited classes spread inimical views and that they become the spokesmen for bourgeois nationalist views and admiration of the capitalist countries."

Sport és Testnevelés (Budapest), January 1956

WITH THE close of 1955 the Hungarian regime can reflect on a season replete with dazzling Hungarian successes in sports. The most glittering accomplishments were achieved in track, where three Hungarian middle-distance runners, Sandor Iharos, Laszlo Tabori, and Istvan Rozsavolgyi, turned out to be probably three of the best milers in the world. Between May and November, Iharos alone made five world records in distances ranging from 1500 to 5000 meters, and participated in establishing a sixth. Tabori, in addition to tying Iharos's 1500 meter record, also defeated England's best in the mile in a memorable 3:59 race in which three runners simultaneously cracked the 4-minute-mile barrier which for so long had been considered impregnable. Rozsavolgyi, said to be the best of the three, broke the 1000 and 2000 meter world records.

What makes Janos run? How were these crack runners able to maintain top form for such a long season? In general, too, how does one account for the spectacular performances of Hungary's "amateurs"?

A large part of the answer lies in modern professional training of a caliber unexcelled in the world, and of an intensity which would discourage all but the most fanatic and single-minded professional. Following Iharos' record-breaking performance of October 23 of last year in which he simultaneously broke the world record for the 5000 meter run and for the three-mile run, *Szabad Nep* (Budapest) carried some revealing information. It said that Iharos had joined the army in 1950, thus coming under the aegis of Mihaly Igloi, professor of physical culture and trainer-coach of the Budapest Honved (Army) Sports Club track team (under whom Tabori and Rozsavolgyi are trained as well). All did not at first go smoothly. "It took time before Iharos, instead of goofing off as young athletes usually do, entirely accepted Igloi's tough, demanding training regimen." Finally, however, Iharos became accustomed to the routine of "training three times daily." The article suggested, and other sources have confirmed, that the regimen prescribed by Igloi for his three

charges consists of some 10-15 miles of alternate running and jogging, plus two hours of gym workout, every day, all year round. No one would suggest that given this severe schedule, anyone can achieve the same results, but it does reveal the intensity with which Hungarian athletes (and probably the athletes of the USSR and the other Satellites) prepare for sports events in general, and specifically for the coming Olympics in Melbourne.

The foregoing is, however, only a partial answer to what makes Janos run. Hungary's good sports record of the past has been greatly improved since the advent of the Communist regime. The Communists place great emphasis on sports both from a publicity and a financial standpoint. Great sums are spent on nurturing and fostering Hungarian sports because:

1. foreign sporting matches are a highly lucrative and welcome source of foreign currency so sorely needed by Hungary's shaky economy;
2. sports successes are extremely good propaganda material for Western consumption (the logic the Communists assume is: sports are closely allied to health so that a country successful in sports must be healthy, and a healthy people is a happy people);
3. emphasis on sports facilitates domestic popularization of the regime and serves as a useful diversion for the people; and
4. sports emphasis and mass sports make for useful civilian military training.

On the surface, then, everything looks rosy in Hungarian athletics. Successes have multiplied and Hungary's sports renown is spreading. Internally, however, the Party is dissatisfied because "bourgeois thinking and behavior," "materialism" and "cosmopolitanism" are rife among the athletes. A recent *Szabad Nep* editorial summarized the results to date of combatting these insidious tendencies and although recognizing that "significant developments" had taken place, stated that conditions were "far from satisfactory." Sports organizations, "which activate large masses, will only develop in a healthy manner and operate consistently with their obligations if they follow the policies

of the Party, if all of their activities everywhere are under the direction and control of the Party organizations, if they enjoy the support of the Party organizations."

Despite the fact that athletics offer Hungarian youth a unique opportunity to rise rapidly in the Hungarian economic scale, there seems a remarkable refusal on the part of a high percentage of Hungary's youth to play ball with the regime. And the temptations are great. Successful athletes are pampered and lionized; they are well paid and remunerated in other ways as well; they can go abroad easily and often; and most of all they have a much larger area of freedom and privilege than the average Hungarian. Yet even those who have become athletes continue to resist "Communization" and "Russification."

Although the Communists have a variety of explanations for the resistance of athletes to Communism and to the regime, the facts are that the development of sports popularizes, emphasizes and develops qualities which in many respects are basically opposed to Communism. Sports at their best level are one of the great fosterers of the spirit of free competition, of playing fairly and according to the rules, and of respect for one's opponents, qualities which the Communists find inimical.

Also, the mass emphasis of Communism, its stress on the "collective spirit," results in the curious paradox of the regime praising individual achievements by Hungarian athletes and simultaneously deploring the emphasis on championships and individual performances to the detriment of "mass sports."

There are still major complaints about the qualities of sports leaders. "As a result of the right-wing deviation, many such individuals have returned to sports leadership in the past two years who once were banned because of their harmful activities. In certain places, a sports leader is selected solely on the basis that he once was an athlete, or, as a fan, is well acquainted with sports. Of course one must have the know-how to be a sports leader, and those who have been active athletes generally know how." But



"The world record-holding 6,000-meter relay team (left to right): Sandor Iharos, Istvan Rozsavolgyi, Laszlo Tabori, Ferenc Mikes." *Beke Es Szabadsag* (Budapest), October 5, 1955

these are not the only, or even the essential, criteria. "Reliability, knowledge of Party policies, and the ability necessary to nurturing the youth are at least as important as technical knowledge."

Given the present regime policies in Hungary, and the country's natural, traditional athletic talents, there is every expectation that Hungarian athletes will maintain their high record of performance in international sports competition. Internally, however, the Communist hopes for "social and political transformation" of Hungary's young athletes remain quite dim.

Practical Biology

In line with Satellite regime exaltation of Soviet heroes, the Bulgarian town of Vassiliko, on the Black Sea, has been renamed Michurin, after the Russian biologist who stressed environmental rather than hereditary influences. The following joke has become popular in Bulgaria. If a child looks like his father, that confirms Darwin's theory of heredity, but if the child resembles the next-door neighbor, that confirms Michurin's theory on the influence of environment.

Current Developments

Area

Cominform Dissolved

On April 17 the dissolution of the Cominform was announced by the Communist press. Long rumored as one of the demands made by Tito of the Soviet leaders, the Cominform dissolution is the latest in the series of placatory and expiatory gestures of the Soviet bloc toward Yugoslavia.

The Cominform (Information Office of Communist and Workers' Parties) was formed in September 1947 at a meeting in Warsaw. It was composed of the Communist parties of the USSR, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Poland, Italy and France. Its first headquarters were in Belgrade; after the expulsion of Yugoslavia in 1948 they were moved to Bucharest. The major public activity of the Cominform was the publication of the weekly newspaper *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!*

Further Reactions to Soviet Congress

The first stunned and tentative reactions to the radical shift in tactics and atmosphere announced at the February Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Party have now broadened to a torrent of confession and reappraisal. There are still, however, very notable differences among the Satellites in the degree and kind of reaction to the Soviet denigration of Stalin, confession of past brutalities, and demands for a reduction of sterile dogma in Party and national life. Indeed, it may be said that each of the Satellites is responding in its own individual manner, as dictated mainly by internal realities.

Poland

POLAND continues to go farther than the other Satellites, farther, indeed, than the USSR, in its criticism of the Stalin-ridden past and the crimes committed by tyranny in the name of ideology. Nowhere else has the attack on Stalin had the bitter tone of: "How monstrously and pathologically suspicious must have been the thoughts of the man who could suppose that numerous members of the Central Committee, most of them Old Bolsheviks, were enemies or imperialist agents. And yet it was Stalin himself who approved the list of members of the Central Committee about to be arrested. The list of false accusations is

long." Or again, from the same March 29 Radio Warsaw broadcast: "To keep people obedient, terror was required. Stalin put forth the theory that the more Socialism develops, the more acute become the activities of the enemy. Thus the security organization was expanded and the use of terror began, first against ideological opponents—instead of combating them in a discussion—and then against everyone who expressed different opinions." No other country of the bloc has dared such irony and scorn as to refer to Stalin's "practically divine omnipotence," as did Radio Warsaw, March 31.

Although the Polish Party, perhaps more than any in the Satellites, has reason to be aware of the crimes of Stalin, nevertheless there is considerable evidence of confusion and resentment among Party members who, committed to unreality, have suddenly been exposed to reality by the Party, the very instrument they depended upon to keep it from them. In a long "Letter to a Comrade," *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), March 23, Roman Werfel, editor of the newspaper, tried to clarify the confusions of such people:

"The telephone rang on my desk and your voice, your familiar voice, reached me through the receiver. 'Why, why are you writing like this, why are you erasing the memory, why don't you say anything about the merits? Why?'

"We talked for a long time. I tried to explain to you and I think that you understood, that you agreed, that I convinced you. That is why I want to put down the notes of our conversation on paper here, our conversation as it really was. After your telephone call, I received several similar ones, and I am probably not the only one that day to whom the question 'Why?' was put.

"Yes, that was thirty-odd years ago, when one night we both got literally drunk on a booklet we had just received from the press. The booklet was entitled 'The Foundations of Leninism,' and the author's name was Josef Stalin.

"Years went by. Do you remember the debate on collectivization, the disputes about industrialization, the reports on the building of Dnieprostroy, the bulletins on the first Five Year Plans? That name was woven into all this, it became, in our minds, an integral part of that magnificent heroic epoch. . . . Do you remember how we used to talk about 'Stalin's Five Year Plans'? Was that correct? No one will deny that Stalin took a leading part in their preparation, in their organization or their execution. But don't you think that the decisive contribution to this fulfillment of the Plans was the contribution of tens of millions of Soviet people. . . . Was it right that we concentrated all our love and our admiration for the heroism of these millions, these tens of millions of people, our great love and admiration for the great Party of Bolsheviks in one man?

"You say, 'the war.' True, we did listen to bulletins which ended with the name Stalin. . . . But don't you think that the substance of these bulletins was composed of the bloody military toil of millions of soldiers in grey hemless coats, of the will of hundreds of thousands of officers, the brain-work of thousands of commanders, the courage and farsightedness of generals, the sacrifices by tens of millions of workers in armament factories and in kolkhozes of the Soviet hinterland. . . . And tell me, was it right for us to have concentrated our love and admiration for those who



Caption reads: "For whom are they meant, these meteorological balloons?" Balloons are marked "Espionage," "Made in USA," "Diversion," "Free Europe."

Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), February 10, 1956

with their toil and their blood saved humanity from Fascist slavery, for the Party which led them in this battle, to have concentrated all this on one man alone?

"I think that this was wrong!

"... Do you remember our first meeting with a Soviet soldier, with Soviet life, in Lvov? Do you remember how, at first, the ritual around that name irritated us? And yet at the same time it was to us the embodiment of the Party line. We became used to it later, we began to perform the same ritual ourselves, to applaud and rise with everyone else, but tell me, did it never occur to you that perhaps less ceremony would have been more suitable to the greatness of the cause?

"... We know today that the ritual concealed the infringement of the collegiate nature of Party organs, the violation of intra-Party democracy, the ever increasing elevation of one man's will above the Party. It was this willfulness which led to fatal political mistakes such as the obstinate refusal in the summer of 1941 to see until the last

moment the threat of a Nazi invasion, the contemptuous treatment given many warnings, the neglect of all caution, the various erroneous operations undertaken during the war against the advice of military experts, operations carried out at the cost of great bloodshed of the heroic Soviet people. And not only that!

"Do you remember how we received the communique about the dissolution of the Polish Communist Party? The matter was not a simple one. Each of us sought a different explanation of that terrible affair, each of us was tortured by the thought: this can't be about us at all, somewhere there must be a terrible mistake! We obeyed that decision, overcoming all our doubts. Today we know that the source of that slander was a crime born in that place where, once upon a time, Feliks Dzierzhinsky picked the best from among the good, the most honest from among the honest, the most devoted from among the devoted.

"How do you think that this crime could have been born if Stalin had not placed his will above that of the Party? We know today that the affair was one of many. At the Congress there was talk about Leningrad, about Georgia and Azerbaidzhan, about grave and the gravest of matters, about the sword which had been sharpened by the Party against the enemies of the revolution in Lenin's day but had begun to cut deeper and deeper into the living body of the Party. How slander had become a deadly weapon, how Party courage had allegedly become proof of enmity to the Party, how people who wanted to defend the rightness of the Party in a manner suitable to the Party were condemned as alleged enemies of the people, and liquidated.

"... We must say this firmly: we must reconsider Stalin's activities. We must never permit his undoubted achievements and that glitter which magnified those achievements out of all proportion and made them seem altogether superhuman to conceal from our eyes serious mistakes, to mask **gruesome, very gruesome affairs.**..."

More than the other Satellites, more than USSR, Poland is rewriting the official history of the last twenty years. The exoneration of the disbanded Polish Communist Party was the first of these revisions (see NBIC, April 1956, pp. 49-50). In line with this exoneration was the announcement by Radio Warsaw, April 1, that an exhibition "devoted to the struggle and work of the Polish Communist Party is to be organized this year in Warsaw. It will depict the role of the CPP as the leader of the Polish working masses in the struggle for social justice and its role in the international Communist movement, as well as the life and struggle of the heroic leaders of the Party."

Following the Congress, a number of voices were suddenly raised in defense of the A.K. (*Armia Krajowa*—Home Army). Men who had fought the Germans in the A.K. have for years been vilified and penalized. Now that persecution is admitted to have been wrong, and Stalin's theory that the class struggle increases with the building of Communism is blamed for it. Radio Warsaw, March 27, said:

"Nevertheless, that false theory about the alleged continuous increase of the enemy's forces has done a great deal of harm. It has barred the road back to Poland to many. To many it meant an undeserved and unjust lot in Poland, as for instance to the former soldiers of the A.K., soldiers who believed that they were fighting for a free and democratic Poland and shed blood for this cause."

"REHABILITATION" OF POLISH A.K. PARTISAN ARMY

From Radio Warsaw (Home Service), March 21, 1956, which quoted an article entitled "Let Us Meet the Men from the A.K.," from the students' periodical *Poprostu*:

"**T**IME HEALS all wounds. It should also heal this one. It is a good thing that the young authors have written on this matter. But it is not enough to congratulate them and rest at that. We must help them by supporting their demands that our schools should teach of the heroism of A.K. soldiers and that the A.K. be a subject for our literature, arts, and films. . . . But that is only one part of the problem. The young authors also refer to the fact that a great number of former A.K. soldiers are being treated as second class citizens 'because of the A.K. complex and—let us say so frankly—also because of the A.K. stigma.'"

From the same authors in *Poprostu*, April 1, in an article on the A.K.:

"**W**E SHOULD approach those on the other side to give them a helping hand, not just pat their shoulders in a protective manner and say 'from now on we shall forget your past.' We have nothing to forgive them for; on the contrary, we owe them an unpaid debt of gratitude."

Another startling revision of doctrine and history was contained in an important speech by Central Committee Secretary Jerzy Morawski, *Trybuna Ludu*, March 26:

"We have abandoned the false theory, once put forth, on Social-Fascism, a theory which, as a matter of fact, characterized social democracy as a particular variety of Fascism. This theory led to the isolation of Communists confronted by the aggressive activities of Fascism and caused in its time much damage to the international working class movement. True, it was overcome in the period of the Popular Front, but even then, on more than one occasion, relapses of sectarianism and suspicion made themselves felt, as well as the alienation from us of forces with which one could and should cooperate, and among which one could and should look for allies of the revolutionary movement and of the working class."

This attempt to placate Social Democrats in the West, after years of Communist invective, is in line with the current campaign for a popular front with parties in the West which can help in the "parliamentary road to Communism."

Gomulka

ALTHOUGH the release from prison of Gomulka and others purged under Stalin has long been rumored (see p. 11), it was only after the Soviet Congress that these releases were officially announced and Gomulka's arrest admitted to have been unjust. It has been stressed, however, that Gomulka's views were incorrect, although his arrest for them is cited as another example of the atmosphere of terror



Photo, from *Drogi Cichociemnych*, London, 1954, shows Partisan (A. K.) Colonel "Oliwa," commander of the 27th Partisan infantry division [second from left], meeting Soviet Colonel Fioderov [second from right] in the Wolyn Province. This meeting between the Soviet "liberators" and men of the Polish underground forces took place in April 1944. Shortly thereafter the Polish officer and his men "disappeared," victims of a Stalinist policy that called for the wholesale liquidation of the heroic Home Army, which numbered over 380,000 partisans and underground soldiers. Many officers were executed and some 50,000 soldiers were deported to the USSR. This treachery reached its climax in August 1944, when for forty crucial, bloody days the Soviet army stood still at the gates of Warsaw while the German army destroyed the city and massacred its defenders.

created by Stalin. First Party Secretary Edward Ochab, *Trybuna Ludu*, April 9, attacked the "Party leadership" of the past for failing "to work with adequate vigor and consistency in unravelling all the matters complicated by Beriaism in our investigative apparatus and on the speedy rehabilitations of persons charged without adequate foundation" (Ochab's speech was as near as the Polish Party has come to denouncing its own top leadership for acquiescence to and participation in Stalin's "cult of the individual"; in view of the recent death of former First Party Secretary Bierut it is quite possible that a tactful silence will be maintained). Ochab went on to say:

"In the years 1954-5 the Party leadership has done much to effect the release and rehabilitation of persons accused without foundation, but the question as to why the rehabilitation proceedings in regard to a number of people were delayed in an unfounded manner must be answered. Undoubtedly the delay was influenced by the acceptance by the Third Plenum [CC meeting of January 1955] of the theory that the authority of the Party would suffer if it were made public that high Party organs, even the Party leadership, had laid accusations against people whose real guilt had not been proved. It is clear that the Party's authority suffered much more because of the insufficiently energetic rehabilitation process in cases where the basic accusations once formulated by the investigating officers and the public prosecution collapsed in the face of new facts revealing the grim methods applied by men of the type of Rozanski [security official purged in 1954].

"Filled with grief, we think not only about cases of groundless arrest of Party comrades whom we have now

fully rehabilitated, but also about unjustified arrests of people whom we fought with justice as purveyors of nationalistic and opportunistic views, but whom we unjustly accused of diversionary activities and consented to their being arrested, by yielding to the theories on the unavoidable transformation of an opportunistic deviation into an imperialist fifth column and by succumbing to a spy complex."

Ochab went on to analyze the "opportunistic and nationalistic deviation of Gomulka." It consisted, apparently, in his opposition to both rapid agricultural collectivization and emphasis on the development of heavy industry to the detriment of the national living standard. After castigating these views as a rejection of "Marxism-Leninism," Ochab added:

"But it is worth while declaring with great emphasis that Gomulka's arrest in 1951, which took place in the atmosphere created by Beriaism, in the atmosphere of the Rajk trial, was unjustified and without foundation. The accusations of diversionary activity advanced against him not only harmed him but also misled public opinion. . . . Gomulka has been cleared of these accusations and released."

As official criticism of Stalin goes on, regime leaders are under increasing pressure to explain and justify their own failure to combat him. Morawski attempted this in his March 26 *Trybuna Ludu* article, following his attack on the crimes of Stalin:

"In this situation, many honest activists of the CPSU, who opposed Stalin in various matters, fell victim to repression. Later on, repression was used mechanically and blindly ever more often against Communists and simple Soviet citizens who seemed suspicious. Methods of provocation were used, false accusations were forged, abuses took place during investigations in order that condemnations might be obtained. As a result, **many honest people were imprisoned, sent to penal camps, or shot. . . .**

"The question is sometimes put as to why the leadership of the CPSU did not earlier, during Stalin's lifetime, take up the struggle against the distortion of Leninist norms and the mistakes committed by him. . . . But in the circumstances, when a stubborn fight was being waged for a correct Party line, when an enormous effort was indispensable to build up the country—and Stalin adopted a correct attitude in actual problems of Socialist construction—the dangers of the growing cult of the individual were not yet fully visible. And later on, under conditions of fanaticism and terrorism against any attempt at opposition, which were the direct results of the cult of the individual, could a struggle against Stalin be real and effective?

"The point was not to save one's own life, the point was to save the revolution. During the years 1934 to 1941, when the imperialists were preparing aggression against the Soviet Union with ever greater intensity, when any action against Stalin would have plunged the country into chaos and disorder, this could have meant only one thing: to open the gates to the enemy, to open the road to imperialist aggression, to facilitate that aggression. Was it possible to take such a decision? Or was it instead necessary to grit one's teeth while seeing all the damage arising from the cult of the individual, and, with a feeling of

responsibility for the cause of the revolution, to fight and work for the growth of the strength of the Socialist State, counting on the dynamism of Socialism, on the strength of the Communist idea to force its way through all distortions brought about by the cult of the individual?"

In other words, the regime leaders excuse their failure to combat the tyranny of Stalin on the familiar grounds that the security of the "Socialist motherland" took precedence over any other considerations, and they couldn't have done anything about it anyway.

In Poland, the strictures of the Congress are being applied to every sphere of activity. Speaking at a national conference of architects (see p. 55), Premier Josef Cyrankiewicz said:

"Our conference is taking place at a time of most extraordinary political importance, perhaps sometimes underestimated by us. Our entire country, in fact the whole world, resounds with echoes of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. A great unceasing reevaluation of many things, which is far from complete yet, is taking place at present in the whole country, in the entire camp of Socialism. This discussion outlines inspiring plans for our further work and condition, the further march forward by the rejection of all that has burdened our life for many years. . . . We do not hesitate to throw overboard the ballast of dogmas which have fettered free thought and have frequently become an obstacle and a brake in our march forward . . . we are restoring full civic rights to creative Marxism and are fully valuing Leninism once more." (Radio Warsaw, March 27)

The heralded end of dogmatic and tyrannical Stalinism is being used in an attempt to stir a weary and apathetic people to recapture the fervor of an earlier day. Cyrankiewicz exhorted the architects:

"This opens before us immense opportunities for releasing the creative energy of the masses in all fields of life. . . . Let us, for instance, recall the splendid period of the exuberant development of cultural life in the Soviet Union after that Great October, after the Revolution. . . . It seems that the present period can be and must be the beginning of a full creative renaissance of Marxism and Leninism and of revolutionary thought."

Beyond the Congress

NOWHERE is the initiative seized from the Congress by the Poles for questioning Communist dogma so clear as in the current criticism of the rubber-stamp role of the Sejm, the Polish parliament. *Trybuna Ludu*, March 31, stated:

"A distortion has occurred based on the tacitly accepted formula: 'As there are no fundamental antagonisms in the Sejm, all the deputies should not discuss but vote unanimously.' I cannot imagine such sincere unanimity among 400 men on all sorts of issues. The Sejm is the organ of power, where the most important decisions are made. Do not these decisions call for discussion and a clash of views? Only discussion can lead to correct conclusions."

To question honest unanimity in a body of 400 men must inevitably lead to questioning the honesty of the

unanimity in the standard 99.9 percent Communist election. Here, as in every field of Polish life, the regime is playing a dangerous game. It apparently feels sufficiently secure to permit the full implications of the Twentieth Congress' call for the overthrow of dogmatism to be expressed. The regime's problem, however, is to control that relaxation and reappraisal, to hold it short of analysis and criticism so basic as to imperil the Party's control. Indeed, even after the short space of time since the Congress, Ochab, in his April 6 speech, found it necessary to admonish:

"Attention must be drawn to the fact that some comrades seem to be losing their sense of balance and their sense of proportion between justified criticism and actions from positions which cannot be of advantage to the Party. There are people who in public—and not through the Party—and in the press come out against the Party. This shows an unhealthy anarchistic tendency, the loss of a feeling of Party responsibility, and a confusion of ideas. . . . The words themselves speak of concern for the Party but in fact they attack the Party. . . . It will, of course, be necessary, by common effort, to separate the chaff from the grain, the constructive idea from the rather rare excesses of irresponsibility and hysteria."

Poland's Communist leaders have apparently committed themselves to the gamble that they can, with the lure of relaxation and "thaw" pushed to and beyond the limits of the Soviet Congress, drive the country faster down the road of Communism. They are not unaware of the danger that the lure may prove stronger than the bit of ultimate Party domination.

Hungary

IN HUNGARY, there was a long pause between the Congress and regime comment. Not until Rakosi returned from Moscow and reported to the Central Committee on March 12 was Stalin mentioned by name, and then in the mildest manner consonant with the strictures of the Soviet leaders:

"The cult of personality is entirely alien to Marxism. We must admit that in connection with Stalin, whose great merits are well known, a personality cult developed which hampered collective leadership and the development of democracy in the Party, and this was the origin of several serious political and ideological errors. The spirit of the cult of personality extended also to the People's Democracies, ours among them." (Radio Budapest, March 14)

Hungarian comment on the Congress has been in the most general terms. There has been no tendency toward a detailed revaluation of the whole fabric of Communist society, as in Poland. The general trend has been to go back to the June 1953 Resolution, which introduced the New Course, to claim, rather smugly, that Hungary had found the right road then, and to blame both left and right deviation for subsequent errors. *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), March 18, said:

"For our Party, too, the two most important and interrelated problems are the successful solution of Socialist construction—first of all economic construction—and the enforcement of the Leninist rules of Party life within the work of our Party. We handled both problems essentially

correctly some years ago, partly in June of 1953 and more particularly at our Party's Third Congress [May 1954]. Therefore the recent session of the Central Committee declared that the Party's political line is correct in adding at the same time—even if we have achieved notable progress, especially in overcoming the personality cult—the continued strengthening of collective leadership and Party democracy as a decisive task. If we have not advanced further in this respect since the Third Congress it is partially due to adherence to the old entrenched incorrect methods and partially to rightist deviation, which sought to distort and pervert demagogically the resolutions of June 1953 and of the Third Congress."

In Hungary, under former Premier Nagy, the relaxations of the immediate post-Stalin years went farther than elsewhere in the area, indeed so far that they began to escape regime control and had to be curtailed. A middle ground was sought between the extremes of that relaxation and the tyranny of Stalin. The key to the Hungarian reaction to the Twentieth Congress seems to be the regime's determination not to abandon that middle ground. First Party Secretary Matyas Rakosi, writing in *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* (Bucharest), March 23, stated it clearly:

"We must also realize that in the early years of the Second Five Year Plan the improvement of the people's well-being will to some extent be hampered by the grave consequences of the irresponsible and demagogic economic policy of right wing deviation, which was pursued by former Council of Ministers Chairman Imre Nagy, and to which the Central Committee of our Party put an end by its resolution last March. . . .

"It should be mentioned in conclusion that in connection with the Twentieth Congress . . . the right wing elements in Hungary, in accordance with the saying 'A hungry pig dreams of acorns,' expected that the Congress line would support their line. It is now clear to everyone that these expectations were not realized. . . . The Central Committee's March decisions last year turned out to be absolutely correct."

Hungary was the first Satellite to respond to the Congress' admission of Stalin's illegalities with a revision of one of the great anti-Titoist trials—that of Laszlo Rajk and his accomplices" (pp. 52-53). The former police chief Gabor Peter, jailed in 1954, was blamed for the "provocation" of the trial. At the same time, a number of Social Democrats have been released from prison (pp. 10-11). Placation of Tito seems to be the reason for the Rajk revision; placation of West European leftists, who are being wooed to form a popular front with the Communist Parties, the reason for the Social Democrats' releases.

A major emphasis in the regime reaction is on the revitalization of the People's Patriotic Front. By giving greater importance to the PPF, the regime apparently hopes to urge the people on to that greater productive effort necessary to bolster the dangerously lagging economy, without allowing the liberalizations which proved so dangerous in the Nagy period. Rakosi, in his report on the Congress, stated:

"It is a fact today that the PPF has become less and less active. This situation can be remedied, the more so because

this is a time when the question of popular fronts is again becoming timely in capitalist countries."

The resolution passed by the Central Committee after hearing Rakosi's report said:

"An ardent and systematic struggle must be pursued within the Party so that collective leadership becomes a full reality at all levels. Democracy must be still further developed within the Party and Socialist legality must be strengthened. Under the leadership of the Party and of the working class, the PPF movement must be expanded."

Here once again the note of moderation and caution is sounded, and the Party leadership of the PPF, which under Nagy threatened to escape Party control, is stressed. The Hungarian regime is still suffering a hangover from the liberalizations of the Nagy period, and is being careful not to drink too deeply of those proclaimed by the Twentieth Congress.

Czechoslovakia


IN A SLOWER, quieter and more restrained manner than Poland, the Czechoslovak regime is subjecting its own past to the criticisms of the Congress. Stalin has been attacked for all the crimes currently being imputed to him, but Czechoslovak spokesmen are always careful to lay stress on the valuable contributions of Stalin before the development of the "cult of the individual."

The effect of the "cult of the individual" within Czechoslovakia is being admitted. First Party Secretary Antonin Novotny, in his report on the Congress to the CC, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), April 10, stated:

"It must be said clearly that in our Party too, we all, without exception, not only succumbed to the cult of personality, but also spread it, particularly from the time when our Party became the ruling party in the State. . . . This practice originated in the very leadership of the Party and gradually a whole system was evolved which had an unfavorable influence upon the whole Party and public life. . . . Let us recollect how only recently at our conferences and meetings and sessions of the CC similar things occurred which afterwards spread to the whole Party."

"Despite Comrade Gottwald's great merit in the fight for the overthrow of capitalism, for the victory of Socialism, which no one doubts, it must be said that in spite of his well-known modesty, merit was attributed to him which belonged to the Party and the masses. This led to the creation of an atmosphere of untouchability of Comrade Gottwald [who died in March 1953], to the propagation of the view 'Comrade Gottwald thinks for us,' to a weakening of the principle of collective leadership in our Party. . . . Comrades, it is an abuse when busts of living persons are exhibited or when individual factories, streets and schools are named after living personalities. This went so far that some Ministers even had their portraits hung in the offices of subordinate authorities. This is a glaring example of flattery and sycophancy."

The criticism so far permitted in Czechoslovakia, although a radical departure from the past, has largely been confined to the safer and more obvious excesses of bureaucracy and dogmatism. Novotny said, for example:



This cartoon is dedicated to "Managers who are notorious for making employees work overtime."

Szabad Nep (Budapest), March 4, 1956

"It must be stated, comrades, that there are more examples of immodesty and haughtiness in our life than necessary. . . . What can one say, for example, to the education of children belonging to . . . officials who from their youth are led to look upon life from the positions held by their fathers. . . ? Let us learn from Lenin to be modest. Let us remove from our lives all haughtiness and pomposity."

Novotny called for more criticism from below:

"The fact is, however, that Party members and non-Party people are often afraid to criticize. Open criticism, irrespective of personalities, is still being muzzled. There are not infrequent cases of officials being railroaded and transferred to inferior positions because of their criticism . . . little notice is taken of the well-meant opinions and advice offered by the working people . . . a hostile atmosphere against them is created at the place of work, they are simply called 'oppositionists.'"

It is made clear, however, that this criticism must be kept within bounds useful to the regime:

"If we say that it is time to release all forces for criticism and self-criticism, this does not in any way mean that we shall tolerate indiscipline, infringe the principle of subordinating the minority to the majority, the principle of the absolutely binding character of decisions of higher organs on lower organs."

In the same manner, while abrogations of "Socialist legality" in the security services are denounced, it is made plain that the Communist concept of security must be enforced. Novotny said: "If we wish to put the security services in their proper place we must realize that it is a concern of the whole Party how to lead and help the security services in the fulfillment of their duties."

Czechoslovakia is unique among the Satellites in failing

to reverse the Slansky trial, its anti-Titoist *cause celebre*, as the Rajk trial in Hungary, and the Kostov trial in Bulgaria have been reversed. (see pp. 50-3). Certain accusations are being withdrawn. Premier Siroky stated in an April 13 interview that the Titoism imputed to Slansky and his co-defendants was an error, and that the anti-Semitic nature of the prosecution was wrong. The anti-Zionism implicit in the trial, however, is not repudiated, and the main charges of attempting to take over the government on behalf of "the imperialists" have been reiterated. Indeed, so far from rehabilitating Slansky, he is now accused of having been responsible for many Stalin-like violations of "Socialist legality" when he was Secretary-General of the Party, according to *Rude Pravo*, April 12.

Bulgaria and Romania

BULGARIA has reacted to the Congress with the ouster of Premier Vulko Chervenkov for his fostering of "the cult of the individual" and with the revision of the Kostov anti-Titoist trial (see pp. 49 and 50); Romania has had no visible political reaction at all. Nevertheless, there is a basic similarity in the treatment the two regimes have found it expedient to give the Congress. Neither of them has permitted the questioning of dogma that is blooming in Poland and is being more carefully cultivated in Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

Bulgarian comment has restricted itself almost completely to exorciation of the "cult of the individual." Since Chervenkov has been sacrificed on this altar, such criticism is relatively safe, and can do nothing to undermine regime control. Chervenkov is guilty, Chervenkov is demoted, and the regime can go on as before. The Central Committee of the Bulgarian Party, meeting April 2-6, promulgated an announcement which, in addition to routine praise of the Soviet Union and the Congress, stated:

"In accounting for the great achievements of the Party in mobilizing the forces of our people in the building of Socialism, the plenary session of the Central Committee considers that these successes would have been greater, providing that the cult of the individual and the harmful and non-Marxist methods of work linked with it had not in the past few years penetrated the ranks of the Communist Party and of our entire life. The cult surrounding the person of Comrade Vulko Chervenkov changed to a great extent the traditional, tested methods of work of the Bulgarian Communist Party, namely internal Party democracy and collective leadership. As a direct consequence, there sometimes were one-sided decisions on problems."

Even in discussing the eradication of the Stalinist cult of the individual, the Bulgarian press used the language and tone of unregenerate Stalinism. *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), April 9, commenting on the Central Committee meeting, said:

"The plenary session detailed measures for the purge of various sectors of science, particularly philosophy, history and political economy, as well as literature and art. They are to be purged of the incorrect views linked with the cult of the individual. In connection with this task it is necessary to examine textbooks and scientific works, which

must be purged of the influence of the cult of the individual."

In Romania, although the speeches of the Soviet leaders attacking Stalin were reproduced, there was no comment mentioning his name until the publication of an abridged version of First Party Secretary Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej's report to the post-Congress Central Committee meeting, on March 29, more than a month after the end of Congress. The report gave five times as much space to the importance and values of Stalin, his "popularity," his "works, his logic, his work for the dissemination and the enrichment of Marxist-Leninist theory," as it did to "negative influence" of his "departure from the Marxist-Leninist concept of the role of personality."

The report stated that the "cult of personality" made possible the "hostile provocative activity of Beria and his accomplices, who staged trials based on faked documents and exterminated innocent people, honest cadres of the Party." It echoed the various animadversions against the dogmatism of the Stalinist period made by the Soviet leaders, and quoted a statement issued by the Romanian Central Committee in 1953 calling for the "liquidation" of the "cult of the individual." In general, however, Romanian comment has been very limited; what there has been has almost entirely consisted of empty rhetoric and tiresome repetition, without any apparent application of the Congress innovations to Romanian life.

New Nuclear Institute

A conference of Soviet bloc countries "on the organization of an Eastern Nuclear Research Institute" opened in Moscow on March 20. All East European Satellites were represented, as were the Asian Communist countries. On March 26 an agreement on the organization of a Joint Nuclear Research Institute was signed, "for the purpose of achieving further development of research in the field of nuclear physics." All Soviet bloc countries (except North Vietnam) are members of the Institute, which will be permitted to utilize Soviet installations and facilities for research. This presumably includes the 680 million electron volt synchrocyclotron of the Soviet Academy's Nuclear Institute, as well as the ten billion electron volt synchrophasatron now being completed at the Academy's Electrophysical Laboratory. In addition, the USSR is to establish an electronic computing section, an experimental nuclear reactor and a cyclotron for the use of the new Institute.

Aside from the new organization, the Soviet Union has announced that it is assembling and mounting a number of 25 million electron volt cyclotrons to be given to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, East Germany and China. China is also to receive a 5-6,000 kilowatt atomic reactor, while the other bloc countries will get 2,000 kilowatt reactors.

* * *

Bulgaria

Yugov Replaces Chervenkov as Premier

On April 16, ten days after he had been rebuked by the Party Central Committee for violating collective leadership and encouraging the "cult of the individual," Premier Vulko Chervenkov presented his resignation to an extraordinary session of parliament. The meeting was attended not only by 249 Bulgarian MPs but also by a Yugoslav parliamentary delegation headed by Moshe Pijade. A day later, the Assembly "accepted" Chervenkov's resignation, demoted him to Deputy Premier, and appointed in his place Anton Yugov, a Politburo member and former First Deputy Premier.

Chervenkov's enforced resignation followed the "rehabilitation" several days earlier of Traicho Kostov, the Communist Deputy Premier who was executed in 1949 as a traitor and "Titoist." Chervenkov, long known as a "Stalin man" and confirmed Muscovite, benefited from Kostov's purge and was one of the signers of the Cominform's 1948 anti-Tito resolution. The Premier's ouster, announced in the presence of the Yugoslavs and effected on the same day as the dissolution of the Cominform, was clearly a move to placate Tito.

Chervenkov, who became Bulgarian Premier in 1950 after the death of Vasil Kolarov, belongs to the hard core of Moscow-trained Communists. He spent some twenty years in the Soviet Union and returned to Bulgaria with the Red Army in 1944. Between 1944 and 1950, as a member of the Central Committee and Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party, he held such posts as: Central Committee Secretary for Agitation and Propaganda; Deputy to the National Assembly; Vice-President of the Slav Committee; editor-in-chief of the Central Committee monthly *Novo Vreme*; President of the State Cultural Commission and Secretary General of the Fatherland Front. In 1949, he became Deputy Premier and, in 1950-1954, he held the posts of Premier and Secretary General of the Party. In accordance with areawide changes relating to collective leadership, he relinquished his Party leadership in 1954 and remained only Premier.

Yugov, a Macedonian by birth, belongs to the group of "national" Communists. During his long revolutionary career, he spent only some two years in Moscow. In the 1920s, he organized tobacco workers in Plovdiv and, by 1937, he had become a Bulgarian Politburo member in charge of Trade Unions. In 1938, he was appointed head of the Central Committee's Department for Military and Mass Organizations, and in 1940 he organized the general strike of tobacco workers. Interned as a Communist, he escaped in 1941 to join the guerrillas and until 1944 was active as chief of the Party's Military Commission. He was appointed to the important post of Minister of Interior in the new Communist-dominated Government and was re-elected a member of the Politburo and Central Committee.

Anton Yugov



The New Bulgarian Premier.

Rabotnichesko Delo (Sofia), February 11, 1953

Although Yugov managed to survive the purge of "national" Communists in 1949, his career suffered a setback in January 1950, when he was removed as Minister of Interior and named to the politically relatively unimportant post of Minister of Industry. At that time he was severely rebuked by Chervenkov for tolerating "Kostov's conspiratorial activities," and he publicly confessed to his mistakes in April and June—at a conference of officials of the Ministry of Industry and at a meeting following the Third Party Conference. Chervenkov's criticism seemed at first to presage Yugov's imminent purge: "We have the right to ask," Chervenkov said, "how the Ministry of Interior worked before. Why did Traicho Kostov's anti-Soviet directives exist in economic ministries and organs, and why did the Ministry of Interior show no sign of alarm? How is it that foreign spies were appointed to responsible posts in the State security? For more than four years, Comrade Yugov was Minister of the Interior. Therefore Comrade Yugov is responsible for this situation." (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], February 4, 1950.)

Despite this reprimand, Yugov managed to retain his posts in the Politburo and the Central Committee, and in 1954 he was promoted from Deputy Premier (1952-54) to First Deputy Premier. This promotion was made at the Sixth Party Congress which marked a turning point in Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations. From that time on, the Sofia government made persistent attempts to normalize relations with Yugoslavia, and the group of "national" Communists—many of whom maintained contacts with Tito's guerrillas during the war—has come increasingly into the limelight. The appointment of Yugov to the Premiership suggests that previous plans to establish a Balkan Federation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria may be revived in the future.

In his speech to the National Assembly, Yugov placed special emphasis on Bulgaria's improved relations with the Balkan countries, and particularly with Yugoslavia: "We

Traicho Kostov



Rabotnichesko Delo (Sofia), December 20, 1948

have to mention with special satisfaction the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia. . . . At present a Yugoslav parliamentary delegation . . . is among us. I greet them most cordially and I would like to ask them to convey my best feelings to the Yugoslav nation. I hope that such expressions of friendship and collaboration will become more frequent in order to preserve peace in the Balkans and in the world, as well as achieve successfully the construction of Socialism in both our countries." (Radio Sofia, April 17.)

The prominence now to be given to non-Moscow trained Communists was noticeable in other government changes. Following Yugov's appointment, the National Assembly promoted Deputy Premiers Georgi Traikov (officially a member of the Agrarian party) and Georgi Chankov (a "national" Communist) to the rank of First Deputy Premiers. The other Deputy Premiers are Ivan Mikhailov, Raiko Damyanov, Chervenkov and Karlo Lukhanov, who until this time was Bulgarian Ambassador to Moscow. On April 6, the Party Central Committee increased the number of Party Secretaries from three to five by the promotion of two other "national" Communists, Encho Staikov and Boyan Bulgaranov. Bulgaranov, who was a Communist guerrilla in World War II, was dismissed from the Ministry of War in 1949, presumably because of his connections with Kostov. In 1950, he was removed from the Party Central Committee, but at the Sixth Party Congress he was reinstated. The other Central Committee Secretaries are Todor Zhivkov, Dimiter Ganev and Boris Taskov.

Traicho Kostov Cleared

In an April 14 speech to a meeting of the Party active in Plovdiv, First Party Secretary Todor Zhivkov declared that Traicho Kostov, former Deputy Premier and Secretary General of the Party who was purged in 1949, had been falsely convicted and was innocent. Zhivkov made this

announcement in connection with a sharp attack against Vulko Chervenkov for "pursuing the cult of the individual." This practice, he said, has led to violations of "Socialist legality." "As a result of this situation, innocent comrades have been wrongly accused and condemned. . . . The charges contained in the act of indictment and the other material in connection with the trial of Traicho Kostov and the other trials which followed this trial, during which the accused were incorrectly charged with having criminal links with Yugoslav State organs and leaders, were fabricated and not in harmony with the truth." Zhivkov declared that "in accordance with a decision of the Council of Ministers and the Party Central Committee, all innocent persons detained in connection with these trials will be freed."

The factional struggle in the Bulgarian Communist Party between the native and the Moscow-trained members came to a head early in 1949, when Prime Minister Georgi Dimitrov left for Moscow to undergo medical treatment. Kostov, a "national" Communist, was considered Dimitrov's most likely successor, but at the end of January, he was suddenly granted "six weeks leave" for alleged reasons of health. In March, he was removed from the Politburo and dismissed as Vice-President of the Council of Ministers. Three months later, in June, shortly before Dimitrov's death, he was expelled from the Party Central Committee and placed under arrest on the grounds of attempting to overthrow the government, working as an Anglo-American and Yugoslav spy, damaging "friendly relations with the USSR," forming subversionist groups, abusing his position by working for foreign governments, and disorganizing the national economy. He was brought to trial on December 2, 1949, and on December 12, he was sentenced to death on the charges of high treason, sabotage and espionage. The conviction of Kostov and his followers left the way open to Vulko Chervenkov, the Moscow-trained Communist who became head of the Bulgarian government after the death of Premier Vasil Kolarov (July 2, 1949-January 23, 1950).

The other defendants in the Kostov trial were: Central Committee member and Minister of Finance Ivan Stefanov; Central Committee member and Deputy Minister of Construction and Roads Nikola Pavlov; President of the State Committee for Economic and Financial Affairs Nikola Nachev; Commercial Attache to the USSR Boris Christov; Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank Tsoniu Tsonchev; Foreign Trade Director Ivan Tutev; Counsellor to the Yugoslav Embassy in Bulgaria Blagoi Hadji Panzov; President of the National Committee of Cultural Societies Vassil Ivanosky; Director of the Rubber Industry Ivan Guevrenov and Political Commissar of the Building Union in the Sofia City Council Ilya Bayaltzaliev. Bayaltzaliev was sentenced to eight years in prison, and the other defendants were sent to prison periods ranging from 15 years to life.

External Amnesty

The first amnesty for Bulgarians in exile was announced in *Izvestia* (Sofia), April 10. It states:

The Kostov Trial

Court Proceedings, December 7, 1949:

TRAICHO KOSTOV: Citizen Judges: I recognize that I am guilty of having held an erroneous attitude toward the Soviet Union, an attitude which was expressed in methods of bargaining which I adopted in our commercial relations with the Soviet Union, in having hidden [from the USSR] a number of prices agreed upon in deals with capitalist countries, and also in the matter of my orders concerning the application of the Law on State Secrets and in my liberal attitude concerning a number of anti-Soviet opinions expressed in my presence. . . . I repeat, I recognize myself guilty of nationalist deviation toward the USSR, and this deserves the severest kind of condemnation. . . .

"I also recognize myself guilty for my attempt, at the time of the Third Session of the CC of the Party, to oppose the CC to the Politburo. . . . My attitude towards Dimitrov, the Party's and the Bulgarian people's chief, . . . was also wrong. . . ."

"Presiding Judge: Kostov, in the bill of indictment which you have just heard read you are accused of acts you committed in the months of April and May 1942. What explanation do you give on this subject?"

"Traicho Kostov: This is what I have to say. I do not admit to having capitulated to the Fascist police, nor that I was recruited in the Intelligence Service, nor that I took part in any conspiratorial activity in collaboration with Tito and his clique. . . ."

"Presiding Judge: Do you still adhere to the depositions which you previously gave, at the time of the examination. . . ?"

"Traicho Kostov: I do not [any longer] adhere to these depositions. . . ."

Kostov's written deposition, dated October 27, 1949, is then read in court. It says in part:

I ADMIT that in May 1942, during the police inquiry in connection with the discovery of the then-illegal Central Committee of the CPB, I was asked by the head of the political department of the Bulgarian police, Guechev, to collaborate with the Intelligence Service, and that, to the day of my arrest in June 1949, I carried out the mis-

sions with which I was charged. I also admit that, from November 1944 to recent times, I maintained criminal contacts with Tito and his gang. Our common task—Tito's in Yugoslavia and mine in Bulgaria—consisted in carrying out a policy of splitting our countries from the USSR in order to bind them again to the Anglo-American bloc. . . .

"My moral fall started in 1930 when, at the time of my stay in Moscow as an exile, I fell under the influence of the leftist sectarian faction. . . ."

"My first contact with Tito . . . dates back to 1934 and took place in Moscow. . . . Tito had probably been informed by Bela Kun and Valecki, with whom he was closely associated, of my adherence to the group of leftist sectarians in Bulgaria. That is why he was very frank with me. In one of our talks, in 1934, Tito let me know of his Trotskyist convictions. . . ."

Last Declarations by the Accused

PRESIDING JUDGE: Accused Traicho Kostov!

"Traicho Kostov: In the last words which I shall say before the distinguished court I consider it to be a duty of my conscience to declare before the Court and, through it, before Bulgarian public opinion, that I have never been in the service of the Intelligence Service, that I have never taken part in the conspiratorial and criminal plans of Tito and his clique. . . ."

Extract from petition allegedly presented by Kostov to the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly on December 14, 1949, two days before his execution:

"Distinguished People's Representatives,

I recognize myself guilty according to the bill of indictment presented by the Court and I confirm on all points the signed depositions I made in the course of the examination."

Le Proces de Traicho Kostov et de Son Groupe, Sofia, 1949.

"Rehabilitation"

" . . . the accusations in the Kostov trial, based on ties with Yugoslav agencies and leaders, are cancelled. All defendants at this trial are rehabilitated."

Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the CCBCP, quoted by Radio Sofia, April 14, 1956.

"Bulgarian citizens who are guilty of the crime of fleeing the country are freed from punishment if they return home voluntarily. If they have been deprived of Bulgarian citizenship that citizenship is reinstated and property confiscated by the State is returned to them in accordance with the established limitations of the law. If this is impossible they will receive monetary compensation or be given other suitable property."

This is the latest in a series of amnesties promulgated by the Satellites in an attempt to obtain the repatriation of the large numbers of citizens who have fled the Communist regimes.

Rapid Rise in Collectivization

According to the latest official reports on farm collectivization, an additional 14 percent of the total farm land was brought into the "Socialist sector" in the first two months of the year. *Zemedelsko Zname* (Sofia), March 25, published the following table on increases achieved in the nation's twelve districts between January 1 and March 3:

District	No. New Collectives	Household Applications	Collectivized [agricultural] Land Area (hectares)
Blagoevgrad	—	2,911	2,284.0
Burgas	8	8,902	20,433.3
Vratza	5	22,625	59,860.7
Kolarovgrad	37	19,961	56,108.2
Pleven	6	12,597	30,314.7
Plovdiv	20	23,120	65,108.0
Russe	14	29,696	71,307.9
Sofia	72	35,669	84,199.8
Stalin	13	20,567	73,639.6
Stara Zagora	20	33,094	116,966.4
Turnovo	6	11,921	27,615.3
Haskovo	14	4,635	10,244.6
Sofia City	—	60	120.0
Total	215	225,758	618,202.5

According to the figures in the table above, the total number of collectives had reached 2,945 by March 3. Between March 3 and April 11 a further sharp rise took place: on that day Radio Sofia announced that "during the last months [presumably since January 1, 1956] the number of households in collectives increased by 270,000 units [some 45,000 more than for March 3] and some half a million new collective farm workers will start working in the fields."

The intensity of the present collectivization drive can best be gauged by comparison with former years. Between 1953-1955, collectivization was virtually at a standstill. It increased by less than one percent (from 60.5 to 61 percent) and the number of kolkhozes declined (from 2,747 to 2,730), although this probably was the result of collective mergers. In the Stalinist period, the greatest annual increase took place in 1950, when the collectivized sector expanded from 11.3 to 43 percent of the total farm land. With the exception of 1950, the average yearly increase between 1947 and 1952 was about four percent. This year,

in the first three months alone, collectivization increased by almost 14 percent. In a speech on April 17, the new Premier, Anton Yugov, announced that 77 percent of the farmer households and 75 percent of the total land now belonged to the collectivized sector.

Hungary

Rajk Cleared

The "rehabilitation" of Hungarian Communists who were purged in a major show trial in 1949 was announced on March 29; it constitutes one of the most important steps so far in Moscow's reconciliation with Tito. In clearing the name of former Hungarian Minister of Interior, Laszlo Rajk, who was sentenced to death for high treason, and in absolving the other seven defendants in the trial, the Rakosi regime has not only restored the reputation of the Hungarian "national" Communists involved; it has also absolved Tito of the "crimes" charged against him in the "confession" of the accused. The regime simultaneously "revised the cases" of a number of Hungarian Social Democrats who were purged between 1948-1952, when the Rakosi government removed all opposition groups in a drive for absolute power.

In announcing the re-examination of the Rajk trial, First Party Secretary Matyas Rakosi claimed that it was an important move to "consolidate Socialist legality." He failed to mention either his own or Stalin's instigation of the trial and placed the blame for this "provocation" on the "imperialist agent Beria" and on former head of the Hungarian Security Police, Gabor Peter, who was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1954. At the time of the trial, however, the Hungarian press gave Rakosi main credit for exposing the "Titoist-Trotskyite-Rajk clique."

Rajk, who was born in Transylvania, was one of the "native" Communists who fought in the Spanish Civil War. During the German occupation, he was leader of the Communist underground in Hungary and, in March 1946, he became Minister of the Interior. He played a major part in the 1947 Communist coup and was largely responsible for the ouster of Premier Ferenc Nagy, who represented the middle-class Smallholders Party. Rajk masterminded police roundups of alleged "reactionaries" in the Smallholders Party and directed the large-scale arrests of non-Communists. In 1947, he wrote the new Communist election law and, in August 1948, he was appointed Foreign Minister. Less than ten months later, however, he himself was the victim of a purge launched by the Muscovite faction of the Party under the leadership of Matyas Rakosi.

On June 16, 1949, Rajk was ousted from the Party and in September of that year was brought to trial with seven "accomplices" who were accused of espionage for the American and Yugoslav governments and of planning with their help to overthrow the Hungarian regime. The indictment against Rajk accused him on three counts: of

Rajk and the Rule of Law

Laszlo Rajk



Gyorgy Palffy



Pal Justus



"The President: Do you plead guilty?
Rajk: Yes, I do.
The President: On all counts?
Rajk: On all counts."

"I have committed the gravest crimes
against the people and my country."

"I feel guilty of subversive ac-
tivities aimed against the Hun-
garian people's democracy."

Pictures from *Figyelo* (Budapest), September 24, 1949;
text in left column from *Laszlo Rajk and his Accom-
plishes before the People's Court*, Budapest, 1949.

"**R**AJK: Mr. President, Honored People's Court! In the course of the investigation and on the occasion of my testimony before the People's Court I told everything and admitted everything, both in detail and in substance. . . . I feel it necessary, however, to make a few additional remarks. . . . In the first place, before the People's Court passes its verdict, to avoid and eliminate any misunderstanding, I must point out that everything I ever did and committed I committed always on my own decision, after free deliberation. . . . In this connection, however, it is undoubtedly true that to a certain extent I became an instrument of Tito, or rather of Tito's policy—of the same Tito who followed in Hitler's wake and followed Hitler's policy in the Balkans and in Eastern Europe, and who was backed by the American imperialists, his ruling masters.

"In conclusion, I fully agree with most of the statements of the Prosecutor; of course, I am not here thinking of the secondary and in any case unimportant details, but of the substance. Now, precisely because of this, I declare in advance that whatever the sentence of the People's Court may be in my case, I shall consider this sentence just."

"**A**FTER unmasking Beria, that imperialist agent, and Gabor Peter's gang, the Rajk trial has been re-examined on the initiative of our Party leadership. It was found that the Rajk trial was based on provocation. Accordingly, on the basis of the resolution adopted by our Central Committee in June 1955, the Supreme Court has rehabilitated Comrade Laszlo Rajk and also other comrades. Other cases were also re-examined. The innocent, who had been sentenced [to death], were rehabilitated, and the others benefited from an amnesty."

First Party Secretary Matyas Rakosi, Radio Budapest, March 29, 1956.

"**T**HAT TRIAL, as Comrade Tito said at the time, was an event so monstrous as to be very rare in history, and perhaps unique. There have been similar proceedings, there have been similar methods and forgeries, but never anything so immoral and stupid as this. . . . [Now] Stalin's regime and his methods have been pilloried, and as a result of the general movement and political development in Eastern Europe, above all in Moscow, today's rehabilitation has taken place."

Radio Belgrade, March 29, 1956

"war crimes and crimes directed against the people"; of "sedition once and continuously committed"; and "of once and continuously having been the leader of an organization aiming at the overthrow of the democratic state order." During the trial, the Prosecutor also charged the Rajk group with aiming "to make Hungary a colony of Tito, who together with his band deserted from the camp of Socialism, deserted into the camp of foreign capital and reaction:"

"Behind the plan of Rajk and his companions, too, there stood American imperialism which, in the German and Austrian zones of occupation has already assembled its bloodhounds, those Arrow-Cross fascist Horthyist ex-officers and ex-gendarmes who are calculating that, as in 1944, they can again wade knee-deep in the blood of the Hungarian working people and again—this time not in the interests of German fascism but of American imperialism—can sell Hungary and thus ruin and annihilate all the results of our Liberation and reconstruction." (*Laszlo Rajk and His Accomplices Before the People's Court* [Budapest] 1949.)

Rajk was sentenced to death and executed in October 1949 along with defendants Tibor Szonyi, a Party organizer, and Andras Szalai, the Party's youth leader. Two other defendants, Lt. General Gyorgy Palfy and Police Colonel Bela Korondy were sentenced to death by a military court. The other three defendants were given prison sentences: Lazar Brankov, a former Counsellor and later Charge d'Affaires at the Yugoslav Legation in Budapest, and Pal Justus, former member of the National Assembly and Vice-Chairman of the Hungarian radio, were given life imprisonment, while Milan Ognjenovich, a clerk in the Yugoslav Legation, was sentenced to nine years in prison. On March 29, 1956, Radio Belgrade reported that Brankov had been freed some time during the winter.

The Rajk trial was used as a basis for other trials which subsequently were held in the Satellite area. At both the Kostov trial in Bulgaria and the Slansky trial in Czechoslovakia there were similar references to a network of "Titoists spies" working in conjunction with US Intelligence.

Further Collectivization

According to comparative figures on 1955 and 1956 collectivization, it appears that this year the regime is increasing the number of new kolkhoz members at a faster rate than the number of kolkhozes. This could either mean that the regime is building larger collectives or that a large proportion of the new collective members are joining existing collective farms. Figures on collectivization increases in 1955 were: 615 new collectives, 86,500 new collective members and 201,150 additional hectares of collectivized land. The latest reports for 1956 stated that 49 new kolkhozes and six lower-type collectives were established in the first few months of the year (*Magyar Nemzet* [Budapest] March 25), that the collectivized land area increased by some 51,000 hectares, and that the number of new collective members increased by 30,817 (*Hungarian-language newspaper Uz Szó* [Bratislava], March 15). These

Gabor Peter



The former Hungarian police chief who has been made the scapegoat in the Rajk case.

increases are proportionate to 1955 increases and confirm recent Party statements about the further "Socialization" of agriculture in 1956.

External Amnesty Extended

On April 5, Radio Budapest announced an extension of the April 1955 amnesty for Hungarian citizens abroad who choose to return to Hungary. Originally scheduled to end on April 3 of this year, it has been extended to April 4, 1957.

The amnesty, part of the bloc-wide repatriation campaign, was also made more inclusive. It now applies to "crimes" committed after leaving the country; this refers to "those who were working in various emigre organizations, for the [Western] press, or held various posts within the hostile propaganda machinery." These persons now come under the amnesty "provided that they repent their deeds, give up their criminal activities and apply for permission to return."

Poland

The "Thaw"

The reappraisal of Polish reality grew sharper last month under the impact of decisions of the Soviet Twentieth Party Congress. In a series of conferences and press articles, the Party attempted to arouse individual initiative by severely condemning the dogmatism, centralism and "interference" which characterized its policy in the past.

Art

At a session of the Council of Art and Culture, March 24-25, speakers demanded an end to administrative censorship and lack of trust in artists. According to Radio Warsaw, March 24, the policy of publishing only those works which supported industrialization and collectiviza-

tion was particularly criticized. Minister of Culture Sokorski insisted that "every artist has the right to his own individual perception of reality" and spoke out in favor of the possible "existence of various creative groups, artistic clubs and periodicals representing different artistic trends." Sokorski also stressed that in the present period of transformation the artist "must be trusted to the end. . . . We must begin to think not in terms of Party directives as to what trend should be chosen by art, but in such a way that Party art becomes the true art of a given artist, an art in which his conscience, vision and ideology become one in perfect harmony."

Architecture

Similarly, the National Conference of Polish Architects, which opened in Warsaw on March 26, criticized the direction taken in architecture during the years 1949-55. The speakers condemned the practice of "dictating to architects," "undermining the nation's confidence in architects" and of "enforcing blind imitation of errors and mistaken trends in the Soviet Union." Radio Warsaw, March 28, announced that the "few positive results" in architecture had been due to the creative attitude of individual architects. "Those taking part in the conference demand, first of all, freedom of creative research."

Premier Cyrankiewicz delivered a long address to the Conference (*Trybuna Ludu*, March 28) in which he stated that the Party and Government had been partly responsible for the "sins and distortions" in architecture. He declared that no recipes could be issued for architecture and that "neither the Party nor the Government leadership want to or will lead Polish architecture by the hand, especially since the results were not encouraging when this happened before." He claimed that architects must realize their individual responsibilities and refuse to limit their horizons:

"The architect must realize that he influences all of Polish building, the whole of Polish economy. If he plans wastefully, if the builder tolerates waste, he automatically reduces our building. Our total waste, an incalculable waste, is expressed in the number of houses, apartments and rooms we have failed to build. In the future, the amount saved must be expressed in the number of houses, apartments and rooms built above the plan. . . .

"Let the new period be characterized by freedom of creation, let nobody be afraid of ferment, of bold and creative ferment. . . . Let everyone learn from the achievements of other architecture. Let the [architect] get to know and analyze French, Italian, British and American achievements. Both in the East and West great progress has been made in architecture. Let us learn from it without blindly imitating foreign examples . . . so that by transforming our own and foreign achievements we can create by this means, and this is probably the only means . . . a Polish Socialist architecture which will be our contribution to the cultural achievements of all mankind."

Cyrankiewicz and other speakers urged better technology in the building industry and declared that the policy of creating standard housing projects would be beneficial. The Premier claimed that these projects would still leave room for artistic values but that "individual projects"

would be given larger scope in public and monumental building.

Unions and the Living Standard

Present housing conditions were the subject of a "stormy discussion" of newspapermen with Deputy Premier Jedrychowski, Minister of Housing Piotrowski and Minister of Communal Economy Mijal. According to Radio Warsaw, March 23, the "criticisms were directed particularly at the fact that so many people live in old bunkers, mud huts, basements, attics and cellars, while so many official buildings and palaces are built. On the other hand, there are people with luxury flats. Intolerance and undemocratic methods are often responsible [for this state of affairs]."

"Stormy discussions" have also been held on the subject of trade unionism. Criticisms of the unions' neglect of the workers' welfare were first aired at the Seventh Plenum of the Central Trade Union Council in January. (See March, 1956, pp. 42-43). Many of these complaints were repeated in a March 28 broadcast by Edda Werfel, wife of the editor of *Trybuna Ludu*, who queried: "I would very much like to know what our trade unions are really doing." Mrs. Werfel claimed that she did not want to hear about "enlightenment of the masses," "Socialist struggle," or "production effort." "I would not deny these at all . . . but there are also other tasks for the trade unions."

Mrs. Werfel complained about "scandalous" violations of labor laws in State-owned factories and mines and accused the unions of implementing only those laws which penalize workers for infringements: "It must be stated,"



"We've done an excellent job. Now we can start on a new one . . ."
Swiat (Warsaw), November 13, 1955

she said, "that there is a dangerous distortion in the work of trade unions; they always protect the interests of production, but very seldom do they protect the daily interests of workers. . . . Therefore, if the workers ask: 'What do we get in return for our fees?' . . . this is a completely justified question." Mrs. Werfel concluded her talk in equally strong language: "In our view, the trade unions should make up their minds whether they are an unnecessary organization or whether they are needed by the working class. In the latter case, the Central Board of Trade Unions must thoroughly . . . change its habits and work methods."

The March 30 issue of the trade union organ *Głos Pracy* (Warsaw) attacked Mrs. Werfel for placing the responsibility solely on the trade unions. The newspaper tossed the blame into the Party's lap, and stated that Party organs had interfered in trade union activities and violated the April 1954 Central Committee resolution condemning the "ordering about" of trade unions and infringement of the trade unions' "internal democracy." This attack on the Party apparatus for censorship and control parallels the above admissions of Party interference in all aspects of Polish life—a policy which the regime is now attempting to soften. *Głos Pracy* stated:

"Comrade Werfel is dissatisfied that trade unions favor the interests of production instead of the interests of the workers. Why doesn't she make note of the fact that the general policy of trade unions is not decided in the quiet rooms of the Central Trade Union Council . . . but at Trade Union Congresses and plenary sessions of the Central Council where resolutions reflect the basic policy of the Party. . . . Doesn't Comrade Werfel know that . . . in the past when some trade union activists tried to improve working conditions . . . they were accused of hostile tendencies? . . . In 1955, at a Conference in Cracow, the Secretary of the Party Provincial Committee more or less said the following: 'The defense of worker rights? What is it all about? The best defense of worker rights is the fight for production.' Comrade Werfel knows this and similar facts quite well. . . . Only now, after the resolutions of the Seventh Plenum of the Trade Union Central Council, do we learn about Comrade Werfel's verdict on trade unions."

Wage Increases

The regime also recently took steps for an immediate improvement of the living standard. In a March 26 *Trybuna Ludu* article Central Committee Secretary Jerzy Morawski announced that instead of the original planned 25 percent increase in the real wages of workers and employees in the Five Year Plan, the government had decided on a 30 percent increase. Morawski also discussed plans to raise the minimum monthly wage to 500 *zloty*, to increase old age pensions, reorganize the wage system and "increase the proportion of basic wages to bonuses." At an April 6 Party Conference in Warsaw, First Party Secretary Ochab gave further details on wage and pension increases. Ochab said that the wage fund would be increased by some five billion *zloty* in 1956 and that wage increases would be given to farm workers employed in plant production, teachers, State administration workers, doctors, orderlies, pharmacists and certain other groups in the health service as well as trade employees.

Ochab also spoke about a regulation of wages for workers in the coal, motor, engineering, metallurgical, chemical, light, printing, timber, paper, agriculture, food, meat, dairy and forestry industries. Certain groups working in the power and building materials industries, in enterprises of the municipal economy and communications would also have their wages revised. "This year changes in the earnings of engineers and technicians of the building industry will be made with the aim of increasing basic earnings. The wage scale of engineering and technical personnel in particular will include improving the pay of foremen." Ochab said that revisions would not take place all at once but would be staggered throughout the year. Although Ochab said that half of the present total of workers and employees will benefit from the new wage regulations, it is unlikely that the adjustments will be substantial. While the five billion *zloty* increase in the wage fund represents a five percent increase over 1955, the projected increase in the labor force amounts to four percent. Therefore a large part of the wage fund probably will be used as salaries for new workers.

In discussing pensions, Ochab said that as of July 1 the lowest old age pension would be 250 *zloty* monthly for those no longer working in trades or professions. Similarly, the minimum widow's pension will be raised to 180 *zloty* per month. "It should be borne in mind," Ochab said, "that at present the lowest old age pensions in these classes are 160 and 110 *zloty*."

While Ochab discussed steps to improve living standards, he pointed out that 1956 plans are modest: "In the light of estimates to date, we must realize that in the first year of the Five Year Plan we will not be able to earmark as many billion *zloty* for improving the living standard as are required by the urgent and often acute needs of workers and peasants. . . . The Party *activ* present here should know that in this respect our true possibilities for the years 1956-57 are modest and quite inadequate as compared with needs."

"Legality"

The "thaw" was also evident in other fields. Radio Warsaw, March 24, reported that the Cracow Provincial Court had sentenced "three chokers of criticism," including a former factory director, to prison for terms ranging from eight months to a year and a half. "The director was accused of misusing his position to stifle criticism of conditions in the factory."

On March 26, Radio Warsaw discussed the case of six students who were tried for "gangsterism," and questioned the present education of Polish youth. "Young people are starved for good times and entertainment and are bored and do not know how to make life more pleasant."

And on April 4, Radio Warsaw discussed the present lack of esteem for judges and the importance of guaranteeing the judge's independence: "The problem of increasing the authority of the judge, and therefore of our whole administration of justice, depends on full implementation [of the constitutional paragraph on his independence]. In our country not everyone is convinced that our judges are, in fact, independent. On the contrary, there is no lack of

examples which show that judges have placed themselves, or have been placed, in a situation in which they are only administrative officials carrying out somebody else's decisions."

Personnel Changes

The Sixth Plenum of the Party's Central Committee, March 20, appointed Edward Ochab First Party Secretary in place of the late Boleslaw Bierut, who died on March 12. The Plenum also promoted Jerzy Albrecht and Edward Gierek to the rank of Central Committee Secretaries, so that the number of Secretaries now totals six. The others are Jerzy Morawski, Franciszek Mazur and Wladyslaw Matwin. Only Ochab and Mazur are Politburo members as well.

Other personnel changes took place later in the month. On March 23, Radio Warsaw announced that Vice-Premier Jaroszewicz had been released from his post as Minister of Mining. He was replaced by Deputy Minister of Mining Franciszek Waniolka. Radio Warsaw also announced that Stanislaw Zawadzki, acting Minister of Labor and Social Welfare had been confirmed in that position. On March 30, Edmund Pszczolkowski was released from his post as Minister of Agriculture and appointed the new Chairman of the Committee for Public Security, which was established in November 1954 after the reorganization of the Security Police. Wladyslaw Dworakowski, the former Chairman, was assigned to work in the Central Committee, and Antoni Kuligowski, formerly Deputy Minister of State Farms, was made the new Minister of Agriculture.

Jerzy Albrecht, born in Lodz in 1914, was active in the Communist underground during the German occupation and in 1942 became Secretary of the Warsaw Committee of the newly-formed Polish Workers' (Communist) Party. In August 1942, he was arrested by the Gestapo and sent to various German concentration camps. When he returned to Poland after the war, he became chief Party organizer in the Warsaw District and eventually was appointed head of the Propaganda, Culture and Education section of the Party's Central Committee. He is also a member of parliament and Chairman of the Warsaw City National Council.

Gierek, the son of a coal miner, was active in the Communist Parties in France and Belgium between 1931 and 1946. By May 1949, he had established himself in Poland as Deputy Director of the Organization Section of the Katowice Provincial Party Committee. In 1951-1954, he was Secretary of the Katowice Provincial Committee and in 1952 was elected to the Sejm. In 1954, he was promoted to full membership in the Party's Central Committee, and in July of that year he was mentioned as Director of the Central Committee's Heavy Industry Section.

Further Collectivization

As compared with an increase of 251 collectives in 1955, 330 new kolkhozes were established in the first few months of 1956. Radio Warsaw, April 2, also announced an in-



"Are you finally writing some new song lyrics?"

"No, a poem satirizing the lack of song lyrics."

Szpilki (Warsaw), January 22, 1956

crease of 14,000 in the collective membership. This means that the nation now has a total of 10,293 collectives with about 214,000 members. It is clear from these figures that in Poland, as elsewhere, the regime has recently stepped-up its campaign to "Socialize" the countryside.

Czechoslovakia

Slansky

It is apparent that there is to be no basic revision of the Slansky trial, the great Czechoslovak anti-Titoist *cause celebre*, despite the current reversal of similar trials in Hungary (Rajk) and Bulgaria (Kostov). Recent regime statements seem to indicate that although certain accusations made against Slansky and his thirteen co-defendants are to be withdrawn, the regime is determined to stick by the basic charges that these men had conspired to seize power as "imperialist agents."

In a statement on April 13, Premier Viliam Siroky stated that the anti-Titoist elements in the accusations had been an error. He also stated that "certain manifestations of anti-Semitism" which had appeared in the trial (eleven of the defendants, including Slansky, were Jews) were mistakenly introduced into the trial. He reaffirmed the anti-Zionist charges made.

The Slansky trial opened on November 20, 1952. In the dock were the following: Rudolf Slansky, former Secre-

tary-General of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party; Vladimir Clementis, former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Bedrich Geminder, former Chief of the International Section of the Central Committee Secretariat; Ludvik Frejka, former Chief of the National Economic Section of the Office of the President of the Republic; Josef Frank, former Deputy Secretary General of the Central Committee; Bedrich Reicin, former Deputy Minister of National Defense; Karel Svab, former Deputy Minister of National Security; Rudolf Margolius, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade; Otto Fischel, former Deputy Minister of Finance; Otto Sling, former Secretary of the Brno Regional Committee; Artur London, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; Vavro Hajdu, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; Evzen Loebl, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade.

With the exception of the last three, all these men were executed. All the defendants had confessed to having been "Trotskyite-Titoist-Zionist . . . bourgeois nationalist traitors and enemies of the Czechoslovak people, of the people's democratic order and of Socialism . . ." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], November 20, 1952). Slansky admitted to having become an "agent of the American Intelligence" in the early Thirties. The defendants chorused their confessions of attempting to wreck the Czechoslovak economy, to deliver the country into the hands of the "Anglo-American imperialists," and of having spied for Tito. They explicitly linked their activities to the other victims of purges in the area: Gomulka in Poland, Kostov in Bulgaria, Rajk in Hungary.

The regime apparently intends to ride out the contradiction of maintaining the guilt of Slansky and the other dead men while Rajk and Kostov are declared innocent, Gomulka is admitted to have been wrongly arrested. It has compounded the contradiction by announcing the release from prison of defendant London, the imminent release of defendant Hajdu, the probable release of defendant Loebl. It has indeed blandly and with straight face called attention to the contradiction by using Slansky as a whipping-boy in the current campaign for "Socialist legality." *Rude Pravo*, April 12, in an article reflecting the Soviet Twentieth Congress' criticisms of Stalinism, stated:

"In our country, too, in connection with the incorrect understanding of some of the basic questions of the class struggle, the cult of the individual and other gross disruptions of the principles of intra-Party life, it came to the point that security was placed above the Party. . . . Therefore, a year and a half ago, the CC Politburo decided that a commission would be formed to investigate the court cases of the period when Slansky was Secretary-General of the Party. Through an intensive investigation it was found that at that time, in a large number of cases, the laws of our country were grossly violated by the security apparatus . . . Slansky even went so far as to request that the workers of the security organization learn from the experience of the capitalist police. On the basis of hearsay a number of people were incriminated, unjustly imprisoned and tried. Many of them were honest devoted members of the Party. . . . It has been shown that it was completely incorrect to have sentenced people on the mere

basis of their own confession obtained by illegal methods, without there being any material proof."

Price Cuts, Wage Revisions and Living Standard

Following a Party Central Committee meeting, March 29-30, the regime announced the reduction of retail prices of some 22,000 consumer goods. According to Radio Prague, March 30, this decision was made on "the basis of a rise in industrial production—mainly . . . a rise in work productivity and a reduction of production costs—and on the basis of the expansion of farm production last year." The savings for the population were estimated at 2.1 billion *koruny* annually.

As of April 1, the following percentage price reductions went into effect: flour, 10; rice, 33-43; pasta, 10; cheese, 5-12; fish (fresh and canned), 5-15; fats, 15-16; mutton, 20; chocolate, 20; milk, 21; milk products, 3; wine, 13-31; winter eggs, 12-25; coffee beans, 20; canned foods, 12; cotton fabrics, 15; linen fabrics, 10-18; woolen fabrics, 15; silk fabrics, 20; overcoats and work clothes, 6-20; girls dresses, 17; cotton hose, 10-15; blankets, 10; footwear, 10-17; leather and plastic goods, 10; soap, 10-40; washing machines, 10; refrigerators, 8-10; aluminum pots and pans, 15; record players, 12; sports equipment, 10-15; cameras, 25; and bicycles, 7-17.

The Party leadership also formulated a "gradual improvement of the wage system." According to Radio Prague, March 30, and confirmed in *Rude Pravo*, April 6, as of May 1, miners' bonuses will be increased and "adjustments made in the wages of transportation workers, particularly engineers, technicians and other specialists." Bonuses for skilled builders on important construction sites will also be revised. In July, new "progressive wage scales" will be introduced in the printing industry, and "adjustments" made in the pay of doctors, nurses and staffs of research institutes. Beginning September 1, the salaries of teachers in technical and general schools will be increased.

The Central Committee also announced lower internal air fares. As of April 1, the Czechoslovak airlines reduced rates about 29 percent and return fares were lowered by 10.5 percent.

In a speech to the Central Committee meeting, Minister of Internal Trade Frantisek Krajcir discussed the effects of the price cuts and recent improvements in the living standard (Radio Prague, March 31). The Minister claimed that since 1953 the prices of many consumer goods have been cut in half. He stated that when rationing was abolished in 1953 and a unified market introduced, a kg. of prime quality rice cost 28 *koruny*, coarse wheat flour, 6, and coffee beans, 300. Now their respective costs are allegedly 9, 4.4 and 170 *koruny*.

"The situation is similar with regard to prices of manufactured goods. In June 1953, one meter of cotton cloth cost 78 *koruny*; now it costs 45.5 *koruny*. Silon [nylon] stockings have fallen from 108 *koruny* to 34; a Flexareta camera from 1,580 to 830; a Perota washing machine from 1,630 to 1,030; a Pobeda watch from 960 to 646."

Krajcir's claims must be interpreted with some reservations, since prices immediately after the June 1953 currency

The Slansky Trial

"TODAY, November 20, 1952, at 0900 hours, court proceedings started before the Senate of the State Court in Prague against the leadership of the anti-State conspiracy center headed by Rudolf Slansky. . . . After the main proceedings had started, Dr. Jaroslav Novak, Chairman of the Senate, gave the floor to the chief prosecutor, Dr. Joseph Urvalek, who presented the indictment. The indictment accuses Rudolf Slansky and the other members of the leadership of the anti-State conspiracy center of the following: as Trotskyite Titoist-Zionist-Bourgeois-Nationalist traitors and enemies of the Czechoslovak people and of Socialism they established an anti-State conspiracy center in the service of American imperialists and under the management of enemy Western espionage services.

"These criminals undermined the people's democratic institutions, spoiled the building of Socialism, damaged the national economy, carried out espionage activity and weakened the unity of the Czechoslovak people and the defense ability of the Republic to break it away from a solid alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union. By their activity, the accused wanted to liquidate the people's democratic order in Czechoslovakia, renew capitalism, and to lead our Republic back into the camp of imperialism. These traitors to the working class are accounting for their crimes. . . .

"PRESIDING JUDGE: Accused Slansky, step before the microphone. Are you guilty of the four described criminal acts?

"Slansky: Yes. . . . I fully admit my guilt and I want to describe truthfully and in detail everything I have done. . . .

"Slansky admitted to having himself maintained contacts with Mr. [Konni] Zilliacus, 'who in fact was a representative of the Anglo-American, but primarily American, ruling circles. . . . Zilliacus would travel about these countries, make contacts with right-wing elements in the Social Democratic parties and with hostile elements in the Communist Parties—such as he did with me in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, with Gomulka in Poland, with Tito's Fascist clique in Yugoslavia, with Kostov in Bulgaria, with Rajk in Hungary—and these hostile elements he then made into his agents.'

" . . . The prosecutor then asked Slansky to elaborate his admission that he had placed Zionists in important posts. Slansky explained that he did so 'because the Zionists were conducting hostile activity aimed at the liquidation of the popular democratic regime in Czechoslovakia.' . . .

" . . . Slansky said he had intended using Titoist methods in achieving his plans.

"Prosecutor: This means putting imperialist agents in the Government, honest Communists in jail and the country in servitude.

"Slansky: Yes."

Radio Prague, November 20, 1952



From left to right: Fierlinger (who recently stated that there would be no rehabilitation for those executed in the Slansky purge), Zaptocky, Gottwald (who died in 1953 and whose "cult" is now condemned), and Slansky.

Svet v Obrazech (Prague), May 6, 1950

Miracles of the Market

A Regime Explanation

How the recent much-heralded price reductions in Poland actually worked out in practice was the subject of an article by Bohdan Drozdowski published in Zycie Literackie (Cracow), March 25, 1956. The author's account of his projected purchase of a coat provides a capsule picture of economic realities in present-day Poland from the consumer's point of view.

THREE YEARS ago I decided to buy a coat made of the green material called 'Loden.' Such a coat then cost 300-plus *zloty* [the average industrial monthly wage is 800 *zloty*]. Then came the price reduction. The coats made from this material disappeared for some time from the shops and then they appeared again, priced at more than 500 *zloty*. Since at the same time my salary had been increased—not because of a wage increase but due to a promotion—and I still liked the coat, I sharpened my teeth to buy it. Then the second price cut came about and the coats disappeared again from the shop windows. Today I see the same coat, with the difference that it has leather buttons instead of the standard buttons, and it costs 735 *zloty*. When I sought an explanation for the miracles of our market, somebody pointed out to me that its oddness is the result of the law of supply and demand: it was necessary to increase the price [of the coat] because the demand grew out of proportion to the supply. I believe that the truth lies elsewhere.

"From my observation of other branches of the industry I came to the conclusion that the reduction of prices did not coincide with the interests of the factories. To reduce prices, if production does not increase, means to reduce the fulfillment of the financial plan. Because production can only be increased slowly, it is necessary to do something in the meantime in order not to lose the premiums. So buttons and slightly broader epaulettes are sewed on—at a cost of several *zloty*—and with a 'clear conscience' the prices are increased by several hundred *zloty*, because a 'new model' is put on the market. The same applies to shoes, underwear, to many manufactured articles, including cigarettes: the practice consists in withdrawing some models—always cheaper and never more expensive types—and putting on the market in their place new models—more expensive and never cheaper. The worker [in the manufacturing industry] loses twice: first he earns less than he would be able to, and secondly, he must buy the products of his own hands for higher prices."

reform reached an all-time high. By using non-rationed June prices instead of pre-June rationed prices, which were considerably lower, Krajcir makes Communist accomplishments seem much greater than they actually are.

Krajcir said that a number of commodities cost less now than they did in 1937 or under rationing. "A perambulator which cost 450 *koruny* in 1937 is now 300 *koruny*; a man's bicycle then cost 600 *koruny* and is now only 385." The Minister also pointed out that while "the wages and living conditions of workers are better today," the prices of some necessities, such as bread, beer and cigarettes have not risen above the prewar level. Furthermore, Krajcir said, the costs of electric power, gas, postal charges and rent "are substantially lower."

At the same time, Krajcir discussed shortcomings in both farm and industrial production. "It is impossible to ignore the fact," he said, "that we are still importing considerable quantities of food. For instance, in the past year, we imported 22 percent of the meat consumption, 45 percent of the poultry, and 35 percent of the butter. Moreover, we are importing considerable quantities of animal fodder." Krajcir also complained about failures in production of engineering products such as electric washing machines, and stated that an assortment of some 500 engineering products had to be imported last year. "Comparing the best foreign

products with our own consumer goods production, we see . . . that we have not kept pace with world developments."

Rapid Rise in Collectivization

According to *Prace* (Prague), April 6, 835 new collectives were formed between January 1 and March 30, and the collective membership was increased by more than 33,000. At the end of 1955, there were 7,016 collectives containing 335,027 kolkhoz members and comprising 25.4 percent of the total agricultural land. (*Rude Pravo*, February 9). This means that in the first quarter of 1956, the number of collectives increased by more than ten percent and the number of kolkhoz members also increased by some ten percent.

Romania

Rapid Rise in Collectivization

According to figures given by First Party Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej in his speech to a Central Committee meeting, March 23-25, the land included in the "Socialist" sector increased by slightly more than 16 percent in the first two months of the year. Dej stated that some 1,100 new collective farms and agricultural associations were established in

January and February and that more than 70,000 families had joined "Socialist" agriculture in this period. (Radio Bucharest, March 29).

At the end of 1955, the number of collectives and agricultural associations totalled 6,600 and included 390,000 families. (In addition, there were some 3,000 crop associations with 16,000 families.) On the basis of the statistics, the total of collectives and agricultural associations now amounts to 7,700 and membership has reached 460,000. Furthermore, the regime has indicated that it intends to maintain a rapid rate of collectivization. Radio Bucharest, March 9, warned, for example, that "The Party Congress criticized Party organs and organizations for often divorcing their tasks for developing agriculture from their tasks for Socializing agriculture. This mistake must not be repeated. Party organizations and the People's Councils must carry out intensive political-organizational work for the collectivization of agriculture as the only means of insuring a continued increase in farm production and the working peasantry's welfare."

1956 Budget

Party leaders discussed the 1956 budget at a plenary Central Committee session, March 23-25, and, after the opening of parliament on March 27, Finance Minister Manea Manescu submitted the draft for approval. In his report to the National Assembly, Manescu declared that the budget was based on directives of the Second Party Congress and provided "the financial means needed for development of all branches of the national economy on the basis of priority for the development of heavy industry." (*Scinteia* [Bucharest], March 28, 1956). The 1956 budget, as compared with the 1955 budget, is as follows (in billions of lei, figures rounded to a tenth).*

Petru Groza



Chairman of the Presidium of the Romanian Grand National Assembly.

Standard Regime Photo

"Dining-Room Scandal"



"Apologies, Vasil Vasilich, the new waitress didn't know that you are our inspector . . . she served you like everyone else."

Krokodil (Moscow), January 20, 1956

	1955 Planned	1955 Realized	1956 Planned
Revenues	44.4	44.2	45.4
"Socialist Sector"	—	39.9	40.3
Turnover Tax	—	24.1	17.3
Income from Profits	—	—	7.9
Income Taxes	3.3	—	3.9**
Unspecified	—	—	1.2
Expenditures	43.0	42.6	44.4
National Economy ...	24.3	25.5	26.1
Industry	12.1	—	15.0
Capital Investments	9.0	9.2	11.0
Agriculture and Forestry	4.3***	—	3.6
Defense	4.4	4.4	4.0
Education, Sports, Health, Culture and Social Welfare	6.9	6.0	7.7#
Administration	1.3	—	1.6
Local Budgets	6.0	—	6.5
Budget Surplus	1.4	1.6	1.0

Premier Chivu Stoica announced that 1956 capital investments would total 52 percent of the total volume of capital projects"; Manescu claimed that capital investments in heavy industry provided by the budget and the resources of enterprises will be 36.5 percent higher than in 1955. Aside from the 3.6 billion lei allocated for agriculture in the budget expenditures, an additional 581,700,000 lei will be provided by the resources of enterprises, thus bringing the total to 4.2 billion lei.

* Figures on the 1955 plan from *Scinteia* (Bucharest), June 1, 1955. Figures for the 1956 plan and 1955 results were taken from Manescu's report in *Scinteia*, March 28, 1956, and Premier Chivu Stoica's report in *Scinteia*, March 30,

** Of the 3.9, 1.7 billion are to come from agricultural taxes.

*** The 4.3 billion undoubtedly include investments from "the resources of enterprises" as well as from the budget.

Stoica stated that of the total amount allocated, the sums for cultural and social expenses total 2.1 billion lei; schools, science and culture, 3.0; health and sports, 2.0, family help, 0.4.

Down on the Farm

A Bulgarian refugee provided the following information on the economic situation of members of the collective farm established by the State in his native village. The peasant chose to flee the country with his family rather than face the prospect of growing indebtedness and impoverishment which appeared inevitable under the methods of the kolkhoz system. Although earnings of collective farm members were slightly raised after his escape in October 1955, it has been estimated that the farmer's income is still less than one-third that of the industrial worker in Bulgaria.

THE RAZDEL collective farm was set up in 1948. At that time only 40 of the village's 360 families joined the kolkhoz. In 1950, 15 families were deported from Razdel to northern Bulgaria because members of these families had escaped to Turkey and Greece. Village authorities announced at the same time that farmers refusing to join the collective farm would likewise be deported. This frightened the entire population into joining, and by 1951 there were no independent farmers left at Razdel.

"Those who had voluntarily joined the kolkhoz in 1948 had a few good years at the beginning. However, when the entire village joined, the situation changed; and for the past five years Razdel collective farm members were unable to secure the proper returns for the heavy work they had to do.

"In 1955, by October 1, my wife and I had accumulated 509 workdays to our credit. I figured we could get another 60 to 70 workdays by the end of the year. The collective farm was giving one workday [credit] per decare of land contributed to the farm, which meant that I was to get an extra 100 workdays [credit]. Thus, our total at the end of the year would have reached an estimated 680 workdays.

"In 1955 production at the Razdel collective farm was as follows: 480 metric tons of wheat, 180 of rye, 200 of barley, 160 of vetch, 140 of oats and 160 of maize. The farm occupies 14,000 hectares. Most of the land is used to produce these grains, while a few hectares are used to grow beets, cotton, tobacco and sunflower.

"In 1954 the crop was very poor and the collective farm had to borrow 100 tons of grain from the State. In 1955 the State was repaid in wheat. Out of the 480 tons of wheat grown on the farm in 1955, only 80 tons were left to the farm members. The other 400 were accounted for as follows: 100 tons to the State to cover the 1954 loan, 125 tons set aside as seed, State delivery quota [*nariad*] 75 tons, 80 tons as payment for services rendered by the MTS, 20 tons set aside for the fund of the aged and orphans.

"According to my estimates, the members of the Razdel kolkhoz would have accumulated a total of 190-200,000 workdays by the end of 1955. This figure is based on the 1953 and 1954 results. If this estimate is correct, farm members will receive 0.4 kilos of wheat and 0.68 kilos of rye per workday. In my case, my wife and I with a total of 680 workdays to our credit would have received roughly 735 kilos of mixed grain. This would have had to serve as basic foodstuffs for my wife, my two sons and myself for

an entire year. A rough calculation shows that each member of my family would have had 500 grams of grain per day. Calculating a loss of 20 percent in processing, each member of my family would have 400 grams of pure flour.

"On the farm, however, the members received bread prepared by the kolkhoz bakery. During the summer months adults received one kilo a day and children 800 grams. During the winter months adults received 800 grams and children 600 grams per day. An annual average will show that my family received 3.2 kilos of bread per day. According to the calculation given above, it will be seen that we were only entitled to 1.680 kilos of grain per day. In short, this means that our earnings in grain did not nearly cover our consumption in bread. Actually, with every passing year my debt to the farm administration increased. In 1954, I had borrowed over 200 kilos of wheat and in 1955, as shown above, my family consumed more wheat in the form of bread than we earned. My guess is that by the end of 1955 I owed more than 400 kilos of grain. Almost all members of the Razdel collective farm are in debt to the administration.

"Although I had 100 decares of land in the collective farm, I still had to pay an annual tax of 150 *leva* for the two decares of vineyard and the five sheep which I was allowed to keep. My income from the vineyard and my earnings at the collective farm were not sufficient to cover even our debts let alone any further needs. In 1954 I had to deliver [to the State] 170 kilos of grapes from my vineyard. I was left with roughly 200 liters of wine and 40 kilos of brandy. In 1955 the vine crop was very poor and I had to deliver only eight kilos as *nariad* but I was left with less than 50 liters of wine. I also owned 12 chickens and sold the eggs. With the income from my vineyard and poultry, I barely managed to cover my needs in salt, kerosene, soap and cigarettes. We never had any money to buy clothes. In 1948 I owned three good suits and two suits for everyday wear plus a number of work pants and shirts I used to wear in the fields. At the time of my escape I had only the suit I was wearing and one good suit. My wife had only one cotton dress and the dress in which she was married. My two sons had one pair of shoes between them. As the elder one had outgrown these shoes he had to go about barefoot because we could not buy him a new pair.

"I should stress the fact that our case was by no means the worst. Two of us were breadwinners and we had only two children to look after. In many families there was only one breadwinner and many more children."

Youth Sent to Rural Areas



"View of the yard of the CKD-Stalingrad factory in Vysocany shortly before the departure of the boys and girls to Podboransko. The march of our youth to aid our border areas has begun."

Svet v Obrazech (Prague), March 19, 1955

New Penal Code

Besides approving the draft budget, the Grand National Assembly approved draft bills for modification of the penal code, the family code, articles in the Constitution regarding administrative districts, and a 1952 law on the judiciary. It also considered a bill for ratification of decrees issued by the Assembly in intervals between sessions.

The new penal code, as outlined by Minister of Justice Gheorghe Diaconescu, appears to be an attempt to remove some of the more flagrant police abuses which have characterized "Socialist legality" until now. The code requires prosecuting organs to inform the defendant of the charges against him, to complete investigations within specified time limits, to document fully indictments against the defendant and to permit the accused to take part in his own defense. The regime claimed that the code thus aims at eliminating the practice of hauling a defendant into court when there is insufficient evidence against him, and of telling him what he is accused of only at the time of his trial. The code is also directed against indefinite postponement and extension of investigations.

According to Diaconescu (*Scinteia* [Bucharest], March 31), the code guarantees the "inviolability of domicile and secrecy of the correspondence of those who are objects of penal action," and establishes strict rules of temporary detention. "Detention exceeding 24 hours is not permitted

without the approval of the prosecutor and generally cannot exceed five days. Preventive arrests cannot be ordered or carried out without a warrant approved by the prosecutor. The draft [also] establishes definite provisions for all conditions and circumstances under which a person can be detained or arrested and provides equally strict procedure regarding approval of preventive arrest."

The draft law on the organization of the judiciary was aimed at improving the professional qualifications of judges and unifying the judicial system. "In order to ensure the best possible recruitment of judges, the draft law establishes a trial period of two years for future judges. Promotion to higher grades [requires] that the judge have a specified period of service in the function he is carrying out." The law also eliminates the people's tribunals for railroads, and the maritime and river tribunals. "The cases within the competence of these courts will be tried by ordinary courts." In addition, it establishes a unified system of military courts "to facilitate the struggle against those who violate military discipline or who harm the country's defense capacity."

The new penal law is similar to the code recently drafted in Poland and constitutes part of the present Communist campaign to convince the captive peoples that the days of Stalinist terrorism are over. It is significant, however, that the new code presumes that the defendant is guilty even before he is brought to trial: "These provisions of the draft

law are our regime's material guarantee . . . that only those guilty of an infringement will be the object of penal inves-

tigation and trial and that no innocent person will be placed in such a situation."

Statistical Relativity

The Polish regime has lately admitted that a good many of its own statistics are distorted and therefore either misleading or completely useless. In some instances this misrepresentation is not deliberate—at least as far as the Central Offices are concerned. It appears that the real villain is the system itself: with its perennial plans, its unrealistic goals and its drastic penalties for failure, this system induces lower functionaries to falsify reports even on the lowest echelons of administration. In its January 18, 1956 issue *Głos Szczeciński* ran a humorous item entitled "A Little Guide Book About the City of Szczecin." The following descriptions appear in it:

"Szczecin has a few thousand inhabitants too many"—according to the Housing Department of the City National Council.

"Szczecin's inhabitants are all honest and quiet citizens"—according to the Citizens' Militia.

The guide book also points out that the city's geographical position is highly relative: the 521 kilometers that separate it from the central administration have a tendency to shrink when Warsaw makes demands upon the city; conversely, they expand when it is Szczecin which requests help from the Central Offices.

Recent and Related

Communism and Peasantry, by Ram Swarup (*Prachi Prakashan*: \$5.00). Subtitled "Implications of Collectivist Agriculture for Asian Countries," this well-written essay by an Indian scholar evaluates Communist tactics and strategy in relation to the peasantry. The first portion of the book outlines the Communist doctrine of agrarian collectivization, emphasizing Marx's belief in the superiority of large-scale, centralized production. A cogent analysis of the ruthless techniques employed to force collectivization follows. Mr. Swarup comes to the heart of the matter when he discusses the future Communism offers Asia. He insists that the peasant would become merely the dupe of another form of colonialism. He combats the notion that Communism is simply a form of Socialism, defining it more accurately as an absolute commitment, a philosophy of total power politics and monolithic control of all aspects of life. Although the author is a staunch anti-Communist, his orientation is essentially Asian, not Western. He feels that conditions in India can not be improved by the importation and imposition of foreign standards, but only by working with indigenous resources within the existing order. Bibliography.

An Essay on the Impact of Marxism, by Joseph Macek (*University of Pittsburgh*: \$5.00). Professor Macek believes that it is the common or "vulgar" version of Marxism which exerts the dominant influence on the Communist movement. Therefore, he is not so much concerned with speculation on what Marx meant as with how Marx is understood and applied. After discussing Marxist theoretical doctrine, the author goes on to examine the understanding of this doctrine held by the Soviet common man. Such concepts as class war, surplus value, and the dictatorship of the proletariat are analyzed.

How Communists Negotiate, by Admiral C. Turner Joy (*MacMillan*: \$3.50). Throughout the eleven months that Admiral Joy served as senior member of the United Nations Armistice Commission to Korea, he had ample opportunity to observe the North Korean delegation. The bitter lessons of his encounters are contained in this account, which is both a perceptive analysis of Communist bargaining techniques and a day-

to-day chronicle of the truce talks. The author discusses the Communists' frequent use of the loaded agenda, the red herring and the road block. To illustrate these methods, verbatim extracts from the Armistice reports are quoted. Admiral Turner states that the Communists are impressed by nothing less than "naked massive power and the willingness to use that power when necessary." Furthermore, he warns that the Communists adhere to essentially the same strategy in all their negotiations. Thus, if the free world is to be successful in future meetings, it must recognize and counter Communism's Machiavellian tactics.

Communism and Christianity, by Martin D'Arcy S. J. (*Penguin*: \$65). Communism is regarded by some as a religion. If this is so, the author reasons, then it presents a serious challenge to Christianity. Both creeds claim to hold the solution to problems agitating man, both creeds demand a total commitment by the individual. Because Communism and Christianity do share certain mutual concerns, Father D'Arcy compares the answers offered by each creed to see where they vary and where they converge. He is frank in admitting Communism's appeals, and equally frank in exposing the inherent vacuity of those appeals. Christian principles are then discussed from the perspective of their social rather than religious merit. In the final analysis, D'Arcy agrees that Communism and Christianity profess a common concern for the welfare of humanity, but they are irrevocably opposed both in methods and ultimate ideals.

Behind the Bamboo Curtain, by Dr. A. M. Dunlap (*Public Affairs*: \$3.75). This book, based mainly on letters written from Shanghai, gives an interesting picture of the effect of Communist domination on Chinese life. The doctor describes the familiar pattern: how Communism first came to an unsettled China, how the "honeymoon" promises soon faded into threats and repression. He asserts that the present regime, contrary to popular belief, cannot succeed in imposing Communist principles upon a people whose attachment to tradition, the family and the land is so deep-rooted.

Military Policy and National Security, W. W. Kaufman, ed. (*Princeton*: \$5.00). This thoughtful collection of essays explores the vital question of how best to conduct our military affairs so as to insure our own security and maintain international peace. Each article treats in logical sequence one aspect of the overall problem. First, requirements to deter war are discussed. Next, should war ensue, ways of using atomic weapons without touching off a global holocaust are suggested. The possibilities of passive air defense and limited warfare follow. The authors take the position that traditional modes of military might are insufficient since the USSR can retaliate in kind. A secure military policy for the future must reinforce armed strength with far-sighted, flexible diplomacy and sound alliances.

Imperial Communism, by Anthony Bouscaren (*Public Affairs*: \$3.75). Professor Bouscaren states that the current Communist peace offensive, far from signifying abatement of Soviet imperialism, is actually a delaying device designed to give Stalin's heirs time to consolidate their position. The very essence of Communism, the author insists, was and continues to be the drive toward world domination. The author finds that the three main prongs of Soviet foreign policy are military power, diplomacy, and subversion. Diplomacy, however, is merely a temporary substitute when war is thought inexpedient. The greater portion of this study reveals how the USSR has used these tactics in every part of the globe. Bibliography and index.

The Right to Love, by Markoosha Fischer (*Harper & Brothers*: \$3.50). This is a sentimental, indeed maudlin story of a few young couples whose love affairs become entangled in political considerations. There is Volik, an unthinking Russian officer, who learns to think when his government forbids his romance with an East-German girl. Communist interference also thwarts the romance between Volik's sister Maya and an American lieutenant. The theme of this novel is quite clear: the liberty to love, like freedom of speech, is an inalienable right with which no truly democratic government can tamper.



THE FREE EUROPE COMMITTEE was founded in 1949 by a group of private American citizens who joined together for direct action aimed at the eventual liberation of the peoples of the Iron Curtain countries. With the help of endowments and public contributions to the Crusade for Freedom, the Committee has set up, among other activities, Radio Free Europe and Free Europe Press. The Committee's efforts are focused on the captive countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In these efforts the Committee counts among its active allies the democratic leaders—scholars, journalists, political and economic experts, and men of letters—who have escaped from the Communist enslavement of their native lands.

NEWS FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN
Free Europe Committee, Inc.
110 WEST 57TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.
Return Postage Guaranteed

Sec. 34.66, P. L. & R.

**U. S. POSTAGE
PAID**

New York, N. Y.
Permit No. 13933

*Form 3547 Requested
Forwarding postage guaranteed*

197 Printed in U.S.A.